Europe’s defense, semiconductor, and telecom networks now run largely on privately held technology that no single government fully controls. Ukraine’s battlefield reliance on Starlink made that vulnerability impossible to ignore.
Kyiv depends on SpaceX satellites for drone coordination, artillery targeting, and command systems. No European alternative exists. Meanwhile, Chinese components fill Ukrainian drone supply chains: lithium batteries, motor magnets, fiber-optic cables. These arrangements function through commercial contracts, not military command structures.
This dependency extends far beyond war zones. Roughly 80 percent of Europe’s critical digital products, services, and intellectual property come from foreign private suppliers. The European Union attempted to respond with its 2023 Chips Act, aiming to double semiconductor market share to 20 percent by 2030. That target remains distant. The European Court of Auditors concluded in December 2025 that EU digital policies lack the strength to get there.
Consider ASML, the Dutch company that alone produces extreme ultraviolet lithography machines essential for advanced chip manufacturing. That monopoly position has not delivered strategic autonomy. Washington uses export controls to dictate which markets ASML can serve. Beijing retaliates by restricting gallium, germanium, and rare-earth processing technologies. Europe sits in the crossfire.
Telecom reveals a different problem. By 2022, Chinese vendors supplied more than half the 5G radio access network equipment in eight EU member states. Huawei and ZTE undercut competitors on price, backed by state subsidies. Washington demanded bans. Beijing threatened retaliation. Brussels offered a voluntary 5G toolbox to coordinate security measures. Voluntary coordination failed to resolve diverging national incentives.
As a result, experts argue Europe must move beyond subsidies. Three mechanisms could shift the balance. Public funding should carry binding conditions: firms receiving EU support must prove their projects reduce dependency on single suppliers or countries. Procurement should function as demand-shaping leverage, with joint European purchasing guaranteeing long-term markets for alternative capabilities. And coordination on high-risk telecom vendors should become mandatory rather than optional.
The proposed European Tech Sovereignty Package and Savings and Investment Union offer potential building blocks. Yet adoption timelines stretch to 2027 or later. Meanwhile, existing budgets run out. The gap between Europe’s technological ambitions and its actual leverage over private infrastructure continues to widen.
