Defence supply chains across Europe now face a quiet but growing threat from foreign-made components. Russian parts sneak through third-country loopholes while Chinese electronics dominate critical systems, exposing a vulnerability that could undermine military readiness.
European officials once dismissed technological sovereignty as a fringe idea. That changed dramatically over the past decade. Major legislation and billions in EU funding now target civil and defence independence. Yet a closer examination of adversarial economies suggests current measures fall short.
The sanctions regime against Moscow prohibits trade in sensitive dual-use and defence technologies. But enforcement happens almost entirely at national level, leaving gaps Russian entities exploit. A hypothetical yet plausible scenario involves Russian components embedded in a legitimate non-EU supplier’s products, later offered to European armed forces. The problem often remains invisible: prohibited imports, circumvention, incomplete disclosures, or security-of-supply risks that never trigger formal sanctions findings.
Verification standards differ wildly between member states. Procurement authorities lean on supplier declarations and certificates that frequently cannot trace components through multi-tier international networks. Whistleblower reports to the European Commission may stall entirely, since Brussels lacks decision-making authority. National investigations can swallow information whole, with no obligation to report outcomes back to the Commission or affected parties. The same unresolved case can resurface in another member state.
Meanwhile, high-risk dependence on Chinese supply chains presents a different challenge. Some European nations apply strict restrictions. Others hesitate, fearing damage to broader trade relations. A reported upcoming “Diversification Act” would compel European companies to reduce non-EU supply reliance, but European industry has not waited. At EUROSATORY in Paris this June, THEON announced a joint venture with SAFRAN to build a pan-European supplier of electro-optical drone solutions.
The demand side must now match that commitment. A recent agreement letting Ukraine spend the first tranche of its EU loan on Chinese components sent a troubling signal. The European supply side stands ready. Procurement decisions must reflect that reality.
