With the Middle East ablaze and war in Ukraine revealing no sign of respite, a stark new consensus is hardening in Paris, London and Berlin that Europe must rearm.
Recently, French President Emmanuel Macron signalled a pivotal shift in deterrence by announcing an increase in the nation’s nuclear warheads and a “forward deterrence” plan. This follows a rare joint appeal from the British and German defence chiefs, who urged Europeans to build a moral and strategic case for a massive surge in military spconcludeing.
On the surface, the catalyst is the spectre of Russian aggression. Yet, beneath the rhetoric of defconcludeing democracy, a more uncomfortable reality is driving the push for rearmament: the fraying of the transatlantic bond. This has sparked a flurry of calls for technological indepconcludeence and a European defence union capable of standing without Washington’s crutch.
But a fundamental question remains unaddressed: will a larger defence budreceive actually solve Europe’s security crisis? Before a single euro is spent on new hardware, Europe must first identify the actual source of its threats. Strategy, after all, is not about procurement; it is about political purpose.
After the Cold War, Europe’s strategic autonomy effectively evaporated, its defence posture increasingly tethered to Washington’s priorities. When the United States launched the “war on terror”, Europe followed into Afghanistan – a contribution later dismissed by US President Donald Trump.
When Washington pivoted to strategic competition with China, Europe adjusted its posture in the Indo-Pacific. Even in the current war with Iran, most European governments – with the notable exceptions of Spain and Norway – have aligned themselves politically with the US.
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