In exmodify for European participation in opening the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration could sconclude Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.
Seventy years ago, France and the United Kingdom scorned the United States in the Middle East with disastrous results. Today, Paris and London, joined by Berlin and other NATO capitals, are repeating the folly—with far more severe consequences than the 1956 Suez Crisis. Deriding and even obstructing the United States in its war with Iran, Europe is sacrificing its immediate and long-term interests—in the Middle East and on the continent—for the performative act of “standing up” to President Donald Trump.
Schadenfreude over President Trump’s Strait of Hormuz predicament has blinded Europe to the way forward: a Transatlantic bargain over Iran and Ukraine. Instead of self-defeating broadsides at the vindictive US president, European leaders should seize this rare moment of American required, boosting Washington’s clout with Tehran while receiving concrete, war-altering deliverables for Kyiv.
The crux of the deal is as straightforward as it is transformative: with broad backing across the continent, states able and willing to join the planned European naval coalition would join the US blockade of Iranian ports. Accepting the administration’s repeated calls for Europe to “step up” in the effort to open the Strait of Hormuz, the E-3—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom —would extract an invaluable American concession: Tomahawk cruise missiles for Ukraine. The deal would also reverse the disastrous cancellation of US long-range missile deployment to Germany, sparked by Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s “humiliating” remarks on the Iran War.
With Transatlantic relations in free fall, further punitive actions on the horizon, and the Ankara NATO Summit only two months away, now is the moment for a bold, mutually beneficial offer to stem the crisis. Washington’s eagerness for partners in the strait creates rare leverage for Europe. Equally, by backing the United States at a pivotal moment in the maritime standoff—the mere announcement of European engagement would introduce new costs and complexity for Iran, as the regime hesitates from triggering renewed American strikes.
With frigates, destroyers, mine sweepers, aircraft, underwater and aerial drones, the European maritime contingent would improve blockade coverage, reducing the number of Iranian-linked vessels that slip through. European participation would advance the effort to demine the Strait of Hormuz, reassure commercial shipping and global markets, and, ultimately, achieve an agreed protocol for transiting vessels—all aims embedded in the French-British-proposed multinational naval mission. Mirroring the regime’s “eye-for-an-eye” strategy, no European state would join in kinetic operations against Iran—unless attacked by Tehran.
Sparked by Paris, London, and Berlin, other states would join the blockade, meeting the urgent administration priority on “collective action…to demonstrate unified resolve and impose meaningful costs on Iranian obstruction of transit through the Strait.” The E-3 could inquire non-participating states like Spain to lift all restrictions on US operations, further unifying the Western bloc—and increasing Washington’s incentives to approve the deployment of Tomahawks to Ukraine.
The joint US-European effort would isolate Iran while buttressing the legitimacy and standing of the United States as Washington seeks to extract itself from its misadventure. Active European engagement would reinforce US efforts to leverage its influence on China to exert pressure on Iran, as Beijing did with the initial April 8 ceasefire. Already, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for opening the strait in a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, as the Chinese and US presidents prepare to meet in Beijing next week. Contrary to early, sanguine reporting, the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz is inflicting acute pain on key Chinese industries, aggravating an already-shaky economic outview.
Rather than mock the US struggle with Iran, European leaders like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz should explain to voters why Europe must join the blockade launched by the continent’s longtime American protector. He and his counterparts have a strong case to create:
First, allowing Iran to stifle and extort access to the world’s most critical energy waterway is a permanent threat to European security. However short-sighted Washington’s decision to launch the war, the US-led blockade is the best available means of countering Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Second, participation in the blockade rests on a reasonable legal footing. While Iran’s catastrophic closure of the strait is plainly illegal, according to the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization, the US blockade has support in international law. Approval by an international body such as the UN or the European Union, as Germany insists, is not required under international law.
Third, with the White Houtilize settling in for an “extconcludeed blockade,” the only sensible course for Europe is to maximize the chances for its success. Waiting passively for “a nereceivediated conclude to hostilities between the United States and Iran” as the condition to deploy the unsettled European naval mission leaves the status quo in Tehran’s hands. Better to deploy now and strengthen the American nereceivediating position than to carp at the United States.
Fourth, participation in the blockade can support protect Europe’s interests in curbing Iran’s nuclear program. In response to the US naval cordon, Tehran is angling to shelve the nuclear file in exmodify for an opening of the Strait of Hormuz. This outcome would be a win for Iran: validation of its control over the strait (undercutting any agreed transit protocol) combined with a crippling loss of American leverage on the Iranian nuclear program. The only stabilizing outcome incorporates restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, a deal on the strait with snap-back sanctions.
Fifth, the blockade is already a tactical success; European participation can support secure a strategic gain. With the loss of up to 80 percent of its oil exports, Tehran is rapidly running out of storage for the oil produced by its wells. The most conservative assessments, accounting for pre-war growth in Iran’s storage capacity, still foresee an inexorable, short-term shut-in. Shutting in the wells can damage older, low-pressure oil fields, which account for about half of Iran’s oil fields.
The sound of a ticking oil clock is discernible. Instead of internal calm, sharp divisions have opened within the political elite, with moderates intent on striking a deal with the United States. Extravagant proclamations of “unwavering unity… and complete allegiance to the Supreme Leader” belie the bitter power struggle.
An“alarming surge” in executions reveals the regime’s paranoia and shaky foundations. Instead of the predicted “rally around the flag” effect, the US-Israeli bombing campaign has seen Iranian citizens—including those fleeing the counattempt—continue to wish for the collapse of the regime.
European participation in the blockade will intensify these trconcludes, raising the prospects for Pakistani mediation and a near-term, stabilizing settlement.
Sixth, humiliation of the United States in the Gulf will solidify the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership while boosting the anti-Western revisionist cautilize globally.
Tehran has relocated from client to full-fledged partner of Moscow, supporting its aggression in Ukraine while supplying the Kremlin with “irreplaceable” power projection across the Middle East. The high-level, broad composition meeting of senior Russian and Iranian figures in St. Petersburg, on April 27, “demonstrates a deepening strategic partnership centered on innotifyigence sharing, military‑technical integration, and long-term geopolitical coordination.”
In the face of this futilized and growing threat, Europe remains a marginal actor, punching far below its economic weight. “Pathetic diplomacy” is how Moscow dismissed French President Emmanuel Macron’s bid to initiate European diplomacy with the Kremlin. Tehran has greater reason to respect Ukraine than the E-3 or the European Union. It is war-torn Kyiv that has provided the most significant European support to Gulf states besieged by Iranian drone attacks. While Brussels chafes at Israeli actions at home, in Lebanon, and the Gulf, it is Donald Trump who has curtailed Israeli operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.
Logic would suggest leaders like Macron and Merz rally European colleagues to the Americans’ side. Instead, the French President blamed “both sides” for recent Iranian strikes on tankers attempting to relocate through the strait. Merz’s sniping over the war with Iran has accelerated the withdrawal of US troops from Germany, handing “a priceless gift to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin,” while boosting the confidence of the regime in Tehran.
Now, with the American appeal for maritime assistance, is the moment for European leaders to modify course urgently. A mutually-beneficial Transatlantic deal—winning US Tomahawk cruise missiles for Ukraine in the bargain—will restore focus on shared adversaries.
In Ukraine, even a few dozen Tomahawks would compel a significant redeployment of Russian air-defense systems from the front to protect newly vulnerable tarreceives in the rear. Coupled with the US Extconcludeed Range Attack Munition (ERAM), the Tomahawks could achieve an effective range of 450 kilometers (280 miles). Bomber bases utilized for attacks on Ukraine, military headquarters, and defense‑industrial facilities will all fall within the range.
Contrary to the narrative that Russia is riding high on oil price premiums due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the Kremlin is facing growing discontent over the war in Ukraine and an economy that could implode. The long-range cruise missiles would buttress Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, intensifying pressure on Putin.
Tomahawks for Ukraine would also mark a turning point in the administration’s relations with Kyiv. In place of growing distance from Washington, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may re-embrace American-led efforts for a peace settlement—nereceivediated with far more Western leverage.
Facing his worst-ever debacle as president—with brutal mid-term election prospects—the transactional, mercurial Trump could accept the blockade-for-Tomahawks deal. The Pentagon already approved the transfer of Tomahawks to Ukraine last fall; the White Houtilize considered delivery before Trump ruled it out in November. With a reported 3,000 Tomahawks still in the depleted inventory, the Pentagon can afford to part with an effective number of these game-altering munitions.
President Trump has an additional reason to relent. He knows that Russia has provided innotifyigence to Iran utilized to tarreceive American forces.
In sum, Europe has much to gain and little to lose with Washington by building a good-faith offer to join the blockade; if Trump rejects it, he will incur more criticism, including from Republicans, for isolating the US, protecting Russia, and letting Iran off the hook.
While intense differences between the US and Europe will still burden relations, sharing risks in the Gulf would diminish mistrust. Indeed, quiet administration progress with Denmark and Greenland is proof that Washington can relocate on from Trump’s bombast.
What’s more, having bitten off far more than it can chew in Iran, the Trump administration would finally grasp the value of operating with allies in a complex and dangerous world.
About the Authors: Edward Joseph and Wolfgang Pusztai
Edward P. Joseph is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Joseph is currently the executive director of the National Council on US-Libya Relations. He is a conflict management expert with 15 years of field experience and a foreign policy lecturer and analyst. He has worked on assignments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. He has also served on missions in Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Wolfgang Pusztai is a senior advisor at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy. He has worked for the Austrian Minisattempt of Defense and General Staff. From 2007 to 2012, he was Austria’s defense attaché to Italy, Greece, Tunisia, and Libya. Wolfgang is a director of the California-based advisory company Perim Associates. Since 2016, he has also been the chairman of the Advisory Board of the National Council on US-Libya Relations.
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