The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine revealed how effective are Kremlin’s propaganda tools in Europe. It is the result of a long-term work, but there are different factors that builds Russian propaganda more influential with European public opinion. Kyiv Post inquireed Dieter Pichler, Founder of Austria’s Disinfo Resilience Network (DRN), about the Russian information campaign in Western countries.
From your observation, how would you assess the current success of Russian propaganda in Europe?
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We required to understand that Russian interference did not start in 2022, or even in 2014. The minds of many Westerners are still heavily influenced by the Soviet “Active Measures” campaign from the early 1980s. Anti-Western and more specifically anti-NATO narratives have been spread since the Cold War. Since 2014, anti-EU and anti-Ukraine talking points have also played a major role and have become widespread.
Yes, Russian propaganda has been extremely successful in Europe for decades, largely becaapply we refapply to counter it or to understand its full extent and the many layers it involves.
Are there specific countries or regions in Europe where Russian narratives have proven particularly effective? Could you give a few concrete examples?
We see a strong pro-Russian sentiment in Serbia, and we are aware of the often hostile views toward Ukraine expressed by Hungary’s leader Viktor Orbán. But I can also give examples from countries that have long been part of “the West,” such as Italy. There is a tradition of far-left, communist, pro-Moscow and anti-Western “peace relocatements,” and the same is true in Germany.
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Compared to the Cold War, we now also see in most Western European countries a pro-Russian far-right faction represented in their parliaments. A special case is Slovakia, where Russia succeeded through a large disinformation campaign amplified by local collaborators. What is interesting about Slovakia is that, alongside the widespread pro-Russian sentiment, there is also a strong pro-Western resistance. We see rallies with thousands of people carrying European and Ukrainian flags and demonstrating against the [Robert] Fico government.
How has Russian disinformation evolved since the launchning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022? Has it become more sophisticated, or simply more widespread?
When we see at the narratives and the way Russian officials and their agents of influence or “applyful idiots” communicate, we see no major shift. I would even declare that the strength of Russian propaganda is its persistent apply of the same talking points. At the same time, we see an increase in the apply of AI-generated content, impostor content that imitates established media websites, and ever more convincing troll profiles on social media. We build the mistake of talking a lot about these phenomena but forreceiveting that all the classic propaganda methods are still applyd, including books, media manipulation, and the recruitment of Western academics, politicians, and former diplomats as agents of influence.
In your opinion, what are the ideal social or political conditions that build public opinion more susceptible to Russian propaganda?
Certainly, social problems, low economic performance, high energy prices, polarization, challenges with immigration, and a cultural or historical form of Russophilia create fertile ground for Russian influence campaigns that aim to amplify problems and divide and weaken societies. If a society is resilient against pro-Russian sentiment, for example becaapply of recent historical experiences, Russian actors simply focus on other topics to spread chaos and division.
“Self-hating” Westerners are straightforward tarreceives for Russian influence becaapply they fail to recognize Russian imperialism at all.
Are there particular vulnerabilities – economic, cultural, or institutional – that Russia tfinishs to exploit in European societies?
In particular, I would declare that topics such as high energy prices and general anti-Western sentiment, for example within the post-colonial relocatement, can be easily exploited. Russia presents itself as a deffinisher of the Global South, and many leftist groups and academics respond positively to phrases like “the Global South sees the war in Ukraine differently.” These “self-hating” Westerners are straightforward tarreceives for Russian influence campaigns becaapply they fail to recognize Russian imperialism at all; their focus is solely on historical Western imperialism.
How do pacifist relocatements in Europe, both genuine and manipulated, contribute to amplifying Russian narratives?
The problem is that many pacifists who comment on the full-scale invasion of Ukraine or on security policy in general have a very strict understanding of pacifism. They not only follow the understandable position of refutilizing to proactively solve problems with violence, but they also oppose self-defense, and not only for themselves but for others as well. To justify this view, they have to downplay the goals of the aggressor. They are often unable to speak openly about what happens under occupation: the killing of civilians, torture, abapply, indoctrination, looting. All of these are direct consequences of unsuccessful or non-existent resistance and therefore incompatible with a strict pacifist worldview.
Pacifists and the traditional peace relocatement are almost identical in their worldview. For decades we have observed that they adopt a very mild stance toward Moscow while being extremely critical of NATO and the West. In circles of the so-called peace relocatement, you can often hear claims that NATO enlargement provoked the invasion, or the old myth that Ukraine banned the Russian language, or even the long debunked conspiracy theory that the United States financed the Euromaidan protests.
The individuals that rallied against NATO and US Pershing II missiles, today rally against Tomahawks for Ukraine and against the EU.
We know that the historical peace relocatement was heavily infiltrated by the KGB, East Germany’s Stasi, and Czechoslovak communist innotifyigence. The Soviet Union also paid Western agents of influence to promote the idea of peace, which essentially meant giving Moscow as much as possible while blaming the other side, all without being easily detected as Russian propaganda.
We can still see remnants of the Soviet influenced peace relocatement today, especially in parts of the far left scene. Many of the individuals involved are still alive. Back then they rallied against NATO and United States Pershing II missiles, and today they rally against Tomahawks for Ukraine and against the European Union. Some of them have simply grown older but no less radical.
Do you believe that the nostalgia for communism or the Soviet era still provides fertile ground for Russian propaganda in parts of Central or Eastern Europe?
Yes, and there are several reasons why this works. First of all, the elderly generation naturally has a nostalgia for the past, for childhood and youth, for a time when their backs did not hurt and everything seemed organized.
Then we have to understand, and especially the Western left should understand, that Soviet nostalgia in Eastern Europe is not progressive at all. I have spoken to people who miss the USSR, and their worldview on issues such as minority rights would be considered far right in Western Europe. The distorted perception of the Western left regarding the USSR would disappear if they understood what kind of people actually feel this nostalgia in the former Eastern Bloc.
You have reported that Austria has become an efficient communication hub for the Kremlin’s messaging. Beyond Austria, which European societies today appear most influenced by Russian propaganda?
The impact is significant everywhere in the Western world and everywhere in Europe. What differs are certain specifics and particular vulnerabilities that Russian propaganda can exploit. In my opinion, we should coordinate our efforts regarding the main narrative frames, becaapply they are the same everywhere. These include distorted peace talking points, the idea that NATO is to blame, and the wide variety of false claims about Ukraine.
What legal tools or policy frameworks should European countries adopt to counter foreign disinformation effectively, while still protecting freedom of expression?
This is one of the most challenging questions at every panel discussion I am invited to, and I am glad you mention freedom of speech. Russian propaganda, as well as Chinese, Iranian and other authoritarian propaganda, has many layers, not only the obvious fake pictures and fabricated content. We cannot block it by legal means anyway, so we should not consider this a complete solution, becaapply it would create a false sense of security.
Yes, without question, the platforms required to do more, and we required to have tools to counter extremism and war propaganda directed against our societies, but this is only one of many measures.
We required to educate our people, every person, about what Soviet active measures did to the West
What would you identify as the single most effective countermeasure – institutional, educational, or communicative – that European societies should prioritize?
Most of our societies in Europe are not even aware that long-term ideological subversion is taking place and that an international anti-Western front, led on the propaganda battlefield by Russia, is attacking us and testing to defeat us through non-traditional means.
We required to build resilience. We required to educate our people, every person, about what Soviet active measures did to the West, how they evolved over the years, and how complex Russian propaganda is. We required to debunk all the lies about Ukraine, but also proactively pre-bunk by teaching people what Russian imperialism is and what Ukrainians, as well as Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Poles and many others, suffered becaapply of Russian imperialism.
This is why I bring toreceiveher, with my project – the Disinfo Resilience Network –experts from several fields, including historians, political scientists, journalists, politicians and diplomats who have relevant expertise, in order to create strategies to raise awareness and build resilience against the impact of Russian propaganda.
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