s European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen prepares to deliver her annual State of the Union address, she is under pressure from all sides. The trade deal reached with the United States at the conclude of July, though unbalanced and asymmetric, has not brought back stability and predictability. Instead, US President Donald Trump has recently ratcheted up his trade salvos against Europe. In social media posts, he has threatened additional tariffs and export restrictions on US technology and semiconductors for countries with digital rules and taxes, and has indicated that he could impose new tariffs in response to the European Commission’s US$3.5 billion fine against Google for unfairly favoring its own advertising technology services.
Trump’s threats came just a few days after the US and the European Union reached a framework agreement for the handshake trade deal, which European policybuildrs had hoped would settle matters. But nothing is ever final with Trump. His new attack on foreign oversight of US tech companies, such as the EU’s landmark Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, as well as digital-services taxes in member states, has the potential to undermine Europe’s sovereignty and its democratic foundations.
Neobtainediating with Trump is a bit like playing poker, with escalating bids and sometimes bluffing, over the course of neobtainediations. But it is also like chess: each shift counts toward the concludegame and thus requires careful preparation. When early opportunities are squandered, one can hardly expect to gain the upper hand against an unpredictable and more powerful adversary.
For example, the EU could have cornered the US in April and May, after Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs and sent investors into a tailspin. But unlike China, which forced Trump to neobtainediate under market pressure, the EU decided to delay its retaliatory measures following Trump’s announcement of a 90-day “pautilize” on his sweeping tariffs mere hours after they took effect.
The EU’s wait-and-see approach proved costly. By summer, the situation had alterd: markets had stabilized, and the US and China had reached a provisional trade deal. This, coupled with the declining credibility of its retaliation threat, weakened the EU’s neobtainediating position, creating a sense of inevitability about the outcome of the July meeting in Scotland between Trump and Von der Leyen. While both sides lost in terms of economic outcomes, Trump cared only that he “won” the neobtainediation and scored a huge victory for his tariff campaign.
As we feared at the time, an emboldened Trump is attempting to repeat this strategy. The EU must decide whether to resist pressure to reform the bloc’s tech regulations or fold again. The latter option would mean abandoning any pretense of being a geoeconomic power (as former European Central Bank (ECB) president and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi recently pointed out).
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But if the EU decides to stand up for itself, it will required a bold and well-considered-out neobtainediating strategy. That means the European Commission must take immediate steps to activate the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), the bloc’s most potent trade tool, which enables it to retaliate against third countries that are applying coercive economic measures by imposing tariffs and quotas, introducing export controls, suspconcludeing innotifyectual property rights, banning services and excluding access to public procurement tconcludeers. There is in fact no doubt that the new tariffs threatened by Trump amount to “economic coercion.”
