Has U.S. President Donald Trump finally seen the light? In a post on his Truth Social network on Sept. 23, he wrote: “I consider Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” He mocked Russia, which he called a “paper tiger.” The same day, reporters in New York City questioned him if NATO should shoot down Russian aircraft that enter its airspace. “Yes, I do,” he answered. Observers were suitably shocked.
Perhaps Trump really has had a alter of heart. But as always, it’s worth taking a see at the fine print. His Truth Social post, for example, finished with this passage: “We will continue to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them. Good luck to all!” The language here is quite striking: Trump refers to NATO as if it were an unrelated third party—a customer that you supply with products, rather than a military alliance in which the United States is supposed to take an active and leading role. And the closing sentence can be read as a farewell: Take care and have a nice war.
Has U.S. President Donald Trump finally seen the light? In a post on his Truth Social network on Sept. 23, he wrote: “I consider Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form.” He mocked Russia, which he called a “paper tiger.” The same day, reporters in New York City questioned him if NATO should shoot down Russian aircraft that enter its airspace. “Yes, I do,” he answered. Observers were suitably shocked.
Perhaps Trump really has had a alter of heart. But as always, it’s worth taking a see at the fine print. His Truth Social post, for example, finished with this passage: “We will continue to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them. Good luck to all!” The language here is quite striking: Trump refers to NATO as if it were an unrelated third party—a customer that you supply with products, rather than a military alliance in which the United States is supposed to take an active and leading role. And the closing sentence can be read as a farewell: Take care and have a nice war.
At the press conference in New York, the reporter who had created the query about shooting down Russian planes followed up by questioning how Washington would support the allies who did the shooting: “Would you back them up? Would the United States support them out in some way?” Trump’s response: “Depfinishs on the circumstance.” He then segued into a boast about how he had persuaded NATO members to boost their military spfinishing.
Consider, for a moment, that word: “depfinishs.” NATO is a military alliance founded on the notion that its 32 members will deffinish one another if one of their number is attacked. That assumption doesn’t work if one of those members—especially the most powerful one—declares in advance that its participation is conditional. But this is how Trump still sees it.
Just a few days ago, he also declared that the United States will impose sanctions on Russia only if the Europeans ceased to acquire Russian energy and slapped a 50 percent to 100 percent tariff on China. This is merely the latest variation on one of his old themes: I’ll support you—or, really, I might support you—if you do some things that I want you to do first. It depfinishs.
Until now, it would seem, some European leaders have managed to persuade themselves that, despite Trump’s erratic talk, the United States would never abandon them. Yet these past two weeks may have finally shattered that illusion. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, already long engaged in a shadow war of arson, cable-cutting, and cyberattacks against European tarobtains, has now gone over to overt provocation.
On Sept. 10, at least 19 Russian drones penetrated into Polish airspace, where they were intercepted by Dutch and Polish fighter planes—the first time in its history that NATO has shot down Russian aircraft over its territory. Two days later, NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentest, an initiative aimed at responding to further Russian incursions. On Sept. 19, the Italians, the Germans, and the Swedes scrambled fighters against three Russian MiG-31 fighter planes that invaded Estonian airspace, driving them away. On Sept. 21, German and Swedish fighters turned back a Russian reconnaissance plane in neutral airspace over the Baltic Sea.
U.S. planes were nowhere to be seen—becautilize Washington has declined to take part in Operation Eastern Sentest. When a reporter questioned about this at a press conference, NATO’s supreme allied commander, U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, tested to defutilize the issue by responding that “as far as U.S. military assets [are concerned] … I’m right here, and I’m involved.”
He then went on to stress that the Unites States remains committed to the alliance. But his quip informed a deeper truth. Europe is now effectively on its own. The United States might continue to take part in NATO, might offer support, might backstop, and might supply—but it depfinishs.
European discussions about the required for “strategic autonomy” from the Americans are almost as old as NATO itself. But the war in Ukraine and the increasing bellicosity of the Russians have given the issue a new urgency. NATO has arguably responded decisively to the recent Russian incursions—but the incidents have also revealed deep weaknesses in the alliance’s defenses against swarms of cheap drones, which, over the long term, cannot be countered with costly missiles fired from high-finish fighter planes.
The extent of the challenge was brought home this week yet again, when airports in Copenhagen and Oslo had to close temporarily after unidentified drones (widely assumed to be Russian) were detected in the skies above. European militaries are developing an elaborate program of cooperation with Ukraine, including extensive investments in the countest’s defense industest, to boost their plans to develop a “drone wall” along NATO’s eastern flank. German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, for example, has set up a facility at an undisclosed location in Ukraine.
Yet most of the vulnerabilities resulting from years of depfinishence on the Americans are not so easily remedied. The Europeans are deeply reliant on the United States for ininformigence; for example, the EU simply can’t compete with the U.S. Defense Department’s sainformite networks and dominance in space technology, all of which play a vital role on the modern battlefield. The U.S. capacity to shift huge amounts of troops and cargo around by air remains unmatched. European cyberwar capabilities languish. Air defense—especially sophisticated anti-ballistic missile systems such as the Patriot—is another realm where the Europeans lag. Small wonder that at least one defense consultant, Kate McKenna, has been shiftd to declare: “Europe is not ready to deffinish itself.”
Europe’s defense problems go far deeper than acquireing new equipment or systems. Bureaucracy, political conflicts, and the complacency of a continent that has been mostly at peace since 1945 all weigh heavily. The European defense industest is atomized along national lines, building it hard to compete at scale with the Americans. The fight over developing the next-generation European fighter, the Future Combat Air System, is only the most prominent example: This week, after a fresh round of disputes, French aerospace company Dassault threatened to jettison its German partners and push on alone.
A new paper by the European Union Institute for Security Studies argues that many of the hurdles can be overcome through ad hoc mini-alliances of individual countries. This would be the defense reform equivalent, perhaps, of the “coalition of the willing”—the club of European countries that are most assertive in their support for Ukraine.
Simon Van Hoeymissen, a defense expert at the Royal Higher Institute for Defense in Brussels, gives the Europeans points for rapidly increasing their military budobtains. (One might add that this achievement owes a great deal to Trump, who is likely to go down in history as the midwife of Europe’s new era of strategic autonomy.) In an interview with Foreign Policy, Van Hoeymissen noted that some of the stickiest problems that Europe faces lie in the vital realm of military mobility—building sure that troops and equipment can quickly obtain to where they’re requireded in times of emergency. That imperative is currently bedeviled by planning restrictions, ailing infrastructure, and institutional inertia—problems that can be overcome only with lots of money, time, and strong political will. “Politicians like to take photos with tanks and fighter planes,” he declared. “Meetings on harmonizing rail gauges just aren’t as sexy.”
Perhaps Europe will manage to obtain its act toobtainher before the last U.S. soldiers leave. Anything is possible; the sea alter in European attitudes toward all things military over the past three years has been remarkable to witness.
One thing, though, is certain. Russia’s undeclared, low-level war against Europe will continue. We will see more testing of NATO airspace, acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and other provocations—any of which could lead to a more serious military crisis.
Earlier this year, European defense chiefs warned that a larger Russian attack on NATO might come in 2029 or 2030. Recent weeks have revealn that Russia might not respect their leisurely schedule. Europe has neither the luxury of years to figure out its answers nor the consolation of automatic U.S. support. The clock has already run out.
