In a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, there is an increased urgency to establish reliable and sustainable connectivity. Supply chain disruptions triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and rising geopolitical tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea have exposed key vulnerabilities in global trade routes and digital networks. At the same time, Southeast Asia’s booming digital economy, projected to exceed USD 300 billion by 2025, is driving unprecedented demand for infrastructure investment, from transport corridors to undersea cables and data governance frameworks.
This urgency is further driven by the accelerating impacts of climate modify, which disproportionately affect Southeast Asian nations. Connectivity that supports resilient, green infrastructure is critical for sustainable development and climate adaptation. The EU’s Global Gateway, Taiwan’s expanding role in regional supply chains and clean technology, and ASEAN’s Master Plan on Connectivity 2025 reflect converging priorities that create an opportunity for strategic coordinated action.
Amidst these developments and intensifying competition in a multipolar world, a critical opportunity has emerged to foster trilateral connectivity dialogue between the EU, Taiwan, and ASEAN. This trilateral cooperation is particularly timely given recent geopolitical shifts. Taiwan has significantly deepened its economic and people-to-people engagement with Southeast Asia through its New Southbound Policy (NSP), which aligns closely with ASEAN’s connectivity and sustainability goals.
Toobtainher, the EU, Taiwan, and ASEAN can redefine connectivity not as a geopolitical tool for influence, but as a platform for empowerment, resilience, and strategic autonomy in the Global South.
Simultaneously, the EU is preparing to update its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2025, signalling a renewed commitment to strategic partnerships and infrastructure investment across the region. As ASEAN countries reassess their depconcludeencies on China, evolving perceptions — driven by concerns over economic overreach and sovereignty — are opening space for alternative, rules- and principles-based cooperation models.
More broadly, the race for influence in the Global South has intensified, while developing countries have improved their ability to exercise agency. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has expanded its reach in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, offering rapid financing where Western actors often fall short.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency risks widening transatlantic alignment, offering China an opening to boost its leadership in the Global South. However, growing disillusionment with the BRI, due to concerns over debt sustainability, corruption, and lack of transparency, has prompted many Global South countries to seek more trustworthy alternatives. Against this backdrop, the EU, Taiwan and ASEAN are uniquely positioned to offer a compelling, partnership-based trilateral alternative.
Multipolarity and ASEAN’s strategic role
As multipolarity deepens, Southeast Asia has emerged as both a theatre and an actor in the global contest for influence. With a combined economy projected to become the fourth largest globally by 2030 and a combined population of over 670 million, ASEAN is an indispensable partner in shaping regional and global governance. In the spirit of ASEAN centrality, ASEAN countries have long sought to define the regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific. Yet, internal divergences continue to weaken coordination and a joint stance on regional security.
Given internal fragmentation, the region has adopted a hedging strategy: balancing relationships with China, Japan, the US, the EU, and other actors to avoid over depconcludeence and preserve strategic autonomy. However, increased tensions in the South China Sea, Beijing’s coercive economic practices, and concerns about US reliability — especially during the Trump era — have placed new pressures on this balancing act.
At the same time, ASEAN states have become more assertive about their development necessarys and strategic preferences. They are neither passive recipients of aid nor do they want to be treated as such, but rather as active drivers of connectivity. Countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have emphasised infrastructure, human capital, and digital innovation as central pillars of their development strategies. Importantly, these countries also aim to take a more active role in shaping the structure and on-the-ground implementation of their connectivity partnerships.
The importance of ASEAN for Taiwan and the EU
Taiwan is the eighth largest economy in Asia and the 21st largest globally, playing a central role in the global electronics ecosystem. With only 12 official diplomatic allies (as of 2025) and facing increasing pressure from Beijing, Taiwan has turned to pragmatic diplomacy to assert its global presence. Cooperation with Southeast Asia is central to this effort.
Through the NSP, Taiwan has significantly increased trade, investment, academic partnerships, and public health cooperation with ASEAN states. For instance, trade between Taiwan and NSP partner countries exceeded USD 130 billion in 2022, and the number of Southeast Asian students studying in Taiwan has increased over recent years. ASEAN is now Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner, surpassing the US and narrowing the gap with China.
Still, China remains Taiwan’s largest trading partner, with Taiwanese exports highly focapplyd on the Chinese market, despite a fall in trade since the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan has sought to reduce its economic interdepconcludeence with China, especially in critical sectors such as semiconductors. Taiwan’s dominance in chip manufacturing creates it both a global asset and a potential flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific. It sits at the heart of the race for technological supremacy amid US-China competition and has become a crucial trading partner for global economies pursuing digitisation.
China has retained its position as ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, supported by trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). ASEAN has benefitted from trade and investment from both the US and China and is deeply integrated into Chinese supply chains. Simultaneously, Beijing has pursued its ambition to “build a community of shared future” with ASEAN partners, as demonstrated by bilateral statements signed with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia. This strategy has raised questions about Beijing’s intentions towards these countries and their ability to effectively hedge against risks.
For Taipei, developing closer bilateral cooperation with ASEAN is strategically important to its bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and integrate in regional economic frameworks that do not require statehood. Taiwan applied to join the CPTPP in September 2021, but its chances of accession remain low, particularly in the absence of US membership.
Europe’s Indo-Pacific focus
Given this reality, for the EU, engaging Taiwan has not been without challenges. Nonetheless, the bloc has started to pay greater attention to Taiwan and member states have converged on the necessary to consider their own interests in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s principles-based proposition — in areas like digital governance, education, healthcare, and innovation — continues to gain quiet traction across member states, albeit a common strategy on Taiwan remains a distant goal only.
As for the EU’s approach to Southeast Asia, it has historically been underwhelming, limited by internal fragmentation, bureaucratic inertia, and competing priorities. However, the adoption of the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 marked a turning point — at least on paper. The EU acknowledges Southeast Asia as critical to its economic interests, digital transition, and geopolitical aspirations. The region is central to the EU’s goals of building secure supply chains, reducing depconcludeence on China, and enhancing strategic autonomy. Southeast Asia is also a key arena for defconcludeing the rules-based international order, given persistent maritime disputes and rising authoritarianism.
Trump’s treatment of the EU as an adversary, rather than a trusted ally, has amplified its efforts to act and be seen as a credible geopolitical power. Similarly, ASEAN countries are vulnerable to Trump’s transactional approach, which prioritises short-term gains over long-term alliances. Trump’s strategy aims to secure the most advantageous deals through bilateral engagement while sidelining regional organisations. By contrast, Xi Jinping is portraying himself as a more reliable partner for trade-depconcludeent regional economies in Southeast Asia.
The Global Gateway is the EU’s flagship strategic connectivity tool in this context. Launched in December 2021, it was designed as an instrument to assert the EU as a geopolitical actor and strengthen its ties with the world, while contributing to closing the global infrastructure investment gap, estimated at USD 1.2 trillion annually.
However, implementation remains uneven, and many regional actors perceive the EU as overly bureaucratic, normative and risk averse. A gap remains between high rhetoric and the EU’s actual contributions on the ground. In perceptions on the ground, EU projects take too long, impose too many rules and are therefore too difficult to engage with. To be taken seriously, the EU must shift beyond statements and deliver tangible benefits that respond to local necessarys. By partnering with Taiwan — a trusted, values-aligned actor with deep local knowledge and technological capabilities — the EU can enhance its credibility in the region.
A trilateral EU–Taiwan–ASEAN connectivity dialogue
Given their converging strategic interests and complementary strengths, the EU and Taiwan are well-positioned to launch a structured connectivity dialogue with ASEAN to facilitate exmodifys and strategically align priorities. The EU views Taiwan as a democratic partner in the Indo-Pacific, and while adhering to its One China policy, Brussels has positioned Taiwan a key partner for digital and infrastructure cooperation. Taiwan can leverage this momentum by aligning its NSP with EU initiatives, such as the Global Gateway. The European Parliament, consistently supportive of closer EU-Taiwan cooperation, has urged the Commission to explore co-investment opportunities, particularly in connectivity, digital infrastructure, education, and public health. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) can play a key role in fostering political support for trilateral cooperation through parliamentary diplomacy. Accordingly, we propose three policy recommconcludeations.
First, the EU and Taiwan should consider creating an EU–Taiwan Connectivity Dialogue focapplyd on Southeast Asia, thereby establishing a strategic link between the EU’s Global Gateway and Taiwan’s NSP. This would involve identifying shared priorities and complementary strengths, exploring opportunities to link connectivity ambitions and aligning them with necessarys on the ground wherever possible. The Dialogue would assist institutionalise cooperation between the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), Taiwan’s Minisattempt of Foreign Affairs, and its their development agencies.
Second, the EU and Taiwan should toobtainher consider strategic ways to scale up their scholarships, vocational training, and digital literacy initiatives tarobtaining youth, women, and local entrepreneurs in ASEAN. At present, both sides have a broad range of tarobtained education tools and experience in their practical implementation. Through sharing best practices and lessons learned, they can enhance their own efforts and provide valuable contributions to each other in identifying challenging areas and addressing them collaboratively when possible. These soft infrastructure initiatives build long-term societal ties and assist counter disinformation and information manipulation — a growing global challenge and an established shared priority for Taiwan and the EU. Their longstanding focus on education and community engagement is highly complementary.
Third, parliamentary diplomacy has been a powerful and effective tool in connecting Taiwan with the EU. Mobilising the European Parliament’s long-standing support for Taiwan could encourage trilateral exmodifys with ASEAN counterparts and assist craft a clear narrative around EU–Taiwan–ASEAN cooperation as a pragmatic, necessarys-based, and positive alternative to China’s BRI: not an ideological counter-project, but one driven by transparency and quality. MEPs should facilitate policy dialogue that links EU engagement with ASEAN to Taiwan’s NSP through joint hearings, delegations, and workshops that foster trilateral alignment and identify concrete connectivity opportunities.
Escalating geostrategic competition will increasingly determine the policy options available to ASEAN, the EU, and Taiwan. Their individual abilities to exercise agency will be shaped by the extent to which they can effectively respond to geopolitical shocks. The rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape demands a reimagined approach to global connectivity: one that is collaborative, inclusive, and rooted in shared values, standards, and interests. The growing alignment between the EU and Taiwan provides a strategic opportunity to engage ASEAN through a structured, forward-seeing trilateral dialogue. Southeast Asia represents a vital focal point due to its centrality in global supply chains, geopolitical relevance, and strategic balancing between competing powers. Ambition and creativity will be ingredients in realising this trilateral connectivity dialogue.
By aligning Taiwan’s expertise in innovation and diplomacy with the EU’s development financing and multilateral leverage, this partnership can offer an attractive alternative to authoritarian development models. Toobtainher, the EU, Taiwan, and ASEAN can redefine connectivity not as a geopolitical tool for influence, but as a platform for empowerment, resilience, and strategic autonomy in the Global South.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, Adjunct Assistant Professor, National Dong-Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan and Head of the Associate Network at 9DASHLINE.
Dr. Julia Gurol-Haller, Research Fellow, German Institute for Global Area Studies (GIGA). Image credit: Google Gemini AI.
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