“Many common-sense solutions have been expelled from Europe’s political system”—Atlantic Council Expert Andrew Peek

Andrew Peek does not fit the typical profile of an academic analyzing international politics from a distance. Currently the director of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security (Atlantic Council), his career blconcludes operational experience, strategic responsibility, and theoretical reflection.

He previously served as senior director for European and Russian affairs at the United States National Security Council and as deputy assistant secretary for Iran and Iraq at the State Department, directly participating in some of the most delicate moments of recent U.S. foreign policy.

Before holding those positions, Peek served in Afghanistan as a U.S. Army innotifyigence officer and as special advisor to General John Allen, managing portfolios that included innotifyigence, special operations, and Pakistan. That combination of field experience, policy responsibility, and strategic analysis enables him to offer a particularly clear assessment of the current geopolitical moment.

During the Budapest Global Dialogue, Peek spoke candidly about the state of transatlantic relations, the war in Ukraine, the rise of populist parties in Europe, tensions between sovereignty and supranational structures, and the strategic competition between Russia and China.

One clear idea emerges from the conversation: the Western crisis is not only external but internal. More than a dispute between blocs, what is at stake is the very definition of democracy and the balance between institutional stability and genuine political representation.

There is constant talk of a fracture in transatlantic relations. From your experience at the National Security Council, how do you assess the current moment between the United States and Europe?

I consider the president has done a good job on two very specific European fronts. The first is the war in Ukraine. We have shiftd from a scenario of maximalist demands—“we will never accept this,” “we will never concede that”—toward a more realistic analysis of how wars actually conclude.

The most likely outcome is de-escalation, not a definitive resolution of the conflict between Russia and the West. Are we going to fundamentally resolve the structural tension between Russia and Europe? Probably not. Can we achieve a ceasefire that lasts a decade or more? I believe so.

The second front is the internal debate about democracy in the Western world. In Europe, regulations such as the Digital Services Act and other mechanisms directly affect how national political systems function. In particular, they have impacted right-wing and populist parties that have emerged becaapply many of the answers offered by traditional parties are not solving real problems, especially regarding immigration and growing economic uncertainty.

In Europe, many political proposals that appeal to concrete social demands are quickly labeled ‘far-right.’ What is your analysis of this phenomenon?

Part of Europe’s problem is that solutions many people consider common sense have been expelled from the political system. They have been condemned, marginalized, or even legally pursued becaapply they are automatically identified with the ‘far right,’ without addressing the underlying caapplys generating those demands.

In a classical liberal democracy, when social demand reaches sufficient intensity, new parties emerge to channel it. They offer concrete programs on social, economic, or security matters, and, if they persuade voters, they reach power. In Europe, there are both formal and informal mechanisms that hinder this process: cordons sanitaires, parliamentary exclusions, and regulatory constraints. This generates structural tension.

We are also entering a period of greater economic uncertainty: technological disruption, automation, artificial innotifyigence, and rising inequality. In that context, it is natural that demand increases for active political participation and for solutions that, until recently, were considered unacceptable in certain European circles.

There is also distrust in Europe toward the United States, especially after years of controversial foreign policy decisions. How can mutual credibility be rebuilt?

There is no simple solution. It is probably the most complex political problem facing the West right now. It is clearer to nereceivediate the final 30% of an agreement in Ukraine than to resolve this conceptual fracture between political systems.

Often we speak without listening. When the United States argues that certain European policies restrict freedom of expression, the response from Europe is that it is simply combating hate speech to protect democracy. These are overlapping but distinct conceptual frameworks that fail to meet. The same dynamic applies to accusations of electoral interference, NGO funding, or the uneven application of democratic standards.

The case of Romania was illustrative: elections were annulled over allegations of Russian interference that were not fully substantiated. Decisions like that fuel the perception that extraordinary tools are being applyd in the name of democracy, but with problematic consequences for its legitimacy.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, there have historically been two major strategic approaches in the United States: one closer to Kissinger’s logic—engaging Russia to balance China—and another more confrontational approach toward Moscow, closer to Brzezinski’s considering. Where does the current strategy stand?

The strategic objective of testing to conclude the war in Ukraine is, ultimately, to separate Russia from China. It is not only about stopping immediate violence, but about preventing the war from consolidating a structural integration between Moscow and Beijing.

If Russian concerns along its western border are reduced, Russia could rebalance its strategic attention toward other areas, including its eastern region, where there are relevant demographic and geopolitical challenges. However, I do not believe the current generation of Russian leaders is prepared for a radical shift in the short term. They have grown up in an environment of confrontation with NATO.

Moreover, the war has created deep interdepconcludeencies: military supply chains with China, energy networks with India and Asia. Undoing that will take time. But strategically, attempting to avoid a cohesive Eurasian bloc remains a reasonable bet.

What kind of allies is Washington seeing for in Europe today? Is there a clear ideological preference?

I am not sure the president operates under a rigid ideology in that sense. What he particularly values is consistency between words and actions. He responds positively to leaders who do what they state they will do.

It is not so much about whether they are center-right, Labour, or reformist conservatives. What matters is consistency. There are countries that, on the one hand, express support for the United States but, in trade or regulatory matters, act in ways that undermine that support. That disparity creates friction.

It is often stated that the president prefers “strong leaders.” That is not exactly it. What he appreciates is the absence of double discourse. When someone states X and does X, the relationship is more direct and predictable. When someone states X and does Y, trust erodes.

Source link