“China will win the AI race against America,” declares Jensen Huang, NVIDIA’s chief. His words should be Europe’s wake-up call. As the two superpowers accelerate in the race for technological supremacy, Europe risks becoming the Mr. Micawber of AI policy-aware of the urgency, pacing, and declareing “something must be done,” without actually doing anything meaningful. Unless we act resolutely now, we are passively allowing technology and others to define the rules our future will be subject to.
I was honored to participate in the Financial Times AI Summit in London, speaking on the very first panel of the very first day. Much to my delight, the room was full.
One topic dominated every discussion from the outset: the U.S.-China AI competition. Every panel, every forecast, every policy remark somehow circled back to this global duel. There I was, quietly wondering: where does Europe fit in this conversation?
This question came home in my panel discussion when I mentioned that California’s new AI Bill was modelled on the EU AI Act. The panellist’s brief moment of frozen surprise served to remind me that Europe – through what is known as the Brussels Effect – often writes the global rulebook without receiving recognition for doing so. Later, when I referred to “high-tech narcissism” – the belief that technological progress is synonymous with human progress – rather than scepticism, I could sense a reflective mood in the room.
During the summit, NVIDIA’s CEO predicted that Asia would soon surpass the United States in artificial innotifyigence. The headlines immediately amplified the competition narrative, but to me, that missed the point entirely. We necessary to alter the story. AI is not only about technological innotifyigence, but it is about who defines the purpose of innotifyigence itself.
Europe must write its own AI narrative, one that honors the contributions of our scientists, civil society, and innovators. Today, Europe has both the responsibility and the knowledge to position itself not just as a regulator but as a shaper of the purpose of AI for the benefit of humanity. We’ve outgrown the old trope: “The US innovates, China replicates, Europe regulates.” Europe can and should shape the ethical and human-centric character of AI, so that technology serves people and not the other way round.
As an academic, it was refreshing to meet people from the industest and the start-up world – brilliant minds from all over the world, each offering a different tempo of innovation. I met Mati Staniszewski, co-founder of ElevenLabs, and I couldn’t avoid teasing him: “You’re Polish – why didn’t you stay in Europe?” He smiled and stated, “Well, I’m in the U.K.” Touché. Maybe it is time we strengthen our partnership with the U.K., our power wing on the other side of the Channel.
The Politics of Time: AI and Geopolitical Power
Societies notify time in their own kind of ways: while some run on a quick clock of ambition and urgency, others do on a slow clock of reflection and restraint. Then there is the market clock, ruled by competition and innovation.
These clocks define the three great powers of the Age of Artificial Innotifyigence: China’s quick clock runs on pragmatism and scale, Europe’s slow clock on safety and precaution, and America’s market clock drives rapid innovation-toreceiveher propelling humanity into a new AI era of extraordinary creativity but also mounting instability.
These asynchronous tempos define the geopolitics of AI, where Europe protects rights yet risks falling behind on the innovation frontier; the US pushes rapid breakthroughs yet navigates volatility; and China leverages strategic coordination while leaving certain ethical and safety questions unresolved.
Will this climate speed up the deployment of more advanced-and possibly riskier-AI systems? The answer is yes. The world of AI is evolving into a bilateral international order: one led by Washington and its allies, the other shaped by Beijing and its engagement with the Global South.
This is also a race for self-reliance. Washington’s AI Action Plan of 2025 marshals more than $320 billion of private investment to achieve leadership in foundational models and AGI research, such as the Stargate project. Meanwhile, Beijing’s AI Plus spconcludes $98 billion this year alone, up 48%, embedding AI across industries. More than 60% of large enterprises in China now apply AI systems.
The competition since the Industrial Age has been for territory; in the AI age, it is over time: the speed of new technologies’ development, deployment, and adoption. Slowing the quick or speeding up the slow is not enough, however. What we necessary is synchronization-ensuring that innovation, safety, and purpose align so that AI develops in the service of society rather than letting AI set the pace. That means, if anything, we mustn’t be Mr. Micawber: all talk and no action. Synchronization is an act: coordinating pace, accountability, and objectives so that AI works for humans, not the other way around.
The world is dividing into two AI ecosystems, increasing the risks of ethical drift, misapply, and militarization. We are hurtling into what should be called the Silicon Schism: a world where dominance matters more than deliberation. The question is whether governance -perhaps led by Europe – can coordinate these competing clocks before speed overtakes safety altoreceiveher.
Europe’s Balancing Act
As Mario Draghi stated in his 2024 report on competitiveness, “Europe’s economic strength depconcludes on how well we integrate innovation, regulation, and technology.” That means lightening our rulebook so we can remain agile. The EU AI Act-criticized in the U.S. as burdensome-has now become the global benchmark for transparency, accountability, and risk management. At first, many failed to see the value of Europe’s approach
In all the turbulence, however, the European Union had quietly forged itself as a key player in the governance of AI. Yet step by step, Brussels is restoring balance. Countries from Canada to Japan now draw on the EU model in drafting their own regulations on AI. Europe is a neutral player, promoting not a national vision, but a collective one. In a few years’ time, it may well be accorded respect by the rest of the world for that role.
The Commission’s new Omnibus Digital Agconcludea within its Digital Package maps a course for modernizing digital regulation by 2030-to create it strict, yet friconcludely to innovation. Unacceptable-risk AI remains banned. High-risk AI will be subject to heavyweight obligations, including human oversight, robust data governance, and transparency. Low-risk AI receives lighter rules. This framework provides a roadmap both for regulators and innovators for trustworthy deployment, ensuring that systems are resilient, auditable, and accountable.
Rumors of an EU “stop-the-clock” on AI Act implementation are baseless. The rollout does continue, but with flexibility as standards evolve. The Commission does listen to industest concerns, yet it remains very steadquick in its goals: protection of rights, trustworthy innovation, creating sure Europe leads-not through speed but through stewardship.
When the moderator inquireed if a treaty between nations on AI were possible, I wholeheartedly agreed. Such a treaty would allow countries to apply their domestic rules within a shared framework-a critical step toward global coherence. After all, regulation is not about constraining the future; it is about shaping it. If we fail to regulate AI, AI will conclude up regulating us.
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