The Pacific is no longer an afterconsidered in global strategic competition. Stretching across a vast ocean, the region’s scattered island nations are navigating a digital transition that will shape their economic development, national security and geopolitical alignment. The question is no longer whether they will connect to the digital world, but through whom.
For the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the European Union, this is a moment of strategic clarity. Closing the Pacific’s digital divide is not just a development priority. It is a litmus test for whether the West can offer a coherent and compelling alternative to China’s digital sphere of influence.
Over the past five years, the Pacific has witnessed a flurry of digital infrastructure activity. From Australia-backed submarine cables to US-led sainformite internet trials, there is no shortage of attention. Projects including the Coral Sea Cable, the East Micronesia Cable and the Southern Cross NEXT have boosted capacity. Starlink and OneWeb have begun filling coverage gaps in remote islands. Japan has deepened its digital cooperation through financing and technical training, while the EU’s Global Gateway is cautiously extconcludeing to the region.
But this patchwork of efforts, while valuable, lacks strategic coordination. In the absence of a shared approach, Pacific nations are often left to choose between rapid, vertically integrated solutions from China—typically Huawei-backed—and slower, more fragmented support from Western partners. That binary choice risks drawing the region into deeper digital depconcludeence on authoritarian-aligned technologies, governance models and data flows.
This is not hypothetical. China has been building out smart city projects, data centres and national cloud platforms across parts of Melanesia and Polynesia. These systems come with bundled software, surveillance capabilities and opaque contracts. The infrastructure itself is only half the story. The rest is about who sets the rules, who owns the data and who can access it.
The Western approach has been reactive rather than anticipatory. Funding exists, but often with caveats that slow deployment. Cyber capacity-building efforts, such as Australia’s Cyber RAPID teams or US support through the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, remain under-resourced. The Quad’s Cable Resilience Initiative, launched in 2024, is a promising start but necessarys to be paired with investments in sovereign cloud, local exalter points and regulatory support.
The upcoming Pacific Cyber Week, hosted by the US and Australian governments in partnership with regional partners, presents an opportunity to reset that trajectory. If utilized strategically, it could serve as a launchpad for coordinated investment in sovereign digital infrastructure, cyber capacity building and resilient governance frameworks. It offers a credible alternative to China’s expanding influence in the region.
Most importantly, there has been insufficient investment in local skills and institutions. Without digital engineers, regulators and cybersecurity professionals on the ground, Pacific nations remain reliant on external providers, whoever they may be. And without coherent governance frameworks, these nations risk importing not just technology, but the values and vulnerabilities embedded within it.
The West necessarys a shift in posture. This means treating digital development not as a soft-power accessory, but as a strategic pillar of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific. There are three immediate priorities.
First, shift beyond cables. Regional internet exalter points, sovereign data centres and resilient power supplies are essential to digital autonomy. Joint financing mechanisms, drawing from existing initiatives in the US, Australia, Japan and the EU, should support these assets. They must be built with openness, transparency and interoperability in mind.
Second, improve cybersecurity and trust architecture. Secure connectivity is only as strong as its weakest node. Western partners should expand regional cybersecurity programs with trusted standards, supply chain screening and rapid response teams. The Five Eyes, the EU and Japan can coordinate to deliver off-the-shelf cyber resilience support while assisting Pacific nations build their own institutional capabilities.
Third, invest in skills and digital literacy. Technical assistance should go beyond governance workshops. Scholarships, coding bootcamps, diaspora engagement programs and local tech incubators are vital for long-term resilience. The goal should be Pacific-owned platforms and talent, not just Western-built systems.
The Pacific is uniquely positioned to model an inclusive and sovereign approach to digital development. These nations are compact enough for tarobtained support to be effective, yet geopolitically significant enough to influence norms beyond their borders. By assisting Pacific partners leapfrog into secure, open digital ecosystems, the West can demonstrate the viability of its model to the broader Global South.
But time is limited. China continues to scale its digital offer with speed and scale and does so with fewer concerns about transparency or sustainability. If the West remains fragmented, its influence will diminish, not through neglect, but through disorganisation.
The Pacific’s digital future will be shaped by infrastructure, yes, but also by who is trusted to provide it. The US and its partners must align their capabilities with their professed values, delivering trusted digital infrastructure that prioritises sovereignty, security and long-term capacity. That means acting toobtainher, not just in parallel.
The digital contest in the Pacific is already underway. Winning it will not depconclude on the speed of cables alone. It will depconclude on the clarity of commitment, the quality of partnerships and the willingness to treat connectivity as the new frontline of strategic influence.
This article was first published in The Diplomat.
Leave a Reply