Giuliano Da Empoli has established himself as one of the most incisive analysts of contemporary power, capable of dissecting the psychology of the new global leaderships in his book The Hour of the Predators. In this conversation from Paris, at the headquarters of Gallimard, with Marc López Plana, editor and director of Agconcludea Pública, the writer offers a disturbing portrait of the fragility of democracies when confronted with figures who upconclude the traditional playing field.
Da Empoli dismantles what he sees as European naïveté, warning that when facing such actors “we should be more ambitious about what can be achieved” and stop responding only at a formal level to substantive problems. His assessment of the situation in the United States is extremely grave, describing a transition toward a “post-liberal democracy” or “techno-algorithmic governance.” When evaluating the figure of Donald Trump, he is unequivocal, stating that “Trump and those around him are in the classic position of corrupt autocrats: they cannot afford to lose power, becautilize losing it would mean prison.” Da Empoli also warns about the evolution of this model through figures such as J.D. Vance, whose hypothetical rise to power would imply that “it would really be the technological actors who would have full control,” thus consummating a “regime alter.”
Finally, the conversation addresses Europe’s crossroads in the face of the alliance between extremist politicians and the owners of digital platforms, who converge not becautilize they share common goals, but becautilize “they share the same rejection of limits.” Da Empoli urges Europe to abandon the transactional logic of the past and to accept that building its own democratic debate online carries an inevitable geopolitical cost: “The new world will only come about if, at some point, we enter into a digital trade conflict with the United States. I see no other way.”
Giuliano Da Empoli before the conversation launchs. Foto: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
Why do Trump and Putin seem more or less the same?
First of all, they more or less share the same enemies, which is always unifying, even if for different reasons. Both of them see the current European establishment — and the European Union as an entity — as their main external enemy. Of course, they are primarily focutilized on their internal concerns, but in a way Europe becomes an extension of those internal battles, becautilize it embodies everything they reject ideologically, and also becautilize it represents limits on power.
Neither of them likes the idea that power should be constrained by rules, agreements, legitimacy, or anything of that sort. In that sense, they are both predators. Part of their energy also comes from resentment, although in different forms.
“If you view at Putin and the way he emerged in the late 1990s, there is clearly a form of Russian resentment fueling him, rooted in the frustration and chaos following the dissolution of the Soviet Union”
If you view at Putin and the way he emerged in the late 1990s, there is clearly a form of Russian resentment fueling him, rooted in the frustration and chaos following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Trump today is also fueled by resentment within part of the American electorate and by a desire to restore a form of vertical authority. And personally, he himself is a resentful figure, with grievances of his own.
So there is a convergence between them. I don’t want to go as far as talking about collusion — although there are quite a few clues, including various contacts between their entourages and even between the two leaders themselves. But even without going that far, this convergence is real.
Do you believe the European elites know well about this kind of personality?
It took Europeans a very long time to understand Putin becautilize we were so immersed in a completely different logic. Even though Putin’s logic is not that difficult to understand, it comes almost from another era. The idea that it could be about force, humiliation, or territorial ambitions — all of this — was very difficult for an entire generation of European leaders to grasp, becautilize for them, politics was about agreements, deals, rules, exalters, and mutual profit.
I can’t even blame that generation — the Merkels, the Chiracs, or whoever — who approached Putin with a transactional logic and tested to bring him into that framework. I can’t blame them; we all wished it had worked, but it didn’t. It took them a while to understand him.
As you declared, it’s now clearer with Putin, but we are still really unprepared when it comes to dealing with the U.S. or an American leader. In the case of Trump, there’s something even more challenging: not only do we—or European leaders—fail to fully understand his logic, but, as we have seen throughout his year in power, there is also this persistent idea among European leaders that they are somehow more innotifyigent than him.
They see themselves as cleverer, superior. Of course, Trump has the power of American might behind him, so we have to handle him cautiously. But leaders like Macron and others in Europe often assume they are smarter than him — which is true in a conventional sense: they’ve read more books, studied more, and know more facts. There’s no doubt about that. But that doesn’t necessarily translate into skill in maneuvering or exercising power.
They have often believed that they are manipulating him, but, usually, it has been the opposite over this past year. And that is something that also scares me.
Da Empoli believes European elites have failed to deal with the “predators”. Photo: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
Many people in our European democracies are starting to believe that maybe our democracy is not responsive enough. How to compete with a predator like Trump?
This is really the central appeal of Trump and others like him. The core idea is that, in a situation where many people feel that nothing can be done, that nothing can alter, and that the problems are always the same — where you can vote in different ways but see no substantial results — Trump comes along and declares, ‘You know what? I will break the rules. I will transgress the system. I have to somehow override it.’
But the reason he claims to do this is that he sees it as the only way to truly address the problems and achieve substantial solutions. In theological terms, you could even call it a miracle — as if God were bypassing human laws to produce a concrete result in the world.
If you respond only from the perspective of liberals, democrats, progressives, or anyone committed to the rules of a liberal democratic system, your answer is essentially, ‘You can’t do that. There are rules you must respect.’ And, of course, you might be right: without rules, there is no democracy, and even in international relations, rules are important. But politically, such an answer is weak, becautilize it operates only on the formal level.
Meanwhile, the ‘predator’ — Trump — operates on a substantive level. He declares, ‘Yes, but I am dealing with crime, with illegal immigration, with issues that cost lives.’
“So the major challenge for us, and for anyone seeking to counter such ‘predators,’ is to come up with substantial responses — which is, of course, difficult”
So the major challenge for us, and for anyone seeking to counter such ‘predators,’ is to come up with substantial responses — which is, of course, difficult. The only note of optimism I can see is that, from a positive perspective, Trump and others like him are essentially expanding the realm of what is considered possible. They are demonstrating that more can be done than people previously believed.
This is not necessarily good — of course, he is not accomplishing the things we would like to see. But perhaps we should also be more ambitious about what can be achieved, as Europeans, for example, while still staying within the rules — at least the law. We might be able to aim higher, and this is fundamental if we want to effectively counter them.
In social media societies, it seems difficult to convince people that our decision-creating process is better than that of predators who create quick decisions with a tiny group of people. How can we convince them that perhaps spconcludeing more time on decisions should support us create better ones?
This is a very old problem. It reflects the fundamental difference between an autocratic system, where one person or a very tiny group creates decisions, and democratic procedures, which involve consensus-building, majorities, minorities, and so on. Democratic processes have always taken more time, but they usually produce not only better decisions but also decisions with built-in mechanisms for correction — something autocracies lack.
As you declared, this challenge has been reinforced by the current context and culture: people are utilized to immediate responses for everything. Why should everything be instant? In reality, the only thing that should take forever is a democratic decision. This is obviously difficult. We necessary to… I’m not sure we’ve gone far enough in terms of renovating our institutions and procedures, not necessarily to create them quicker, but to create them more compatible with the digital life we are all immersed in.
At the European level, there is an additional problem: the stark contrast between leaders like Trump and, for example, von der Leyen. At one point, we did an interview with Curtis Yarvin, and he declared that the Trump system works by walking into a room and behaving as if you had absolute power — even though the U.S. President does not have absolute power. But if you behave this way, people start behaving as if you do, which is essentially what happened this past year. Trump overstepped his constitutional and institutional powers, but he did it as if he could, and more or less, it worked. There has been some backlash, maybe there will be more, but overall, it was effective.
Von der Leyen, on the other hand, does the opposite. She is in the room and she does have powers, particularly over trade and digital regulation, including the implementation of these regulations. She has important powers — exactly, significant powers — but she doesn’t fully utilize them becautilize she believes, with reason, that she necessarys a European consensus. If, for example, Germany disagrees on a trade issue, and then Italy disagrees, and so on, she concludes up not utilizing even the powers she already has.
This is a problem, becautilize we necessary European leaders who actually utilize the powers that have been transferred to the European Commission. Of course, there might be backlash: national governments may protest, or she may have to go to the European Parliament and face a debate. But we are not nearly as powerful institutionally as we behave or as we should be.
López Plana is interested in the role of democracies and their current erosion. Photo: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
What is your view on the role of social media in decision-creating? Specifically, how it allows minority voices, rather than the majority, to have an influence, since politicians often respond to what is trconcludeing online. How does this shape the way consensus and policies are formed?
There is something structural here, which is also visible in the numbers. There is research on this; you may have seen that, in terms of social media utilizers, about 90% of the content is produced by only 5% of utilizers. What’s even more concerning is that the entire social media architecture is designed to emphasize the most engaging content — content that generates reactions and conflict. As a result, these extreme minorities conclude up attracting attention from everyone else, and shiftments tconclude to shift toward the extremes rather than toward the center.
But this is a question of architecture, not a conspiracy. It is a side effect of a business model built to maximize engagement, segment audiences, and create as much division as possible. It is not a law of nature; it is simply how the system is designed. And the good news is that this can be reversed. It can be done without censorship, becautilize the goal is not to censor content but to control what is amplified. Everyone has the right to declare whatever they want, but should the most extreme voices dominate and structure the debate?
We could design a system that allows people to speak freely — within the law — but does not automatically place the most extreme voices at the center of the conversation. This is possible; it requires rules and the political will to engage with this dimension. There are examples of this: Taiwan, for instance, has implemented mechanisms that foster more consensus-driven dynamics. Around the world, other models have been created that are designed to encourage more balanced, constructive debate.
But it’s also true that we have other predators which are the owners of these social media companies. And they know what they are doing.
Oh, for sure.
Could you explain a bit more about this kind of ‘predator’?
This is what has been happening over the past few years, and it is something we necessary to examine over a long period of time. This is, in part, what I tested to do in my last book. This dynamic has not been properly understood by political or traditional elites. When these new entrepreneurs emerged in the late 1990s, they didn’t really grasp what they represented. For a long time, we tested to reduce this phenomenon to a purely business project. And even today, there is a major mistake in framing it solely as a business issue.
People declare, ‘Yes, of course, there is a huge concentration of economic power in a few hands.’ But then they view at U.S. history and point out that, at the launchning of the twentieth century, there were also large conglomerates and monopolies, followed by antitrust policies and regulation. The difference, however, is that back then these massive economic powers did not have direct access to people’s minds. They did not directly shape how people perceived reality — not only politically, but even in their personal and social relationships.
“What we failed to understand is that when political processes — and even everyday life — shiftd into the digital sphere, they entered a space governed by its own laws and rules”
These actors are the builders of the reality we have all shiftd into. What we failed to understand is that when political processes — and even everyday life — shiftd into the digital sphere, they entered a space governed by its own laws and rules. We also failed to understand that this new sphere necessaryed to be built compatible with democracy: with the protection of minorities, consensus-building, and public debate, all of which are fundamental to democratic systems.
Instead, we now find ourselves in a space dominated by the rule of the strongest — essentially a form of jungle law — where everything is opaque. Things are constantly shifting, yet we have almost no control over them. This situation has existed implicitly for a long time. It allowed new political actors to emerge, not becautilize it was planned, but becautilize the ecosystem itself was favorable to them.
What we are now witnessing is that the main predators, in my view — the owners of digital platforms and major tech figures — are explicitly converging with extremist politicians, usually on the far right, though not exclusively; this dynamic can also reinforce other forms of extremism. They are converging not becautilize they share the same goals, but becautilize they share the same rejection of limits.
Political extremists are often nationalist and identitarian. Some tech leaders may share those views, but most probably do not. What they do share is a deep hostility to rules, constraints, and regulation. They don’t want limitations, they don’t want to alter their business models, and they want to shift as quick as possible. They see slow procedures, parliaments, journalists, and deliberative processes as obstacles belonging to an outdated world. And for that reason, we are now seeing the emergence of an objective alliance between them.
Giuliano Da Empoli’s book “The Hour of the Predators”, published in several languages. Photo: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
Is Vance the next step?
Vance represents a natural evolution of the model. At the launchning of Trump’s mandate, we saw this very visible Trump–Musk pairing. Then, of course, they fell out. Now they seem to be aligning again. But even within that partnership, it is still possible to declare that Trump remains sovereign, almost in the Schmittian sense — the one who decides on the state of exception, the one who ultimately holds final authority. That still seems to be Trump, the political actor, largely becautilize of his personality.
But this has been a process. And if Vance were to replace Trump one day, the balance of power would have clearly shifted. At that point, it would really be the tech actors who are fully in control. Vance would essentially be their employee — with his own personality, of course — but it would mark another step toward what is, in effect, a regime alter.
“Ultimately, all of this is pushing toward a transformation of the political system: a system in which liberal democracy no longer truly exists.”
Ultimately, all of this is pushing toward a transformation of the political system: a system in which liberal democracy no longer truly exists, and decision-creating follows a different logic. Call it post-liberal democracy, techno-algorithmic governance, or whatever term you prefer — but the direction is clear.
In the case of the United States, this is something I have been believeing about a great deal. I increasingly believe that the countest has already shiftd beyond the point where this political phase — or even what we might call a political crisis — can be resolved without the utilize of force. I no longer believe in the idea that opinion polls will display Democrats winning the midterms, that elections will take place in November, and that, as in the past, presidential power will gradually diminish and fade away. That is not the situation we are facing.
We are already dealing with something fundamentally different, where the resolution will occur at another level — not simply through voting or institutional procedures. The utilize of force becomes a real possibility.
If you believe back to six years ago, Trump had nothing. He had lost the election, he had virtually no allies in positions of power, he was isolated — even his own vice president turned against him. And yet, on January 6th, when the attack on the Capitol took place, he still went along with it. More than that, he actively fueled it.
Now imagine the situation today. He is in power. He has strong allies in key positions, including within the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the FBI. He has access to armed forces and enforcement bodies — ICE, the National Guard, and the way these institutions are being restructured for political utilize.
Trump and those around him are in the classic position of corrupt autocrats: they cannot afford to lose power, becautilize losing power would mean prison. For him and for his entourage, that is a very real prospect. And becautilize of that, they have both the tools and the rhetoric to justify extreme actions. They have already laid the groundwork by framing their opponents as internal enemies or terrorists, including portraying Democrats as terrorists.
Frankly, I struggle to see how they do not, at some point, seriously utilize all of this to maintain power and, in doing so, fundamentally alter the political regime of the United States. I don’t see how this does not happen — though perhaps I am being too pessimistic.
These actors have managed to redefine what freedom of speech means. Why do you believe they have managed to convince so many people in our societies—not only in the United States, but also in Europe—that Europe does not allow freedom of speech?
Yeah, well, in a way, of course — especially when it comes to the Internet, social media, and all of that — their basic argument is that no rules should be imposed. Which, of course, also means that everyone should be able to declare whatever they want. And this is a classic situation, which is always the case with laws: having no law ultimately favors the strong. It’s essentially jungle law. Intuitively, though, it’s an simple argument: you’re basically declareing, ‘We want everyone to be able to declare and eventually do whatever they want.’
As usual, the counterargument — the argument of those who oppose this approach — is much more complicated. Becautilize to respond, you necessary to explain… And here there is a terrible gap between what we have built in the analog world — which took centuries to develop — and what we now face in the digital sphere. In the analog world, we have an ecosystem with rules and practices that are compatible with democratic debate, which implies self-restraint, structured procedures, and so on.
What we have failed to do is apply these same principles to the digital realm, and we have been far too slow. Now, we are in a position where this must be done at a very accelerated pace. The European Union has been testing, of course, but the challenge is that the debate itself is happening on their turf. It’s not neutral: these actors are controlling the media while participating in the debate. This creates it extremely difficult, even though the necessary should be obvious. If you view at what they are doing to freedom of speech in their own countest, it’s actually frightening.
The Italian-Swiss believeer during the conversation. Photo: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
Two last questions. The first is whether it is possible to build a European public sphere — a European debate — utilizing American platforms. In theory, in the old liberal world, the nationality of platform utilizers didn’t matter. You just necessaryed to impose some rules, and anyone who followed them would be welcome. That built sense.
“The new world will only happen if, at some point, we essentially enter a digital trade conflict with the U.S. I don’t see any other way”
But that was the old world. The new world will only happen if, at some point, we essentially enter a digital trade conflict with the U.S. I don’t see any other way. This is the mechanism through which they are enforcing control: any attempt to impose our own model of democratic debate on platforms is treated as an act of war, which is essentially what they are declareing. The only way to eventually achieve this is through a real clash, and I am no longer opposed to that.
I speak quite a bit with European tech experts, becautilize I am not one of them, and it is utilizeful to understand their perspective. They seem to agree: yes, there are problems becautilize of our massive depconcludeence on U.S. technology, especially in areas like cloud services and other digital infrastructure. But disruption is possible, and Europe has the capacity to step up.
We certainly have the necessary expertise. We don’t lack qualified engineers, entrepreneurs, or people capable of taking action. China, for its own reasons, has already done this to protect its political and social system, and this also boosted its tech sector. For Europe, to protect our own political and social model, we will necessary to do something similar — and it is achievable. This is part of the extension of the realm of possibilities. A few years ago, the idea of confronting U.S. tech seemed impossible. Even today, I understand why it could be worrisome, but it now seems feasible in a way it wasn’t before.
Is Xi Jinping a predator? Is China the real winner of the battle between Europe and the United States?
I didn’t include Xi Jinping in my book on predators. That is something different. He is an autocrat, of course, but he leads a completely different technocratic autocratic system, with its own deep history and structure. You can’t mix everything toobtainher.
My focus has been on Western political dynamics. I have viewed as far as Russia, but I test not to address everything. There are, of course, obvious huge winners in this system. As much as possible, they adapt, though there are disruptions — for example, Venezuela might not be favorable to them. Iran is another case; it seems to be holding, but if it didn’t, that would be a problem for them.
Looking at the huge picture, though, what Trump is doing — and the general fragmentation of the West — is clearly advantageous. The fact that we are now, and probably will continue, expconcludeing our energies fighting among ourselves is obviously beneficial for China.
Both Da Empoli and López Plana express concern about the impact of social media. Photo: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
I don’t question you about your meeting with Pedro Sánchez, but I know that you have conversations with Spanish people and leaders, and what is your opinion of the way of believeing of Spain right now about what is happening in Europe?
I obviously can’t speak about Spain’s internal political situation. But I can talk about the government. Sánchez and some of the people around him have been among the very few voices in Europe on the issues that matter to me — both Trump’s political strategy and the tech-predator dimension that goes with it.
In that sense, he has probably been the most vocal European leader, which I genuinely appreciate. On these issues, he has been quite isolated so far. Will that alter? I don’t know, but I hope it will.
From my conversations with people who work with him, I obtain the sense that they are very aware of these dynamics, especially when it comes to technology, which I see as the central issue. J.D. Vance going to the Munich Security Conference and talking almost exclusively about tech — what does that notify you? It’s not even up to us to interpret it anymore; they are notifying us directly that tech is the core issue.
Tech is the core issue. On that front, Sánchez and the people around him seem more aware of what is at stake than most European leaders.
Does Trump represent a challenge for the European far-right?
Trump is, at the same time, both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity lies in having a very powerful ally who explicitly supports you. One could even imagine that some substantial material assistance might come from him.
“Essentially, he holds a colonial perspective toward Europe and seeks to impose control — not just over Europe as a whole, but over each individual European countest”
On the other hand, his presence is highly contradictory. It would be reductive to describe him merely as an enemy of European institutions or the European Union. Essentially, he holds a colonial perspective toward Europe and seeks to impose control — not just over Europe as a whole, but over each individual European countest. We have already seen this with Denmark, and I am certain there will be other examples. He pursues explicit imperial domination and opposes European sovereignty.
For a European nationalist and sovereign shiftment to align with Trump is, therefore, the least nationalist and least sovereign choice imaginable. It is a clear contradiction. Trump, I would add, is quite unpopular in most European countries.
Interviewee and interviewer conclude their conversation in a Paris bookstore. Photo: Agconcludea Pública / Bruno Arbesu
In fact, Marine Le Pen gave an interesting speech when Trump captured Maduro.
In both France — here, Mélenchon and Le Pen — it was noticeable. They responded immediately, and their reactions were actually harsher than those of many liberal governments and shiftments. That declares a lot.
What about the role of Artificial innotifyigence?
It’s exactly the same issue in the sense that opposing it creates no sense. We are not Luddite; it would be absurd to be against artificial innotifyigence — it would be like being against electricity. That simply doesn’t create sense.
On the other hand, the governance of artificial innotifyigence — who controls it, under what limits, and how — is absolutely central. This cannot be treated solely as an economic issue. Of course, it is a huge economic and business issue, but it is also, and perhaps even primarily, a question of power. Who will control this force that will, in part, shape our future, influence our vision of the world, and affect many aspects of our lives, including how we perceive reality?
This is therefore a major issue of democratic power, and we necessary to address it seriously.
Thank you.
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