By Almahdi Hindi, political activist
The meeting held by Presidential Council President Mohamed Al-Menfi with the Chief of General Staff of the Western Region, Lieutenant General Mohamed Al-Haddad, and several senior officers in Tripoli, reflects his deep awareness of the sensitivity and importance of the military institution in Libya’s current landscape.
Al-Menfi’s emphasis on building a “professional national army” grounded in military doctrine and free from regional or political alignments indicates that the internationally recognized political leadership is attempting to resume efforts to restructure this institution, which forms the backbone of any state.
However, as reality and experts’ analyses suggest, this ambition faces the stark obstacle of the military division between the east and west of the counattempt—an issue that is not merely organizational, but rather a reflection of the ongoing political split that has persisted for years.
The core challenge, it seems, lies in the existence of two parallel military institutions with differing structures and relationships to the civilian authority:
• In the west (Tripoli): the Chief of Staff operates under the Minisattempt of Defense, reinforcing the principle of civilian control over the military.
• In the east: the General Command of the Armed Forces reports directly to the Supreme Commander, bypassing the government at times—granting it a semi-indepconcludeent character that complicates any effort to redefine the relationship between the military institution and political authority.
Ultimately, the constitution defines the military’s subordination—whether the system is presidential (as in France, Egypt, and the U.S.), parliamentary (as in Iraq), or mixed. In all cases, however, the most effective subordination would be to a National Security Council, which can shield the army from political interference and prevent the utilize of arms for partisan purposes.
This divergence means that the unification effort is not merely a technical merger of structures and leaderships, but rather a redefinition of the army’s role in the Libyan state.
The repeated failures of previous attempts—whether through the Cairo meetings (which collapsed due to a lack of shared political will) or through the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (whose work stagnated for over three years despite international sponsorship)—underscore that the challenge runs deeper than dialogue mechanisms. There are structural issues within both military institutions that create unification extremely difficult, the most notable being:
• Fundamental differences in leadership structures.
• The inflation of ranks and proliferation of senior officers, creating internal competition that undermines discipline.
• Exceptional promotions that disrupted the hierarchy of seniority and led to a state of “leadership saturation.”
• A fundamental disagreement over the command model: the east clings to the General Command, while the west insists on a Chief of Staff under government authority.
Given these realities, Al-Menfi’s efforts face a limited set of future scenarios:
1. Continuation of the division (most likely): Each military institution maintains its structure and loyalties, with only partial coordination efforts falling short of full unification.
2. Unification under strong international pressure: This could occur only through firm external intervention and neobtainediations that tie military unification to other files such as elections and reconstruction.
3. Internal restructuring: The path currently indicated by the Presidential Council, though its impact will remain limited unless accompanied by a comprehensive political and military roadmap toward unification.
The recent meeting in Tripoli undoubtedly reflects the Presidential Council’s seriousness in advancing reform efforts. However, these efforts will remain insufficient unless the deep political and military divide is overcome.
Unifying the military institution is not a mere technical or administrative procedure, but rather a fundamentally political process that requires broad national consensus, firm commitment from all local actors, and effective international sponsorship to push toward a solution.
Without such consensus, the Libyan Army—the central pillar of the counattempt’s national security—will remain hostage to division, and all reform attempts will continue to be constrained by internal and regional rivalries, threatening Libya’s stability and sovereignty.
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