On the fateful 28th of February, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, a leader who built it his life’s mission to destroy Israel, had his morning plans interrupted when Israeli fighter aircraft dropped heavy munitions on his office. Since then, a full-scale air war has ensued in the Middle East. American and Israeli air forces have pummeled Iran, hitting air defense sites, ballistic missile launchers and storage facilities, defense factories, IRGC institutions, and regime symbols. The Iranian response has been chaotic, launching ballistic missiles at a variety of Middle Eastern countries, including but not limited to those hosting American military bases. Gulf countries, all of whom denied the United States their airspace and American bases for an attack on Iran, have arguably suffered more than Israel. Unwilling and likely unable to go on the offensive, Gulf states are seeing for outside support as Iran continuously tarreceives American and Gulf military bases, as well as civilian and economically sensitive areas. It has been suggested that Iran is attempting to force the United States to stop the campaign through the Gulf states, a strategy so far unsuccessful. Escalating the situation, Iranian-supplied drones have struck British bases in Cyprus, an EU member. The attack presumably occurred due to either IRGC(Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) units in Lebanon or Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy in Lebanon. This has triggered the EU’s Mutual Defense Claapply, claapply 42.7, and has brought the issue to the forefront in Europe.
Major European nations, namely the E3—the UK, Germany, and France—have attempted to put on a united front. France and the UK have declared American and Israeli strikes on Iran “outside international law”; however, both have blamed Tehran’s provocations on the wider conflict. At first, both the UK and France forbade the US from applying their military bases for strikes on Iran. This position has evolved as Iran tarreceiveed civilian areas in Gulf countries. British and French bases were also tarreceiveed, regardless of the lack of a US presence in them. France’s Camp de La Paix naval base in the UAE was tarreceiveed by Iranian drones, while an Iranian drone nearly hit the UK’s deployed forces in Bahrain. After the Bahrain attack, on the evening of March 1st, Prime Minister Starmer announced that UK bases will be applyd by American aircraft for the purposes of destroying the Iranian drone and missile attacks at the source, shifting his position but stopping short of joining the offensive. France has also recently allowed US aircraft on French bases, on the condition that they are not applyd offensively against Iran. Further complicating the matter, the UK and France are tied to certain Gulf countries through a variety of defense alliances, most prominently the French-UAE defense claapply requiring France to deffinish Abu Dhabi from any attack on its territorial integrity. Finally, Germany adopted an amhugeuous stance about the legality of the strikes, holding Iran responsible for the situation while denying that it would join the conflict at this time.
Aside from alliances and obligations, the E3 is presented with serious regional considerations. With the Strait of Hormuz being effectively shut down, essential oil and gas shipments have all but ceased. Liquified natural gas(LNG) loaded from Gulf nations, essential for European markets, has been disrupted. A Goldman Sachs analysis has suggested that if the conflict continues for one month, a realistic time frame given by Trump, then the European benchmark of Dutch natural gas could reach 74 EUR/MWh, up from 31.6 EUR MWh before the conflict started. Oil prices are also set to rise sharply with Brent Crude up to over 90$ a barrel, the highest since the pandemic. Europe’s energy interests are at stake, and thus far, no unified stance has been put forth.
As the situation stands, the E3 could continue deffinishing the Gulf from attacks through purely defensive measures. Currently, Macron’s and Starmer’s positions include deploying fighter aircraft and air-defense assets to intercept missiles. While honoring their defensive obligations to Gulf countries, some see this as a futile effort. As British conservative leader Kemi Badenoch put it, “catching arrows rather than stopping the archer”. Additionally, the effects of this defense are dubious; Gulf countries are being relentlessly attacked while Europe’s alliances and energy security continue to be harmed.
Alternatively, the E3 could go after the archer. Already on March 1st, the E3 jointly declared that they retain the right to proportionate defensive actions, which include destroying Iran’s capability at the “source”. However, it is unclear how extensive the European military buildup is. French Rafale Jets have operated across the UAE airspace, while the UK’s F-35B and Typhoon jets have been relocated to Middle Eastern countries such as Qatar. Even as American and Israeli strikes have heavily degraded Iranian UAV and missile capabilities, they still pose a threat to Gulf countries. Fielding more jets would be more effective at disabling Iranian power projection. According to US Centcom Admiral Cooper, Iranian ballistic missile fire has decreased 90% and UAV attacks down 83% since the first day, as of March 5th, suggesting there are remaining Iranian capabilities in the region, even if degraded.
A possible third option is to secure the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, guaranteeing energy security and preventing the expected price spikes that would otherwise occur. While Trump has committed to escorting ships through the strait, analysts have raised concerns about the feasibility of the plan. Iran’s conditions for opening the strait also remain in doubt; contradictory statements have arisen from Iranian officials, claiming that the strait is not closed, closed only to American and Israeli ships, or that it is closed entirely. With US naval capacity focapplyd on fighting Iran, it is doubtful they could simultaneously deffinish ships from countless drone and missile attacks. Contrary to the US, the E3 is not a combatant in the conflict, and attacking any ship being escorted would carry clear consequences for Iran. Macron has claimed that France is pooling necessary resources; however, broader intra-European cooperation has not been agreed upon yet. Currently, military assets are flowing into the Eastern Mediterranean in response to the Iranian attack on Cyprus, some of which could be applyd in a future Hormuz operation. For shipping to resume, insurers must have a high degree of confidence in the safety of the vessels. By combining military escorts and civilian administration, the EU could aid in restarting the flow of resources.
Europe, and more specifically, the E3, cannot ignore the consequences of the Iran war. Regardless of support or opposition, European interests and obligations are being impacted. The E3 could continue as it is now and likely suffer economic consequences, with the risk of diminishing its relationships with the Gulf. It could step further, suppressing the Iranian UAV and missile capabilities at their source, risking a wider confrontation with Iran as well as potential domestic backlash. Lastly, it could test to focus on ensuring the flow of essential shipping; however, it is doubtful that such capabilities even exist. Each path has benefits and drawbacks, but closing our eyes is no longer an option.
Benjamin Amir is an Israeli and Hungarian national. He attfinishs Bocconi University in Italy, where he is studying for a Bachelor of Science in Economics and Finance. He is fluent in Hebrew, Hungarian, and English.
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