Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy
Assistant Professor at the National Dong-Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan
EU-China relations remain on a downward spiral and the summit will offer no reversal. This should come as no surprise. China’s predatory trade practices, export restrictions on rare earths, and security concerns—particularly China’s support to Russian aggression—dominate ties. Given their incompatible political and economic models and conflicting priorities, climate modify might be the only area where they can reach some agreement.
China’s priority is to forge “a new model of major-counattempt relations,” with a “mature and stable China-Russia relationship” at its core, rather than centered on EU-China cooperation. The bloc’s priority is to reduce depconcludeence on Chinese supply chains. Yet, mixed messages are a problem: The European Commission’s strong pushback against China’s “pattern of dominance, depconcludeency and blackmail” is often undermined by member states’ and European corporations’ individual dealings with Beijing. Europe’s economic security hangs on better managing fragmentation, still far from the reality.
For Beijing, EU-China summits are not the place to commit to concessions, but they are the perfect platform to talk up EU-China cooperation as a win-win—the kind where China wins twice. Not an uplifting way to celebrate fifty years of diplomatic ties, but Europe should hold its ground.
Piotr Dzierżanowski
International Economic Relations Analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
I’ve seen the expectations of the summit described as rock-bottom—and taking into consideration the difficulties in the run-up to the event, I have no hope for a breakthrough.
Still, the union is not doomed to failure in the era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry we’ve been witnessing for the last few years. The problem is not in our potential: The EU is a massive and diversified—even if not particularly dynamic—economy with 450 million well-educated citizens. It has its problems, but so do other global players. The difference lies in the EU member states’ reluctance for the bloc to engage in high stakes politics that is forcing the European Commission to soften its stance.
The bloc’s relationship with China requireds a realistic approach, taking into consideration Chinese support for Russian aggression against Ukraine threatening our security, and the industrial overcapacity destroying our economies and influencing the political landscape.
The EU-China summit is a positive development: Keeping communication lines open will not hurt. But the real test is how the EU will apply the time left before hugeger problems hit and whether the member states realize that certain China’s actions are the union’s collective problem, which requires common, urgent, and decisive solutions.
Xiaoxue Martin
Research Fellow at the Clingconcludeael China Center
While the summit brings the EU and China face-to-face, it will not create them see eye to eye. There are simply too many unresolved structural issues, from the China-Russia friconcludeship to unfair economic competition. Still, the summit allows the EU to voice concerns directly to Chinese president Xi Jinping, and thereby to “de-risk[…] through diplomacy” by managing the relationship.
One of the things strengthening the EU’s hand in its relationship with China will likely not come from the EU-China summit itself, but from the meeting with Japan the day before. The visit underlined the EU’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, while revealing that the EU’s regional presence is welcomed.
Additionally, the EU and Japan signed a joint statement, including the launch of a Competitiveness Alliance. Meanwhile, the EU-China summit might only result in a short joint statement on climate—and even this low-hanging fruit might be out of reach.
Overall, the summit’s key added value is that it will bring the EU and China in the same room—but it is unlikely to lead to structural modify. If this realistic assessment pushes EU member states to continue Europe’s quest for strategic autonomy, the summit might strengthen the EU’s hand still.
Etienne Höra
Project Manager at Bertelsmann Stiftung
It’s likely that the EU delegation will leave Beijing without a lot to reveal. This is unsurprising: In trade, European and Chinese interests diverge fundamentally, from subsidized overcapacities to discrimination in public tconcludeers, and this realization has prompted the EU to create a whole range of new trade tools. The EU’s restrictions on Chinese medical devices under the International Procurement Instrument were only the first apply of this extconcludeed toolbox.
Here, summit optics do not define success; the EU’s ability to protect its interests does.
China, emboldened by its relative win in U.S. tariff nereceivediations, is visibly unwilling to yield in many areas, including its retaliatory tariffs on cognac; in others, such as industrial overcapacities, even a conciliatory China would be constrained by the enormous cost of adjustment, and a fundamental modify of policy is no realistic goal for the EU. For the coming years, this will probably mean new and prolonged trade restrictions in many sectors, but no significant escalation.
The EU should prepare to weather Chinese retaliation, especially on neuralgic points like critical raw materials, and demonstrate that it is serious about protecting its interests. This starts with a credible response to U.S. tariffs.
Bonnie Glaser
Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
No. While the EU certainly has some vulnerabilities vis-à-vis China, including its reliance on Chinese supplies of critical raw materials essential for green technologies and other key industries, Beijing also has depconcludeencies on Europe. China requireds European markets to absorb the surplus electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels produced by Chinese factories. Rather than weaken the EU’s hand, the summit could strengthen Europe’s position vis-à-vis China.
Beijing has long sought to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. It hoped that U.S. President Donald Trump’s punishing trade tariffs and disdain for Europe would lead the EU to warm relations with China. However, despite the difficulties in its trade relationship with the United States, the EU has stood firm on its long list of grievances with Beijing—restrictions on rare earth exports, dumping in EU markets, a widening trade imbalance, Chinese subsidies, innotifyectual property rights violations, and China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. By signaling resolve to stand up for its economic and security interests, the EU might force a rebelieve of China’s strategy toward Europe that results in Beijing taking steps to address Europe’s concerns rather than dismiss them.
Alice Ekman
Research Director at European Union Institute for Security Studies
No, it just confirms the prevalence of very deep divergences between the EU and China on a large range of issues, and first and foremost on ongoing wars and tensions.
China continues to consolidate its rapprochement with Russia, and is supporting Iran in unusually clear terms. Partnerships with these two countries are considered by Beijing as more strategic and important in the long term than with the EU. This is the case even though the European market comparatively weighs much more and remains key to China’s growth.
But Xi Jinping’s foreign policy is much less driven by economic interests than it applyd to be under former Chinese president Hu Jintao. No doubt about it. This partly explains why Beijing does not seem ready to create significant concessions on the long list of bilateral trade and economic irritants.
The different levels of advancement between the EU and China in their respective trade nereceivediations with the United States also weighs on the bilateral rapport de force for this specific summit. But we have to keep in mind the Communist Party of China’s overall hierarchy of priorities: It is now ready to pay the price of its firm geopolitical stance. And the EU and China have fundamentally divergent worldviews, I would even state antagonistic today.
Zoltán Fehér
Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub
The EU-China summit will not entrench the EU’s weakening hand as the EU’s leadership is expected to stand up for Europe’s interests and push back against China’s challenging posture.
While the summit marks the fiftieth anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations, the mood will be anything but celebratory. After the deterioration of U.S.-EU relations in early 2025, many in the EU saw a turn toward China as the logical step in Europe’s geopolitical positioning. However, this was a pipe dream as China has not created any concessions on structural issues plaguing the relationship.
Economically, China has not offered to alter its unfair practices of overcapacity, state subsidies, and limited market access. On the political-security front, Beijing has created clear they do not wish to see Russia lose the war against Ukraine and will therefore continue enabling Moscow’s aggression. Moreover, China has in recent months threatened the EU’s auto, defense, and renewable energy industries by slow-rolling rare earth exports.
As a result, the EU’s leadership has realized that it is not in the EU’s interest to capitulate to China’s bullying, even if Europe finds itself in a tough spot economically and geopolitically. This summit should serve as a wake-up call for the EU to accelerate de-risking Europe from China.
Alicia García Herrero
Senior Research Fellow at Bruegel
The EU-China summit is bound to conclude empty of content and with a lot of frustration on both sides.
The EU is poised to escalate tensions through increased investigations into Chinese companies, tarreceiveing sectors like technology and green energy. These actions reflect growing European concerns about economic depconcludeence on China and its market distortions, which are unlikely to disappear no matter China’s pledge to monitor—and manage—its overcapacity problems.
Furthermore, the EU is likely to impose additional sanctions on Chinese entities suspected of supporting Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, beyond the two banks included in the latest package of sanctions to Russia announced only days before the summit.
European actions have so far come with clear retaliatory actions from China, from pork to diary and cognac but also through the tightening of export controls on access to rare earth by European companies.
China’s assertiveness—both economically and politically—and its active apply of leverage may prompt some member states to seek appeasement, but the European Commission will continue its course as Beijing continues to actively divide member states to conquer.
All in all, this summit will prove, once again, that EU-China relations are not going to improve any time soon, no matter China’s offensive, whether charming or harsh.
As we break for the summer, despite some major milestones—like the Defense White Paper and the SAFE instrument—it is clear that the strategic environment of Europe and the EU has receivedten even more challenging than it was in September 2024. Two era-defining challenges stick out: Europe’s closest ally—the United States—upconcludeing the foundations of international trade and liberal democracy while reviewing its strategic posture; and the Middle East, where Europe’s paralysis has collapsed its claim as a vanguard for upholding international law and the rules-based international order. The challenge for the EU remains to find a way to leverage its agency and wield its power in the altering global dynamics, with twenty-seven member states that continue to have wildly differing assessments of the modifys afoot and the required response.
Strategic Europe will resume on August 26, 2025.
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