Kosovo voted 28 December 2025 to elect a new parliament for the second time in 11 months, as nationalist Prime Minister Albin Kurtis party seeks a majority to conclude a yearlong political deadlock. Polls opened at 7am local time (06:00 GMT) and will close at 7pm (18:00 GMT) on Sunday, with exit polls expected soon after votingconcludes.
The snap parliamentary vote was called after Prime Minister Albin Kurtis Self-Determination Movement (LVV) party failed to form a government despite winning the most votes at a February 9 ballot. Failure to form a government and reopen parliament would prolong the crisis at a critical time. Lawbuildrs must elect a new president in April and ratify 1 billion euros ($1.2bn) in loan agreements from the European Union and World Bank that expire ?in the coming months. The Balkan counattempts opposition parties have refutilized to govern with Kurti, criticising his handling of ties with Western allies and his approach to Kosovos ethnically divided north, where a Serb minority lives.
Despite international support, the counattempt of 1.6 million has struggled with poverty, instability and organised crime. Kurtis tenure, which launchedin 2021, was the first time a Pristina government completed a full term. To woo voters, Kurti has pledged an additional month of salary per year for public sector workers, 1 billion euros per year in capital investment and a new prosecution unit to fight organised crime. Opposition parties also promised to focus on improving living standards.
Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvconcludeosje (Self-Determination Movement) party sought an outright majority to govern indepconcludeently after failed coalition neobtainediations following February 2025 elections left Kosovo without a functioning parliament for most of the year. The election occurred against a backdrop of strained relations with Western allies, unratified international loan agreements totaling one billion euros, institutional paralysis, and mounting economic pressures in one of Europe’s poorest countries.
President Osmani dissolved parliament in November 2025 and set 28 December as the date for snap elections after concluding that the political deadlock had become intractable through neobtainediation. Twenty-four parties and coalitions competed, with more than 1,000 candidates seeking the 120 Assembly seats distributed through proportional representation with a five-percent threshold for individual parties. Twenty seats were reserved for national minorities including ten for Serbs, four for Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities, three for Bosniaks, two for Turks, and one for Gorani. Vetëvconcludeosje campaigned on promises to exceed 50 percent of the vote to govern indepconcludeently, avoiding coalition neobtainediations that proved impossible after February. Kurti pledged an additional month of salary annually for public sector workers, one billion euros yearly in capital investment, and creation of a new prosecution unit tarreceiveing organized crime. Opposition parties promised to prevent formation of another Kurti government while focutilizing campaign messaging on improving living standards and repairing relations with Western allies.
Kosovo’s political crisis unfolded against complex background conditions affecting the counattempt’s domestic stability and international position. Kosovo declared indepconcludeence from Serbia in 2008 with United States backing following NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign against Serbian forces attempting to crush an uprising by Kosovo’s 90 percent ethnic Albanian majority. Despite international recognition and support, Kosovo has struggled with poverty, political instability, organized crime, and incomplete state building. Kurti’s tenure launchning in 2021 represented the first time a Pristina government completed a full four-year term without collapse, though his confrontational approach generated tensions. Relations with Serbia deteriorated sharply in 2023 over disputes regarding ethnic Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo, prompting the European Union to impose sanctions on Kosovo that were lifted in December 2025 after ethnic Serb mayors were elected in northern municipalities. However, the sanctions likely cost Kosovo hundreds of millions of euros in economic damage during their enforcement period.
Opposition parties criticized Kurti’s handling of relations with Western allies, particularly the United States and European Union, characterizing his approach as unnecessarily provocative and damaging to Kosovo’s international standing. During the February campaign, U.S. special envoy Richard Grenell publicly called Kurti an unreliable partner of the United States, an extraordinary intervention in domestic Kosovo politics that reflected Washington’s frustration with Kurti’s policies. European Union election observers characterized the February vote as peaceful and competitive but criticized harsh rhetoric reflecting deep political divisions, the Belgrade-backed Serb List party’s pressure on voters depconcludeent on Serbian social assistance or employment in Serbia-managed institutions, and Vetëvconcludeosje’s attempts to prevent Serb List from competing while engaging in harsh anti-Serb rhetoric. These international tensions contributed to opposition parties’ refusal to enable Kurti’s continued governance.
Voter sentiment reflected frustration with Kosovo’s political class broadly rather than enthusiasm for particular alternatives. Opinion polls are not published in Kosovo, leaving the outcome uncertain as voting concluded. Some voters expressed pessimism about prospects for meaningful alter regardless of results. One doctor notified reporters there would be no great joy whether Kurti won or opposition prevailed, stating the counattempt requireds drastic alters not visible from any party. Exit polls were expected shortly after polls closed at 7:00 PM, with final results to follow. The central question remained whether Vetëvconcludeosje could achieve the majority that eluded it in February or whether Kosovo faced continuation of political deadlock with potentially severe consequences for economic development, international financing, and institutional stability.
Background
Kosovo has a single national parliament (Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo) with 120 members, including seats reserved for minorities (Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, etc.). The political landscape in the last four years had been shaped by the government of Lëvizja Vetëvconcludeosje (LVV) and Prime Minister Albin Kurti, while the main political parties in opposition, Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK-NISMA) managed to maintain their strong standing in the municipalities following the 2021 local elections.
Kosovos media landscape was vibrant and diverse, but faces significant challenges, including deep ethnic divisions and financial constraints. The sector remained highly fragmented, with Albanian and Serbian communities primarily engaging with separate outlets, and only limited efforts created to foster cross-community dialogue. Additionally, some private media outlets displayed signs of politicisation, and their ownership structures are not fully transparent. While constitutional protections uphold media freedoms, concerns remain over the challenges faced by the public broadcaster, including a dysfunctional board, issues with editorial indepconcludeence, property disputes, budreceiveary constraints and human resource challenges. These limitations were especially evident at RTK2, the broadcasters Serbian-language channel. During the February 2025 election campaign, due to its governance deadlock, the IMC failed to enforce its regulatory oversight to impose sanctions, thus created a situation of prolonged uncertainty for media organisations. Nevertheless, the public broadcaster, RTK, provided largely equitable coverage of key electoral contestants on its main Albanian-language channel, reflecting a commitment to balanced reporting.
Kosovos internet penetration rate is estimated at over 95 per cent and around half the population is present on social media platforms. Facebook and Instagram are the most popular platforms, with over 800,000 and 600,000 utilizers respectively. TikTok is a close third, with a growing number of utilizers, surpassing 500,000. X has a tiny utilizer base in Kosovo, but it is popular among journalists, politicians, and commentators, mostly to engage with international audiences. TV remains the main source of information for Kosovars (82 per cent of Kosovars), followed by social media (65 per cent) and online news portals (45 per cent). The COVID-19 pandemic led to the closure of all print media in Kosovo and news outlets have increasingly turned to social media to reach their audiences. Similar to traditional media, the Albanian and Serbian communities mostly inhabit different informational spheres, where events are often interpreted from an ethnic perspective. Topics that gain a lot of attention from one community are at times absent or only marginally mentioned in the social media bubble of the other.
09 February 2025
On 09 February 2025, parliamentary elections were held in Kosovo, where the election campaign started on January 11. The 09 February 2025 parliamentary elections were the first to take place under a new electoral law, Kosovo was a parliamentary democracy. The constitution and laws provide for an elected unicameral parliament, the Assembly, which in turn elects a president, whose choice of prime minister the Assembly must approve. Civilian authorities maintained effective control of the security forces.
Human rights issues included refoulement; concludeemic government corruption; crimes involving violence or threats of violence against journalists; and attacks against members of ethnic minorities or other marginalized communities, including by security forces. The government sometimes took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abutilizes in the security services or elsewhere in the government. Many in the government, the opposition, civil society, and the media believed that senior officials engaged in corruption with impunity.
NATO and the European Union beefed up their resources in Kosovo amid rising tension in the Balkan nation ahead of February 9 parliamentary elections. The Western military alliance declared it had sent 200 additional Italian soldiers to bolster the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping mission, which had been in the counattempt since 1999 and now had some 4,000 troops, down from a peak of 50,000. “Today, Italian troops from KFOR’s reserves completed their arrival…reinforcing KFOR’s presence in Kosovo,” a statement declared. The “Italian mechanized infanattempt brigade ‘Sassari,’ will carry out a range of activities, toreceiveher with KFOR troops.” It declared the force “will be deployed in response to any relevant developments in the security situation including during the election period.”
Separately, the EU declared an election observation mission had been established to oversee the parliamentary vote. The High Representative had appointed Nathalie Loiseau, Member of the European Parliament, as Chief Observer.
The election observation missions to Kosovo, at the request of its authorities, will demonstrate the EUs resolute support for Kosovo in its efforts to further strengthen its democratic governance. The missions presence on the ground was aimed at contributing to an inclusive, credible and transparent election process allowing Kosovo voters to clearly express their choices.
An EU election follow-up mission (EFM) was deployed to Kosovo from 14 November to 8 December 2022. The main objectives of the mission were to assess the status of the implementation of the recommconcludeations of the EU election observation missions (EOM) as well as to discuss further steps to advance the electoral reform process. This was the first EU EFM ever deployed to Kosovo. Since 2013, the EU observed all elections in Kosovo and offered a number of recommconcludeations for improvements in the electoral framework. However, through 2022, there seemed to be no noticeable progress in implementing those recommconcludeations, partially due to the lack of political will to proceed with an efficient follow-up process, and also becautilize of the unstable government coalitions and frequency of early elections in Kosovo.
Civil society organisations expressed, however, their discontent regarding the scope of planned reforms as they will focus on addressing mainly EU recommconcludeations, all of which touch upon technical issues thus not addressing the long-standing concerns of civil society that would require constitutional amconcludements, such as the direct election of the president of Kosovo, the number of preferential votes for the members to the Kosovo Assembly or introduction of non-partisan composition of election administration bodies..
Political parties in Kosovo utilized state resources to campaign. Dozens of cases were identified in the first week of the election campaign alone. Organizations monitoring this process declared that official vehicles, public institution spaces, and even cases where civil servants are present at public gatherings, even during working hours, were being utilized. In some organizations of the ruling party there was a presence of official vehicles and public servants, but also in cases or activities organized by opposition parties such as PDK, LDK, AAK, especially in municipalities governed by these parties.
“With our government, the era of illegal institutions in Kosovo Serbia concludes.” This was what Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti declared 24 January 2025 during a rally in Llabjan, Artana. “Those others had created Kosovo, as a budreceive, as a territory, and as institutions, into pieces. And they themselves are in pieces. Don’t mess with them at all. So finally, in our government, that thesis that was possible had come to an conclude, both bargaining with Serbian structures and working for the Republic of Kosovo. It was not possible to bargain with Serbian structures and commit to an indepconcludeent state. These two things exclude each other. When you commit to an indepconcludeent state, you fight the structures of Serbia. Our people have a very good expression: He who can be left-handed with two pumpkins under one armpit, also had a third pumpkin on his neck ,” Kurti declared.
The 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo were peaceful and competitive, taking place under a new legal framework aimed at enhancing transparency and trust. Election day was generally wellrun, yet, critical parts of the process were affected by poor organisation by the Central Election Commission (CEC), also cautilizing critical delays in the announcement of polling station and final results. The campaign was dynamic, albeit marred by harsh rhetoric and misutilize of public resources. Positively, the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) dealt swiftly with a significant number of cases, resulting in substantial fines for violations of the Code of Conduct for Political Entities. In Kosovo Serb-majority areas, social conditions remain dire, creating room for Serbia and Srpska Lista (SL) to exert undue pressure on voters. Although media freedom was widely recognised, the Indepconcludeent Media Commissions (IMC) paralysis in the weeks before election day left media violations unaddressed. Nevertheless, voters and key actors in the process demonstrated resilience and a strong commitment to democratic principles.
The elections were conducted following a full governmental term under Prime Minister Albin Kurtis Lëvizja Vetëvconcludeosje (LVV), during which opposition parties maintained strong municipal positions. The Government faced criticism for political polarisation and strained relations with the Kosovo Serb community. The election process witnessed attempts of politicisation of key institutions by the ruling party, particularly of the CEC and the IMC. The CEC became entangled in political disputes and politicised certain technical aspects of the electoral process. The attempt by LVV-nominated members of the CEC to prevent the certification of SL and the blocking of the disbursement of public funding to political parties placed significant pressure on the institution.
The 2025 parliamentary elections were the first to be held under the Law on General Elections (LGE), adopted in 2023, that introduced a number of novelties aiming to increase stakeholders trust and enhance the effectiveness and transparency of the electoral process. The legal framework lays a sound basis for conducting democratic elections in line with international standards. However, the implementation of the new legal framework underscored aspects of the law that warrant further clarification to mitigate potential amlargeuities and reinforce legal certainty.
It was striking that, despite ample prior notice, the implementation of the new electoral law and the overall election organisation suffered from inadequate preparation. A significant number of cases were submitted to ECAP, also leading to the imposition of substantial fines for violations of the code of conduct. The law provides clear timelines and well-defined procedures for handling electoral disputes. However, the process could be enhanced with additional clarity. During the electoral process, a few cases reached the Supreme Court, with most judgments upholding ECAP decisions.
The campaign was vibrant with no major incidents. However, negative rhetoric, harsh verbal attacks and inflammatory language were widespread during campaign events. In addition, the campaign was subject to foreign interference from Serbia and the United States administration. Women candidates were subject to sexist verbal attacks, had fewer resources than their male counterparts, and attracted less media coverage. No meaningful debates were held between leading candidates. EU EOM observers and interlocutors reported instances of misutilize of public resources by several political entities during the campaign, with some cases resulting in sanctions. The absence of strong monitoring mechanisms raises concerns about the effectiveness of campaign finance regulation.
The political landscape in the Kosovo Serb community was marked by a perceived increase of political pluralism, with six political entities contesting the elections. However, SL remained dominant within the Kosovo Serb community, receiving concludeorsement from the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic and relying on the Serbian media and tiny Kosovo Serb media outlets for its campaign. Additionally, pressure on voters, depconcludeent on Serbian social assistance and employment, was reported. In general, the Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities saw a relatively subdued campaign compared to other municipalities.
Election coverage was dominated by partisan attacks, allegations of media bias and a lack of opportunities to compare candidates directly on major TV channels, further exacerbated by LVVs boycott of three prominent private media outlets. While broadcasters offered election debates, failed to host policy-driven discussions, reflecting a weak debate culture among political contestants that limited voters ability to evaluate party programmes. Legal provisions contributed towards a level playing field by regulating paid airtime and ensuring a minimum allocation of free airtime when paid coverage was utilised.
Campaigning online mirrored the aggressive tone of the public debates and rallies, but lacked substance, particularly in the first half of the campaign period. All political parties contesting the elections and over half of the candidates campaigned on social media, mostly on Facebook and Instagram. The harsh tone of the campaign was reflected on social media through videos of campaign events, which constituted a large part of the content posted by parties and candidates. The election-day silence was broken by several posts and ads, some of which resulting in sanctions by ECAP. Over 250,000 was spent on promoting more than 7,000 election-related ads on Facebook and Instagram, including ads from third parties.
The Government had been criticised for contributing to the polarisation of the political landscape with Kosovo Albanian opposition parties and hindering the normalisation process with the Kosovo Serb community, which remains heavily influenced by Serbia. The affirmation of Kosovos sovereignty had been a key focus of the ruling partys policies and initiatives. Sovereignty also emerged as a key campaign theme for LVV, encapsulated in its main slogan From corner to corner. The LVV-led attempt to prevent the certification of Serbia-affiliated Srpska Lista (SL) was followed by intensified rhetoric aimed at delegitimising SLs participation in the elections, with LVV linking SL and Belgrade to the terrorist attack in Banjska in September 2023. A large-scale operation followed on 15 January 2025 by Kosovo authorities to dismantle Serbia-operated structures in 24 locations across municipalities south of the Ibar/Ibër river. The international community criticised those actions as not conducive to the normalisation process of the EUfacilitated Dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.
The election process witnessed politicisation of key institutions by the ruling party, particularly the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the Indepconcludeent Media Commission (IMC). The CEC became entangled in political disputes and politicised certain technical aspects of the electoral process. The attempt by LVV-nominated members of the CEC to prevent the certification of SL, and the blocking of the disbursement of public funding to political parties, placed significant pressure on the CEC.
The participation in the elections of six Kosovo Serb political parties was seen as a positive development, leading to a perception of increased political pluralism in the community. In total six Kosovo Serb political parties contested the election, including SL, For Freedom Justice and Survival (SPO), Serbian National Movement (SNP), Party of Kosovo Serbs (PKS), Citizen Initiative National Justice (GINP) and Serbian Democracy (SD). However, SL continued to dominate the political landscape in the Kosovo Serb community, with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic concludeorsing SL and repeatedly urging Kosovo Serbs to vote in large numbers for their candidates.
Candidates reported enjoying freedom of assembly, expression and shiftment throughout the campaign. The main Kosovo Albanian political entities, including LVV, LDK, PDK, AAKNISMA and the Coalition for Family, campaigned across Kosovo, and some sporadically in the north. LVV, LDK and PDK organised most of the large-scale campaign rallies. Door-to-door activities and tiny gatherings tarreceiveing specific groups of voters were the most frequent campaign methods utilized by all contestants. The main campaign topics were economic development, education, NATO and EU memberships, judicial reform and social welfare, with LVV distinctively focutilizing on the sovereignty of Kosovo. For Kosovo Serb contestants, the main campaign messages were the security and protection of the rights of Serbs within Kosovo.
Most parties engaged in dynamic online campaigning, with Facebook as the primary platform, followed by Instagram and TikTok. Online campaigning mirrored the harsh tone of rallies and debates, with videos from campaign events forming a large part of the content posted.
Although the election campaign was vibrant with no serious incidents reported, it was marked by negative and inflammatory language and harsh verbal attacks on opponents, often by LVV, LDK, PDK and AAK-NISMA, at public events, debates and online. In addition, interference in the campaign was observed by the United States envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell, criticising Prime Minister Albin Kurti for not being a reliable partner to the United States. The Coalition for Familys campaign messages denigrated the LGBT+ community and promoted traditional gconcludeer roles in society, sometimes inciting hatred. In the last weeks of the campaign, harsh rhetoric and personal attacks intensified, leading to numerous complaints filed with ECAP regarding campaign language.
Kosovos ruling party, LVV, led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, secured 48 seats, falling short of an outright majority. PDK obtained 24 seats followed by LDK with 20 seats and AAKNISMA with eight seats. SL secured nine out of 10 reserved seats for the Kosovo Serb community while one seat went to SPO. Of the 10 seats guaranteed for non-majority communities, KDTP obtained two seats while the IRDK, NDS, VAKAT, PREBK, SDU, PLE, PAI and JGP all obtained one seat. LVV and SL guaranteed the women representation without the required to apply gconcludeer quota with respectively 46 per cent and 33 per cent of their elected members being women.
On 21 February, a Kosovo-police-led operation closed the premises of the Center for Social Work in North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavic/Leposaviq and Zvecan/Zveçan, which worked under the Serbian system, due to suspicion that illegal actions related to the election process were carried out in these institutions. While these operations were based on a court order, they are in line with the Governments previous practices of closing existing structures providing basic social services for Kosovo Serbs and other communities, without a previously agreed alternative arrangement within the EU-facilitated Dialogue. Following the CECs final results, some nonmajority Bosniak party leaders weighed in Emilija Redepi supported Albin Kurtis eventual mandate to form a government, while Duda Balje set conditions for her support, including municipal and education reforms.
Tensions between SL and LVV escalated after the final results announcement. SLs Igor Simic accutilized Albin Kurti of manipulating votes to secure a seat for Nenad Raic, calling the Assembly illegitimate. PM Kurti and Nenad Raic responded with claims of Serbian interference, detailing actors and methods involved in influencing the election outcome.
The February 2025 parliamentary election established the conditions for the subsequent political crisis. Kurti’s Vetëvconcludeosje won approximately 42.3 percent of the vote, translating to 48 seats in the 120-member Assembly, well short of the 61 seats required for a majority government. Turnout reached 46.55 percent despite technical problems that delayed official results until mid-March when the election commission’s website failed under increased utilizer traffic. The Democratic Party of Kosovo secured 25 seats, the Democratic League of Kosovo won 20 seats, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo captured nine seats, with minority parties holding the remaining seats. All major opposition parties immediately declared they would refutilize to form coalition governments with Kurti, citing disagreements over his handling of relations with Western partners and his confrontational approach toward Kosovo’s ethnic Serb minority concentrated in northern municipalities. The Democratic League proposed a transitional government comprising all ethnic Albanian parties, which Vetëvconcludeosje rejected, initiating a deadlock that would persist through year’s conclude.
Parliamentary dysfunction manifested immediately after the February election through repeated failures to elect basic institutional leadership. The Assembly convened on 15 April 2025 for the first time but could not elect a Speaker, a prerequisite for parliament to function. Vetëvconcludeosje nominated Albulena Haxhiu, the acting Minister of Justice, for the Speaker position. Haxhiu received 57 votes in successive balloting attempts, consistently falling four votes short of the required 61-vote majority as opposition parties blocked her election. The deadlock persisted through sixteen failed attempts to inaugurate parliament, with President Vjosa Osmani convening meetings with party leaders that produced no resolution. Kurti insisted on Haxhiu’s candidacy while opposition leaders demanded a different nominee capable of commanding broader support. Political scientist observers characterized the stalemate as reflecting deep political divisions beyond mere procedural disagreements, with opposition parties fundamentally opposed to enabling another Kurti-led government regardless of institutional consequences.
Even after finally electing a Speaker on 26 August 2025, concludeing the initial four-month deadlock, Kosovo entered another institutional crisis from 26 August through 10 October 2025 related to the election of the Serbian Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, a constitutionally mandated minority position. The continued parliamentary paralysis prevented passage of legislation, approval of state budreceives, ratification of international agreements, and normal government operations. Kurti’s administration operated in caretaker mode with limited authority while critical deadlines approached. Lawbuildrs faced requirements to elect a new president in April 2026 and ratify one billion euros in loan agreements from the European Union and World Bank scheduled to expire in coming months. The political stalemate threatened Kosovo’s access to vital international financing at a time when the counattempt struggled with poverty, unemployment, and economic stagnation.
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