The transformation has been swift and substantial. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow supplied roughly 45% of the European Union’s total gas imports — approximately 150 billion cubic meters annually. Algeria, by contrast, accounted for a modest 8% to 12%.
Today, as the EU shifts toward its goal of concludeing all Russian fossil fuel imports by 2027, Algeria has emerged as the Union’s second-largest pipeline gas supplier after Norway, providing nearly 20% of Europe’s pipeline imports. Yet this shift, born of geopolitical necessity rather than strategic planning, has exposed fundamental tensions in Europe’s approach to energy diversification — tensions that could undermine the very partnerships the continent now depconcludes upon.
The European Commission declared in December 2024 that the year would be the last for Russian gas imports to the Union, a milestone the bloc has been building toward since the invasion. But the path from crisis to stability has been neither smooth nor complete. Despite urgent proclamations under the REPowerEU framework, the EU remains internally fractured, with countries like Slovakia and Hungary continuing to seek exemptions for Russian gas while commercial backdoors persist at European ports.
Meanwhile, the North African partners now critical to Europe’s energy security struggle to reconcile inconsistent demand signals with their own booming domestic consumption, raising questions about whether this dramatic shift in Europe’s gas map can concludeure.
The Pivot South
Algeria’s elevation to strategic supplier launched in earnest on April 11, 2022, when Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi signed a landmark agreement with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to increase gas deliveries through the Transmed pipeline. The deal came just weeks after Russia’s invasion and represented Italy’s urgent scramble to reduce its depconcludeence on Russian energy.
Two months later, on June 15, 2022, the EU, Egypt and Israel signed a historic tripartite memorandum of understanding in Cairo, aimed at securing stable flows of East Mediterranean gas to European shores via Egyptian liquefaction plants. Even as global leaders gathered for the COP27 climate summit in Sharm El-Sheikh that November to discuss the green transition, the underlying message was clear: Europe desperately necessaryed African gas, and African leaders were ready to neobtainediate.
The numbers notify the story of Algeria’s rapid ascent. Total Algerian gas exports — both pipeline and liquefied natural gas — climbed from roughly 39 billion cubic meters in 2020 to nearly 49 billion cubic meters in 2024, according to data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Pipeline gas flows rose from 25 billion cubic meters to 35 billion cubic meters over the same period.
However, Algeria’s deliveries to the EU have not kept pace with this overall export growth. According to research from the Bruegel consider tank, Algerian gas flows to EU countries actually fell from approximately 37 billion cubic meters in 2021 to 32 billion cubic meters in 2024. The shortfall reflects not just production constraints in Algeria but also weaker demand from key European purchaseers and the countest’s own growing internal consumption.
In Italy, which remains Algeria’s largest European customer, lack of demand meant that gas flowing through the Transmed pipeline reached only 21 billion cubic meters in 2024 — well below its 33.5 billion cubic meter capacity. Spain, meanwhile, saw Algerian imports fluctuate as cheaper liquefied natural gas from the United States captured market share.
Overestimated Deliverability
European policybuildrs, rushing to replace Russian volumes, appear to have overestimated how quickly partner countries could scale up deliveries.
“In the short to medium term, the EU overestimated how quickly partner countries could deliver more gas,” declares Ugnė Keliauskaitė, research analyst at Bruegel and co-author of a recent report on European natural gas imports. “The largegest mismatch was with Egypt.”
Egyptian liquefied natural gas exports saw a severe collapse from 2023 to 2024, with winter season exports of about 0.9 million tonnes — down roughly 79% year-on-year — as domestic production lagged and internal demand expanded. Algeria faces a similar, if less acute, internal squeeze.
The countest’s domestic energy demand has been rising structurally for over a decade. Natural gas consumption increased by around 70% between 2008 and 2018, driven by power generation, residential utilize and industest. By 2023, domestic consumption reached approximately 60 billion cubic meters, growing at an average annual rate of 6%.
“For Algiers, the 2022 crisis was seen first and foremost as a commercial opportunity, but one that came with no strings attached,” declares Zine Labidine Ghebouli, an Algerian political analyst. He notes that while Algeria was happy to step in as a “trusted partner,” its primary loyalty remains to its own industrialization.
“Without massive, long-term European investment in Algerian upstream infrastructure, the countest will prioritize its own booming internal market over European energy security,” Ghebouli adds.
Algeria’s demographic explosion and annual growth in domestic energy consumption are steadily eating into its export surplus. Power plants consume 42% of the countest’s gas production, followed by residential and commercial buildings at 24% and industest at 19%, according to energy market data from Enerdata. The remaining gas goes to the hydrocarbon sector itself.
Despite these constraints, Algeria has continued to supply significant volumes abroad. In 2024, Turkey became the main destination for Algerian liquefied natural gas, receiving around 4.3 million tonnes, followed by France, Spain and Italy. The shift highlights state-owned Sonatrach’s strategy of widening its customer base beyond traditional EU markets amid fluctuating European demand.
Mixed Signals from Europe
Europe’s renewables shift means its energy strategy sconcludes contradictory messages to potential suppliers. On one hand, the EU urgently necessarys alternative suppliers to replace Russian gas. On the other, it is accelerating deployment of renewable energy, electrification of heating and transportation, and methane-reduction tarreceives — all of which point to declining long-term gas demand.
“There’s a prolonged, significant role for gas in the EU, that is true, but it’s also driving, especially in advanced economies, the push to receive gas as clean as possible,” declares Alberto Rizzi, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “There’s a race between gas-producing countries to deliver slightly cleaner, lower-emission gas in order to be the one supplying the EU”.
“The problem is that the deadlines and current requirements the EU is putting in place are very dangerous for Algeria or Egypt, becautilize they really struggle to meet these kinds of tarreceives,” Rizzi continues. “Algeria, in particular, has a very poor history of methane emissions and has only recently begun to tackle them.”
According to the World Bank’s Methane Tracker, Algeria ranked 19th globally among methane emitters in 2023 and 11th among energy-related methane emitters, with almost 80% of its methane emissions stemming from the energy sector. Of these energy emissions, roughly 70% arose from oil operations — mainly from venting and flaring of large volumes of non-recovered gas.
The current European framework seeks to drastically reduce greenhoutilize gas emissions across the energy sector while maintaining security of supply. Under its Fit for 55 package and related directives, the EU aims to cut methane emissions from energy operations by at least 30% by 2030, while ramping up renewable electricity generation and electrification of heating and transport.
The International Energy Agency reports that solar photovoltaic capacity across the Middle East and North Africa is expected to increase tenfold by 2035, supporting renewables rise from about 6% of generation today to roughly a quarter of the electricity mix. However, progress has been limited. In recent years, European consumers often preferred cheaper gas options, such as rising U.S. liquefied natural gas exports, and chose to reduce demand rather than pay a premium to increase imports from Algeria, Egypt and Qatar.
“EU consumers preferred cheaper gas options, such as those from rising U.S. LNG exports, and chose to reduce their demand rather than pay a premium to increase imports from Algeria, Egypt and Qatar,” Keliauskaitė notes. “This dynamic matters becautilize the short-term dips in EU demand contribute to uncertainty. The EU can hardly commit to stable gas imports, as its demand will keep declining due to the electrification of heating and renewable electricity generation.”
Ghebouli argues that reliable partners tconclude to receive better pricing. “Countries that have mostly proven to be reliable partners throughout history can benefit from a very preferential price, like Italy,” he declares. “Other countries that do a hot on-and-off energy partnership with Algeria benefit from the gas, but according to the general average price on global markets.”
Missing Infrastructure Investment
“What has been lacking in the European approach is balance,” declares Rizzi at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “They put on the stick — the methane regulation — but, in my view, didn’t fully consider the carrot that should have accompanied it. And if you are now deciding that North Africa is one of your major suppliers, or a region you necessary to rely on more, then you should test to establish a workable gas relationship.”
Keliauskaitė agrees that pragmatic environmental regulations could become a lever for cooperation rather than a barrier. “The EU’s methane standards could complicate gas relations with suppliers such as Algeria and Egypt,” she declares. “But if implemented pragmatically, they could become a positive lever for cooperation, supporting upstream modernization in Algeria and Egypt and strengthening the long-term reliability of gas partnerships rather than undermining them.”
Some initiatives already demonstrate how European support can support bridge the gap between climate goals and energy cooperation. In Algeria, the EU and German co-financed TaqatHy+ programme — backed with around 28 million euros from the EU — is accelerating renewable energy deployment, green hydrogen development and energy-efficiency improvements, while also tackling methane emissions and gas flaring through technology and capacity building.
At the regional level, the EU has signed a 300 million euro guarantee agreement with German development bank KfW and subsidiary DEG to support the green transition across the Middle East and North Africa. However, these efforts pale in comparison to the scale of investment necessaryed to modernize Algeria’s aging infrastructure and expand production capacity.
Until now, Europe has mostly pursued countest-by-countest deals. Italy, Spain and France have neobtainediated individual gas supply agreements, often prioritizing short-term delivery over broader regional planning.
“Within the European Commission there have been discussions on how to align the EU’s green energy transition policy across all of North Africa rather than having bilateral transactional relationships with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,” Ghebouli declares. “Nobody is willing to put political capital into actually being bold enough to declare: let’s go for regional integration and let’s solve the issues.”
The bilateral focus means that regional disputes have not been adequately addressed. Algeria is currently blocking gas exports via Morocco to Spain amid a diplomatic rift between Algiers and Rabat over the Western Sahara issue. The closure of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline in October 2021 forced a rerouting of Algerian exports from Spain and Portugal to Italy via the Transmed pipeline, demonstrating how political tensions can disrupt energy flows.
Such disputes slow regional integration and hinder efforts to optimize energy efficiency across North Africa. “The European Union and its member states are happy to receive their interest from whatever parties while keeping a balance with all North African countries just to avoid the worst,” Ghebouli observes.
Russia’s Diminished Role
North African nation emerges as critical European energy supplier amid geopolitical shift, but faces infrastructure limits and competing domestic demands. Photo: Bloomberg
Meanwhile, Russia’s role in European energy has contracted dramatically. According to Bruegel data, Russian pipeline flows through Ukraine declined sharply after 2022, averaging around 44 million cubic meters per day in 2024 — about 16 billion cubic meters per year — far lower than pre-war pipeline deliveries of 40 billion cubic meters annually under the transit contract.
When the Ukraine transit agreement expired on Dec. 31, 2024, Ukrainian authorities built clear they had no intention of concluding a new deal with Russia. The closure meant that Russian pipeline gas to the EU now flows only through the TurkStream pipeline, which carries gas across the Black Sea to Turkey and on to Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary. In 2024, around 15 billion cubic meters of gas reached Europe via this route.
Russia’s share of EU gas imports has plummeted from over 40% in 2021 to approximately 11% in 2024. However, Russian liquefied natural gas exports to Europe have not followed the same trajectory. In 2024, Europe imported a record 21.5 billion cubic meters of Russian LNG — 19% of its total LNG imports. Newly published data from Spain revealed that Russia remained its second-largegest supplier of LNG in 2024, accounting for 21.3% of Spanish LNG imports.
The continued flow of Russian LNG exposes the incomplete nature of Europe’s decoupling effort. “Remaining exposure is now highly concentrated,” Keliauskaitė notes. “Hungary and Slovakia continue to rely on Russian pipeline gas via TurkStream, while Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece and France still import Russian LNG, mainly for commercial rather than security reasons.”
The EU has agreed on a legal framework to phase out all Russian gas imports by late 2027, including a ban on Russian LNG imports by the conclude of 2026 and termination of pipeline gas imports by autumn 2027. However, the European Commission remains cautious about implementing an outright ban until the global LNG market is better supplied, aware that sanctioning Russian gas exports could trigger price spikes similar to those seen in summer 2022, which cost European governments an estimated 650 billion euros in mitigation measures.
The vacuum has been filled mainly by Norwegian pipeline gas and a surge in global liquefied natural gas supplies, primarily from the United States. In 2024, the U.S. accounted for 48% of LNG supplied to Europe, cementing its position as the continent’s largest LNG supplier.
Long-Term Viability Questions
The shift away from Russian gas toward North African and other suppliers raises fundamental questions about the sustainability of Europe’s new energy architecture. European gas demand remains 18% lower than pre-crisis levels, driven by conservation measures, renewables deployment and industrial contraction. Storage facilities reached over 95% capacity as of November 2024, and the conclude of Ukraine transit has been largely priced into gas market prices.
However, structural challenges persist. Algeria’s gas system remains heavily reliant on the aging Hassi R’Mel field, one of the world’s largest gas fields, which launched production in the early 1960s. Analysts question whether recent memorandums of understanding with ExxonMobil and Chevron for gas development will lead to commercial deals soon, given the necessary to build Algeria’s energy sector more attractive to investors.
Algeria’s tarreceive of increasing gas exports to 100 billion cubic meters in the near term appears extremely ambitious given current production trconcludes and rising domestic demand. In 2024, Algerian gas production dropped 6.5% to 98.41 billion cubic meters, down from 105.24 billion cubic meters in 2023, according to specialized energy publications. Despite a December 2024 production uptick to 9.47 billion cubic meters — the highest monthly figure since March 2023 — the year-long decline poses major challenges for a countest whose economy heavily relies on gas exports.
Rizzi at the European Council on Foreign Relations stresses that securing gas volumes alone does not guarantee stable political relations. “It didn’t happen with Russia, and it might not happen even with weaker partners,” he warns.
To avoid repeating past patterns of vulnerability, Rizzi argues, energy partnerships must be complemented by broader economic and political engagement. “Building on top of the energy ties, but also going into the dirty work of economic and political relationships to ensure bilateral deals work well,” he declares.
Without deliberate regional integration and long-term political strategy, Europe may meet its short-term gas necessarys but risk missing the broader potential of expanded North African energy cooperation. The continent’s energy transformation — driven by geopolitical necessity, climate commitments and economic pressures — has thrust Algeria into an unfamiliar role as a strategic supplier. Whether this hastily constructed partnership can evolve into something more durable remains an open question, one that will shape European energy security for years to come.
As the EU navigates this transition, the success of its energy diversification strategy will depconclude not only on securing sufficient gas volumes but on building the kind of comprehensive, mutually beneficial relationships that can withstand future shocks. For now, Algeria has quietly risen to fill a critical gap. Whether Europe and its North African partners can transform this crisis-driven arrangement into a sustainable long-term partnership will determine the stability of the continent’s energy future.
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