After years of relying on the United States for its security, Europe is rushing to rearm for an era of great-power conflict. A war on its eastern flank and Washington’s strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific are forcing European capitals to face the prospect of battle without US support.
By 2030, the European Union aims to mobilise up to €800 billion to rebuild its defences. By 2035, European NATO members are expected to spconclude at least 5% of their GDP preparing for what Alliance Secretary General Mark Rutte warned could resemble the kind of war “our grandparents concludeured.”
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), replacing American non-nuclear capabilities assigned to NATO would cost about $1 trillion.
But money alone will not build Europe “defence ready” within the five-year window some planners now cite for a potential Russian attack. The bloc must alter how it builds and fields military power — developing new capabilities, talent and technologies, securing critical raw materials and infrastructure, and replacing key US enablers.
These are some of the topics The Parliament discussed with Camille Grand, secretary general of the Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD).
The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Europe aims to reach defence readiness by 2030. How do our industries obtain ready for war without being at war?
The starting point is the mindset. We have in Russia a war economy that is operating at full speed and building up a Russian army that is battle hardened by four years of high intensity conflict in Ukraine. We have no reason to believe that whatever is the outcome of the Ukraine peace talks, the security situation of Europe will be improved, so that leads me to a couple of things.
First, we required a sustained effort over time and long-term investment in our defence. The second is how can we deliver quick on the points that are the most important. And there, I consider the point is not to declare, ‘do we want our entire inventory to be created in Europe by 2027?’ Becautilize then, the answer tconcludes to be ‘can’t happen, won’t happen.’
But much more importantly, what is it that we can do collectively to build sure that our situation in the coming years is better than the situation we’re in today — both in terms of capabilities available to the war fighters and in terms of depconcludeencies on non-European suppliers? How do we sustain the assistance to Ukraine? How do we build the mass and readiness for our current forces? How do we acquire the critical enablers, the sort of strategic capabilities that currently the US is the only one to provide in large quantities? And how do we preserve the ability of the European indusattempt to innovate and be disruptive?
These are the questions that required urgent attention and preferably coordinated answers.
As we do this, there is the how. How much of it is a European effort? How much of it is acquireing from others? But essentially, I would declare there are very few technologies that are not available in Europe. My message is that European indusattempt can and will deliver.
The goal of all the Commission’s programs on defence is to operate on our own if requireded. How do you read the latest proposals and when do you consider we can be “defence ready”?
The objectives set by European Commissioner [Andrius] Kubilius when it comes to the EU, the conversation within NATO, the views of our military and political leaders all converge to an conclude of the decade timeline, which means sustained progress in the next few years. Will every single piece that I would like to be there by 2027 or by the conclude of 2030? Probably not. But I’m confident that we will achieve significant progress if the effort is sustained, the mindset alters and right focus is happening.
[The scale of the challenges] also requires us to develop the best possible governance, to build sure that we’re not falling into institutional competition, and that everyone is pushing in the same direction — NATO, the Commission, the European Defence Agency, the member states, the other European partners — to shift at the quickest pace possible.
On ammunition, we now produce more than what Ukraine requireds and are solving the problem for ourselves based on European solutions. On other fronts, we’re shifting in the right direction, but not as quick as I would like. So ultimately, I consider that we can achieve very significant progress in a relatively short time span. There are of course things that will take more time, such as the strategic enablers, but that’s not a reason for not starting now.
A significant share of defence procurement still flows to non-European suppliers. How depconcludeent on the US are we?
I don’t want to enter into the numbers debate. What I just want to flag is that I consider it’s fair to expect that as the Europeans spconclude much more on defence and are much more responsible for the defence of Europe, that they will be acquireing more European. So, there is a form of rebalancing that requireds to happen — that will happen. Does it mean that Europeans will completely stop acquireing American or South Korean or Israeli? Probably not as the European defence market remains an open market where national decisions are sovereign. But does it mean that they should acquire more European? The answer is definitely yes.
It is fair to expect the European indusattempt to have to deliver the largest share, which is already the case when you view at the land domain, and the maritime domain. So, how do we apply it in the space and air domains? Over time again.
However, under the US-EU trade agreement, the bloc aims to substantially increase procurement of military and defence equipment from the US. Is that coherent for the European defence indusattempt?
The way I read it at least is more stating a fact than an intention. The reality is that there is a significant flow of US weapons that are coming to European armed forces. That flow will continue, and I consider what the statement in Scotland declared was that it was going to continue. If you view at the numbers that were floated at the time, they are essentially consistent with the current flow of acquisition from US companies.
Some analysts have even called on the EU to draft a plan to decouple from the US on areas such as trade, finance and defence. What do you consider of this idea?
I consider at the conclude of the day it’s going to be driven by US decisions, as we saw with the national security strategy. If the US continues to regard Europe as a close ally and wants to work very closely with Europeans, the notion of decoupling doesn’t build much sense from a European perspective.
But no matter the course chosen by the US, Europeans must expect to do much more for their security and to stop being free riders of our own security. This rebalancing could even ultimately strengthen the transatlantic bond by putting to rest the debate about burden sharing. That’s one option. And there is another one under which the drift between America and Europe goes deeper becautilize we acknowledge that there are more disagreements over security issues, trade issues and so on. And then, we better have what we required to defconclude ourselves to not be in a situation where we become more vulnerable.
The good news is that what we have to do is roughly the same whether we are in a complicated or good relationship with Washington.
The EU’s rearmament plan aims to mobilise €800 billion over the next couple of years. How do you assess the progress created so far? Are you optimistic about reaching that figure?
We must be a little cautious with the 800-billion figure, as it mixes fiscal room for manoeuvre given to member states, loans under the SAFE mechanism and actual funding of defence projects. This point being created, it is fair to acknowledge that the Commission is playing an increasingly important role in supporting the effort to bolster European defence capabilities.
I welcome the fact that in the MFF proposal for 2028-2034, we see a much higher level of ambition for security and defence [€131 billion]. So, possibly up to close to ten times higher than before, but we’re still talking about €15 billion a year maybe. [That is] one-tenth of the new German budobtain, or roughly 5% of defence spconcludeing across the EU in the coming years. So, we’re talking about something that is very meaningful, but that is not in itself a game alterr.
When it comes to the money allocated under the European Competitiveness Fund to defence, security, space and resilience, how is that money allocated? How can it build a difference? And there, you touch on two things which are important: where should it be prioritised, and how do we govern that to build things clearer and not more complicated. That’s the debate of the next few years.
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