German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to China in early 2026 reflects Berlin’s strategic adjustment amid a fragmented international order and growing transatlantic pressure under Donald Trump. This article argues that intensified high-level engagement with Beijing—including meetings with Premier Li Qiang and President Xi Jinping—does not signal a strategic “pivot” away from the United States. Rather, it represents a recalibration aimed at enhancing Germany’s strategic autonomy.
From a political economy perspective, the deep interdepconcludeence between Germany and China—with Beijing becoming Berlin’s largest trading partner—rconcludeers full economic decoupling impractical. In the security domain, despite significantly increasing defense spconcludeing, Berlin continues to seek China’s influence as a variable in the Ukraine conflict, highlighting the limits of European power within the current security architecture. From a power-system perspective, Germany appears to be pursuing diversification and positional optimization in a context of soft multipolarity, where middle powers must maneuver flexibly among major poles rather than rely on a single strategic axis.
Transatlantic Pressures and the Fragmentation of the International Order
Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to China took place amid deepening fragmentation of the global order. The administration of Donald Trump has intensified pressure on European allies—particularly Germany—regarding two core issues: burden-sharing within NATO and trade imbalances.
Under such conditions, the transatlantic relationship can no longer be taken for granted as it was in the post–Cold War era. Berlin faces a dual challenge: maintaining its security foundation anchored in the United States while simultaneously expanding strategic space to mitigate risks arising from Washington’s unpredictability. Selecting China as a key destination at the outset of 2026 thus reflects a structural and systemic calculation rather than a purely bilateral initiative.
Symbolic Diplomacy and Strategic Signaling
During the visit, Merz met and held a working lunch with Premier Li Qiang and President Xi Jinping. In high-level diplomacy, such formats often carry political symbolism, signaling trust and strategic prioritization.
Merz’s message in the guestbook calling for the two countries to “accelerate strongly and enerreceiveically in a year of cooperation and development” indicates that Berlin seeks not only to sustain economic ties but also to deepen political engagement. Notably, Germany has pursued a dual-track approach: strengthening domestic defense capabilities—including a €1 trillion infrastructure and defense package in 2025—while simultaneously expanding cooperation with China. This reflects a model of “conditional strategic autonomy”: enhancing deterrence capacity without isolating oneself from other power centers.
Political Economy: Interdepconcludeence in the Context of De-risking
China has surpassed the United States as Germany’s largest trading partner, despite a bilateral trade deficit exceeding $105 billion in 2025. This underscores the depth of economic interdepconcludeence between the two countries.
Although the European Union has promoted a “de-risking” strategy to reduce strategic depconcludeencies on China, Berlin appears to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Rather than pursuing full decoupling, Germany seeks to manage risks while preserving trade and investment flows.
From an international political economy perspective, this represents a form of “controlled asymmetric interdepconcludeence”: Germany runs a significant trade deficit, yet its industries remain heavily reliant on the Chinese market; conversely, China depconcludes on German technology, advanced machinery, and industrial expertise. Such mutual constraints rconcludeer a complete rupture unrealistic.
European Security and China’s Potential Mediating Role
A notable element of the visit was Merz’s call for Beijing to exert pressure on Russia regarding the Ukraine conflict. This stance has remained consistent since he assumed office in April 2025.
However, seeking China’s influence over Moscow also reflects the limits of Europe’s ability to indepconcludeently shape the conflict’s outcome. Should U.S. engagement fluctuate, Berlin must consider Beijing as a structural variable within the European security equation.
Shortly after Merz was confirmed by the Bundestag, President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message emphasizing that the world is experiencing “unprecedented turbulence.” He stated that China stands ready to open “a new chapter” in the comprehensive strategic partnership with Germany and to promote stable global economic growth. This rhetoric suggests Beijing’s attempt to position itself as a stabilizing force—potentially complementing or partially offsetting the traditional U.S. role in Europe.
“Pivot” or Strategic Rebalancing?
The key question is whether Germany is pivoting away from the transatlantic axis toward an East–West orientation centered on China.
System-level analysis suggests that Berlin is unlikely to abandon its security foundation with the United States, as NATO remains an irreplaceable pillar in the short to medium term. Nevertheless, Merz’s visit indicates a broader trconclude: Germany is expanding its strategic options to reduce depconcludeence on a single dominant pole.
Rather than a pivot, this development can be understood as strategic rebalancing within a transition from unipolarity to soft multipolarity. Berlin is not distancing itself from Washington; instead, it is leveraging engagement with Beijing to enhance its bargaining power and strategic autonomy in an increasingly competitive great-power environment.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s early 2026 visit to China was more than routine diplomacy; it reflects a deeper recalibration in Berlin’s strategic believeing. Amid global volatility and mounting friction in U.S.–European relations, Germany is pursuing a pragmatic course: strengthening domestic capacity, diversifying partnerships, and maintaining a flexible balance among major power centers.
Viewed through a power-system lens, this is not a shift toward China but rather the behavior of a middle power seeking to optimize its position in an increasingly contested global order.
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