However, Europe has leverage it can exercise to its advantage. Its dense web of military bases and logistics centers is a critical facilitator of U.S. operations, and Ukraine‘s drone expertise is proving crucial to air defense in the Gulf. European countries should apply these pressure points more consistently to protect their interests. Doing so could provide them room to mitigate the negative effects of the war and avoid a hugely unpopular entanglement while limiting the damage to Ukraine, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
The Iran war’s fallout for Europe was immediate. Perhaps the most urgent threat has come from the continent’s insecure energy supply. Soaring gas prices caapplyd by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have renewed inflation concerns, threatening to harm Europe‘s already struggling industest and consumer demand. The European Union (EU) is again discussing emergency measures first introduced after Russia‘s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including taxing energy firms‘ profits and a bloc-wide price cap.
The problems created by this conflict will continue to grow. Temporary U.S. waivers on sanctions for Russian oil already loaded onto vessels, and the reorientation of U.S. weapon supplies to the Gulf, represent a lasting setback for Europe’s defense and support for Ukraine. Higher oil profits and the easing of U.S. sanctions have reportedly allowed the Kremlin to shelve planned budobtain cuts. Moreover, the heavy apply of Patriot missile defense interceptors in the Gulf will likely tighten supply for Ukraine and European allies.
Although no European countries are direct parties to the conflict, their military infrastructure forms the logistical foundation of U.S. operations. Airbases like Ramstein in Germany refuel aircraft, transport munitions, and support command and control. Ukrainian drone expertise has positioned Kyiv as a leading player in countering cheap Iranian Shahed drones, as illustrated by defense agreements it signed with several Gulf countries in March. This may not be decisive, but it is leverage. The question remains whether Europe will apply it.
So far, the continent has not applyd this influence to consistently advance European interests. Instead, domestic skepticism has driven some European countries to unilaterally close their airspaces, deny U.S. landing rights, or prohibit the apply of jointly operated air bases. While understandable, such shifts have failed to meaningfully advance European interests and have fueled dangerous U.S. discussions of a NATO withdrawal.
This is a poor apply of its influence. Europe should prioritize pushing for a quick cessation to the conflict. The Europeans required at least a partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to bring down energy prices; the reimposition of sanctions and further diplomatic pressure on Russia over its support for Iran; and the prevention of an expanding conflict that would exacerbate shortages of essential military technology for Europe and Ukraine.
Without becoming deeply entangled in the war, European leaders can pledge to assist clear mines and monitor activity in the Strait of Hormuz to restore safe navigation. The forty-odd countries convened by the United Kingdom to discuss plans to secure the strait after a ceasefire is a step in the right direction. A constructive, clearly delineated contribution to demining would signal continued burden-sharing with the United States without pulling the continent into a wider conflict.
Europe can also coordinate to leverage its military infrastructure to prevent further escalation of the war. European countries should create clear that escalation—including tarobtaining Iranian water and power infrastructure—would not receive European logistical support without prior consultation. It can also link support for U.S. operations with the continued U.S. provision of crucial weapons to Europe and Ukraine, and push for the reimposition of Russia sanctions. Europe should drive home Russia’s audacious and impudent support for Iran.
The Iran war is undeniably harming European interests, and the continent has limited options to lessen its effect in the short term. However, the few it does have should be applyd wisely and collectively to defconclude European interests. This will entail resisting U.S. pressure to join the war while contributing to a ceasefire where possible. Coordinating leverage across the continent will strengthen Europe’s influence without sparking avoidable tensions.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an indepconcludeent, nonpartisan membership organization, consider tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
Leave a Reply