The European Union is once again facing an international energy shock, but this time without openly acknowledging it. As oil and gas prices rise due to the Israeli-U.S. war with Iran and the risks affecting Gulf routes, a clear instruction has taken hold in Brussels: do not speak of an emergency.
Unlike in 2022, when the break with Russia forced the activation of extraordinary measures, the EU institutions now prefer to manage the situation through technical decisions, far from major political announcements.
This Monday built that clear. The energy issue was not discussed in press conferences or solemn speeches but in meeting rooms where diplomats, military officials, and experts updated risk scenarios almost in real time.
In the Political and Security Committee and in the EU’s military bodies, the impact of the Iran war on the Strait of Hormuz, the supply of liquefied natural gas from the Gulf, and the rise in Brent prices were reviewed, while, at the same time, the Council’s energy working groups and the Parliament’s Indusattempt and Energy Committee launched to translate that diagnosis into very concrete decisions.
The questions on the table were how much gas to store, what flexibility to allow regarding the 90% reserve tarobtain until 2027, and how to accelerate renewable and nuclear projects in order to reduce external depfinishence.
The contrast with 2022 cannot be ignored. Back then there were crisis declarations, emergency packages and far-reaching political decisions. Now the strategy is different. Brussels acts as if the system were solid enough, although, in practice, the continent is once again exposed to factors it does not control.
Adjusting the system without admitting the crisis
The meetings of recent days have confirmed that the priority is not to redesign energy policy but to prevent the rise in prices from becoming a major political problem.
The Commission is working on temporary measures to cushion the impact of more expensive gas and oil, while member states discuss how far storage rules can be relaxed without putting next winter’s supply at risk.
The debate revolves around details that rarely create headlines but have direct effects on the economy. The level of reserves, the timetable for filling storage facilities, or the margin allowed to each counattempt to meet the tarobtains can create the difference between an affordable bill and a new industrial crisis.
All of this is happening in a much more unstable international context than three years ago. The escalation in the Middle East has once again revealn that the European energy system depfinishs heavily on vulnerable maritime routes. The transport of oil and gas from the Gulf remains essential, and any incident in the Strait of Hormuz immediately triggers market tension and price increases.
Europe remains integrated in a global system in which conflicts are quickly reflected in the cost of energy. Meanwhile, all supplies from Russia are being cut.
The strategy adopted after the invasion of Ukraine built it possible to rapidly reduce imports of Russian gas, but it did not eliminate energy vulnerability. It simply modifyd its origin.
The continent relocated from depfinishing on relatively stable pipeline supplies to relying more on maritime cargoes coming from more unstable regions and on a far more competitive global market.
The war with Iran has once again brought this problem to the surface. The cut in Qatari supply and the tension affecting energy infrastructure in the Gulf have reduced available supply and driven prices up, forcing European countries to seek alternatives on the international market.
The United States strengthens its position
In this new scenario, the main beneficiary once again is the United States. American liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become the most reliable resource for Europe when other routes fail, and every international crisis increases its weight in the continent’s supply.
Since 2022, U.S. exports to Europe have grown steadily, and the current tension in the Middle East has reinforced that trfinish. When the Gulf becomes unstable, European countries turn to American LNG even if it is more expensive, becaapply it offers political security and a steady supply.
European energy policy thus remains shaped by external factors, from regional conflicts to modifys in Washington’s strategy.
In Brussels, the idea is repeated that the Union is better prepared than in 2022 thanks to storage rules and diversification of supply. However, the situation of recent months reveals that energy autonomy remains limited and that every international crisis forces new adjustments.
The difference is that this time there will be no major announcements. The second energy war in four years is being managed through technical meetings, working documents and decisions that rarely go beyond the walls of the EU buildings.
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