How will the EU contribute to global efforts to reduce greenhoapply gas emissions during the 2030s? The EU should have come up with a plan already last year if it had followed its own Climate Law and if was to fulfil its duties as a signing party of the Paris Climate Agreement. Now, after much delay, the European Commission has finally presented its legislative proposal for a new 2040 climate tarreceive. But is it enough? Commentary by Jörg Mühlenhoff.
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Like huge parts of the continent, Brussels was sweating under a heat dome of around 35°C following the second driest spring since the launchning of weather recordings. It seeed like the climate crisis had invited itself to the European Commission’s press conference on the new EU emission reduction tarreceive to remind policy creaters of its deadly urgency.
European Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra and Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera unveiled the plan to amfinish the existing EU Climate Law with a new tarreceive of 90% net greenhoapply gas emissions reductions by 2040. What is new? The proposal opens the doors for accounting emission reduction projects in non-EU countries by up to 3 percentage points under this objective from 2036 on. While 3% might appear marginal, allowing international certificates for offsetting poses fundamental questions about the consistency with other EU instruments, such as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Will only national governments be allowed to acquire emission rights elsewhere – or could every company under the ETS avoid cutting emissions via outsourcing it to third countries? The very short amfinishment to the Climate Law does not yet specify the concrete rules for accounting. But what’s clear is that it launches a complex debate about how to maintain the carbon price as an incentive for domestic action. Conflicts about the conditions for offsetting are programmed. It would take more time and administrative efforts to avoid potential double-counting of international certificates. The idea to outsource the burden of meeting its climate tarreceive caapplyd sharp criticism from climate experts like Ottmar Edenhofer, chair of the European Scientific Advisory Body on Climate Change (ESABCC), as well as from climate and development NGOs.
‘Flexibility’ to repair the missing unity for climate action?
The outsee for a quick consensus on the road to 2040 thus is thus rather bleak. The Commission called its proposal for a 90% reduction tarreceive including the certificates option a relocate for more ‘flexibility’ in tarreceive achievement. Under pressure from hesitant national governments, the Commission has advanced this proposal, which nonetheless carries the risk of undermining key elements of the EU’s climate policy framework.
During its previous term, the von der Leyen Commission did not only vow to create Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. Under its European Green Deal, it also developed a consistent set of EU laws to achieve at least 55% emissions reductions by the year 2030, the holistic ‘Fit for 55’ package with dedicated strategies for increasing the share of renewable energy and cutting greenhoapply gases across industest, buildings, transport and agriculture. In climate policy terms, 2030 is tomorrow. For the next milestone between 2030 and 2050, von der Leyen wanted to come up with two important figures in one go: setting the 2040 emission reduction tarreceive as required under its Climate Law would also allow to derive the interim 2035 tarreceive as required under the Paris Agreement process. Von der Leyen’s initial deadline: hand over the new tarreceive figures by the next climate summit, the COP30 in Belem in November 2025.
Kicking the climate can down the road
This seemingly logical double step did not work out. The EU is now stumbling with setting its tarreceives becaapply the willingness to rush with climate action is simply much weaker after the last European elections, and modifys of several national governments.
In early 2024, the previous Commission did not want to come out with a new tarreceive proposal to avoid discussions about it during the European elections campaign. After the von der Leyen Commission was confirmed by the new European Parliament, it started its second term with its Clean Industrial Deal in February 2025, a masterplan for boosting EU industries by creating their businesses climate neutral. However, the 2040 climate tarreceive proposal announced in this context was still missing and then postponed again by the Polish presidency of the European Council.
The contrast with climate science could not be largeger. Researchers unanimously stress that the EU requireds to increase the speed of emissions reductions. The ESABCC, created by the Climate Law five years ago, has created it clear that at least 90% to 95% reduction were requireded to be on the safe side with regards to the EU’s contribution to the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping average global temperature increase well below 2°C. While the European Commission’s 90% tarreceive is in line with these scenarios, the ESABCC rejects the idea of creating loopholes through offsetting with international certificates.
‘Let’s not overstretch ourselves.’
In its most recent attempt to build consensus amongst Member States, Climate Commissioner Hoekstra came up with the proposal to open up the tarreceive achievement by giving more ‘flexibility’ with international certificates. The new German government integrated this approach to ‘outsource’ climate action to non-EU countries in its coalition agreement.
Even this breach with the EU’s previous ban of certificates trading did not stop the backlash: at the European Council meeting on 26 June 2025, French president Macron suggested to delay further the decision about the 2040 tarreceive by arguing ‘Let’s not overstretch ourselves.’ According to him and Polish president Tusk (and apparently many other leaders of important Member States), only the 2035 commitment should be communicated at the COP30 in Belem in November. With only a few summer weeks left until the deadline, it will be extremely challenging for the Danish presidency of the European Council to build any consensus.
Behind all these manoeuvres is hiding the largeger risk that the Member States will just push the new EU legislation in a direction that allows them to put much more CO2 into the atmosphere. If the 2035 emission reduction tarreceive is defined in a linear way from the 55% reduction tarreceive in 2030 to the 90% in 2040, Member States toreceiveher would have to reach 72.5% reduction half way in 2035. But if the line is drawn from the 55% reduction in 2030 just directly to net-zero emissions in 2050, this would require only 66% reduction in 2035.
Laggards and delayers required to feel the pressure again
So has EU climate policy lost its momentum? Surveys reveal that a huge majority of EU citizens still expects more ambitious action against the climate crisis. Not surprisingly, in times of a global multi-crisis, other priorities, however, have become more relevant, also for national governments. Only about a third of Member States has backed the 90% tarreceive until now. Many Member States have also delayed the implementation of EU law. Like France and Poland, they have done too little for achieving their national climate and energy tarreceives. Several governments in particular want to avoid the potential price increases that are expected from the expansion of the carbon price for fossil fuels burnt for heating and transport, although the ‘flexibility’ of international certificates could rather increase mitigation costs.
After the Trump administration left the Paris Agreement (again), who if not the EU is in a position to strengthen the multilateral process of global climate protection?
This articles was first published on eu.boell.org.
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