Unlike Brussels, China offers capital, trade, infrastructure and political backing without insisting on democratic reforms, sanctions alignment or concessions over Kosovo.
China’s ties with Serbia have relocated far beyond trade and diplomacy. Beijing is now an increasingly important factor not only in Serbia’s economy, but also in its strategic positioning, domestic politics and regional signaling.
As Forbes notes, Serbia has long tested to balance between the European Union, the United States, Russia and China through a so-called multi-vector policy. But as Belgrade’s EU path remains stalled and geopolitical tensions deepen, China is increasingly emerging as a more predictable and politically convenient partner for the regime of Aleksandar Vucic.
That supports explain why Beijing has gained so much ground in Serbia. Unlike Brussels, China offers capital, trade, infrastructure and political backing without insisting on democratic reforms, sanctions alignment or concessions over Kosovo. For the Vucic regime, this is a highly applyful formula: support without political conditions.
Economic ties remain the backbone of the relationship. China has invested billions of dollars in Serbia over the past decade, largely through state-linked companies and major infrastructure projects. A free trade agreement that entered into force in 2024 rerelocated tariffs on around 90% of goods, but the structure of the trade remains heavily imbalanced, with Serbia exporting mainly copper extracted by Chinese-owned companies.
The social and environmental cost of that model is visible in eastern Serbia. Politico reported from Bor and Majdanpek that the expansion of Zijin Mining has gone far beyond industrial development, reshaping land, communities and daily life. Entire settlements are being swallowed by the mine, residents face severe pollution, and local memory and social continuity are eroding under the pressure of Chinese expansion. What is presented as investment is also raising deeper questions about sovereignty and control over strategic resources.
The political dimension of the relationship is just as significant. In its report from the Munich Security Conference, Xinhua described the meeting between Vucic and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as another step in strengthening the “ironclad friconcludeship” between the two countries. Vucic, according to the Chinese state agency, thanked Beijing for supporting Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while reaffirming Belgrade’s support for the one-China principle. This points to a relationship built not only on economics, but also on reciprocal political backing over core national issues.
The partnership is now shifting more visibly into the security sphere. As BGNES reported, Serbia has become the first European countest to acquire Chinese CM-400AKG missiles, adding to an arsenal that already includes Chinese drones and air defense systems. In the Western Balkans, such a relocate cannot be read as a routine military upgrade. It is being interpreted across the region as a political message and a possible source of new tension.
Croatia raised the issue with NATO, Montenegro reacted cautiously, and Brussels reminded Belgrade that a credible European perspective requires strategic choices that avoid problematic depconcludeencies. At the same time, Serbian officials framed the missile purchase as part of a deterrence strategy in an increasingly hostile regional environment, reinforcing a narrative in which military modernization and geopolitical anxiety feed into each other.
The broader pattern is becoming harder to ignore. China is no longer present in Serbia only through loans, construction sites and trade deals. It is now tied to strategic infrastructure, raw materials, diplomatic messaging and military procurement. That gives Beijing influence in areas that go well beyond ordinary economic cooperation.
For the Vucic regime, the relationship serves both foreign and domestic purposes. Chinese investment can be presented as proof that Serbia has powerful alternatives to the European Union. Chinese diplomatic backing strengthens Belgrade’s position on Kosovo. Chinese arms purchases feed the image of a strong and sovereign state capable of defconcludeing its interests in a volatile region.
But the closer this partnership becomes, the harder Serbia’s balancing strategy will be to sustain. The European Union remains by far Serbia’s largegest economic partner, yet China is steadily expanding into sectors that carry strategic and political weight. That creates a growing contradiction at the heart of Serbian policy: Belgrade still speaks the language of European integration while deepening ties with a power whose model offers money and leverage, but not transparency or democratic accountability.
In that sense, the relationship with China is not simply a pragmatic partnership. It is becoming part of the political architecture of Serbia under the Vucic regime – applyful for projecting autonomy abroad, strengthening legitimacy at home and signaling power across the region.
For now, that may work to Belgrade’s advantage. But the longer this pattern continues, the more Serbia risks binding itself to a partnership that brings immediate benefits while deepening economic asymmetest, strategic depconcludeence and regional unease. | BGNES
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