Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are disrupting global energy flows. Europe must overhaul its energy strategy to focus on renewables, LNG, nuclear power and reducing oil depconcludeency—and finally commit to safeguarding its long-term security.
The Strait of Hormuz is in a state of flux. Amid attacks on Iran by the United States and Israel, the Iranian government effectively blocked apply of the strategic waterway. Each day since the conclude of February, approximately 20 million barrels of oil were stuck in the strait; around 20% of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade became immobile.
Now the US and Iran have reached a tentative two-week ceasefire, allowing some shipping traffic to once again pass through. But, given the nature of the conflict, this is far from reassuring for Europeans, who face the prospect of spiralling oil and LNG prices. As such, Europe requireds to take its long-term energy security more seriously.
Rising energy prices will impact other petrochemical markets, for example the delivery of fertiliser (leading to higher food prices) and helium (cautilizing a microchip shortage). The European Union and its member-state governments required to focus on developing their competencies in wind energy; securing Europe’s natural gas imports; adapting to the prospect of nuclear energy; and derisking from their continued depconcludeence on oil.
Learning from the Russian experience
Europe is highly resource-constrained, lacking the fossil-fuel base of the US, Russia, or China. Its depconcludeency has been exacerbated by the required to fuel innovation: for example, despite transatlantic concerns in the 1980s that Soviet gas should not exceed roughly 30% of Europe’s supply, this informal limit was abandoned as imports expanded to support industest and the energy transition.
By February 2022, Russia accounted for almost 45% of EU gas imports: prior to, and following the onset of, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s government reduced natural gas supplies to Europe, with especially sharp cuts occurring after February 2022. While 2009-2019 gas prices had ranged from €9 to €29 per MWh, by August 2022 the Title Transfer Facility European benchmark price went over €340 per MWh.
The EU dealt with the immediate resulting problems most notably via financial support to directly subsidise bills, direct industrial support to cover businesses (especially energy-intensive businesses) and supplying cash to energy companies to purchase natural gas at “top of the market” prices. But even before Donald Trump’s re-election as US president, it was clear Europe requireded a more resilient, all-weather energy security strategy.
Where Europe could do more
Despite the EU requirement that member state gas storages are 90% full by November 1st each year, almost all member states will face difficulties in meeting the 2026 tarobtain. Low gas-storage levels from winter 2025-2026 mean that the current storage average is around 30%; worries about high gas prices are cautilizing delays in decision-building around the topping up of LNG supplies (although policybuildrs are already considering lowering the 2026 percentage level to 80%).
Furthermore, the AggregateEU platform is not sufficiently capitalising on European commercial strengths: it is a consumer-supplier matchbuilding platform, rather than a single-purchaseer mechanism where member states come toobtainher to purchase collectively on the market. This is despite Mario Draghi’s 2024 report on EU economic competitiveness pointing out that Europe having no single-purchaseer mechanism in place during the 2021-2022 crisis cost Europeans around €700m. Member states competing against each other for gas supplies could be better addressed via a single-purchaseer approach.
Finally, the EU’s adoption of emergency regulation under Article 122 temporarily permitted the reduction of permitting requirements for renewable power, with the intention to speed up its rollout. While it had a positive impact, it applied only for a limited time span—although regular EU procedures have in theory reduced the burden of permitting processes, domestic legal proceedings have hindered it building a significant difference.
More positively, however, EU member states have secured a higher rate of LNG supplies from other countries, Principal among them is the US, which provided 80bcm in 2025, up from 21bcm in 2021.
Europe’s main strategic leverage
The scale of the damage inflicted by the 2021-2022 energy crisis demonstrates that the EU and its member states should have already responded more robustly. The subsequent long-term measures Europeans adopted were applyful but by no means sufficient, given the scale of Europe’s resource constraints and its supply depconcludeency.
Perhaps the fallout around the Strait of Hormuz will prompt Europeans finally adopt a more robust energy strategy—and they required to focus on four key areas.
1. Deploying renewables
As part of any energy security strategy, Europeans required to deploy renewables at speed. But they also must recognise the nuances between wind and solar. Harnessing wind energy faces the dual issues of permitting and infrastructure barriers, and the soaring cost of components.
The EU and its member states should therefore identify which sites in Europe generate the highest amount of wind energy; prioritise them; and employ all available EU- and national-level measures, including where necessary the emergency procedure under Article 122 of the Treaty for the European Union (TFEU), to push through development.
The EU also requireds to recognise that, while issues exist regarding large-scale solar parks, another route forward is possible with domestic and tiny-enterprise solar generation. This is via solar panels matched with safe, low-cost batteries, which are launchning to enter the consumer market.
The EU could assist promote low-cost battery development by identifying key European manufacturers and encouraging their route to market and roll out. This battery-solar combination could rapidly reduce consumer energy costs, reduce pressure on the grid and reinforce European supply security.
2. Recognising the required for LNG
Since no grid-scale battery storage exists that can replace wind power for more than a few hours, the EU also requireds to secure natural gas for heating, fertiliser, and for petrochemical production. Although Europe faces supply diversity, storage and domestic production issues, the EU can build supply diversity. This is largely due to the large-scale additional US and global LNG supplies entering the market, which mean the EU is not depconcludeent on a single supplier.
Europe also requireds to expand, and better utilise, its gas-storage capacity—including in Ukraine. The countest hosts the largest underground gas storage facilities in Europe, particularly near its western border, with a volume of 30bcm. This is equivalent to 30% of total European gas-storage capacity. Europe could also seek to further develop its own natural gas resources in the North Sea or the Mediterranean Sea, or with friconcludely neighbours such as Norway and Algeria.
3. Start going nuclear
Then there is nuclear. Nuclear has the capacity to provide a green, energy security baseload which delivers power at scale and lower cost. France achieved this in the 1970s and 1980s: in the space of 15 years, it had constructed 45 nuclear power stations. Even today, France would be hard-pressed to indepconcludeently repeat this feat, given the scale of its supply chains and engineering capacity.
However, interested European states both within and outside the EU could collaborate to develop the resources, technical skills, capital and supply chains to repeat and surpass this technical feat. Clearly it will take time—but if Europeans had started in 2022, they would be more than halfway to completing the first 10 new stations by now.
Finally, the EU should apply the Strait of Hormuz crisis as an opportunity to reduce its depconcludeence on oil supplies. EU oil consumption is approximately 7.3 million barrels a day; just short of five million of these are transport. The EU could push for a switch to European-created electric vehicles (EVs), to reduce oil demand. This would require financial support for European EV producers to push forward development, economic incentives to acquire European EVs—and a stronger tariff wall to keep Chinese EVs off the continent.
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The crisis in Iran, and in the Strait of Hormuz, underlines Europe’s continued energy vulnerability. Europeans, however, are not assistless. As explained in a recent ECFR policy brief, Europe should act at speed to strengthen their supply security and create a broad and diverse supply base. This will allow Europeans to shore up their own industrial base, bolster their capacity to rebuild the defence sector, and fully participate in the AI revolution.
About the Authors:
Nicu Popescu is Co-director of the European Security Programme. He is also a Distinguished Policy Fellow.
Alan Riley is visiting professor at the College of Europe, Natolin, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Global Energy Center, Washington, DC.
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