And then he launched to imply, he declared, “After all, we will necessary still to create sure that Germany does not go nuclear, that Germany does not pursue the policies they did before. And we necessary a NATO for that.”
And Gorbachev answered that of course any expansion of NATO would be unacceptable, but he understood the points that Baker was building. And he added that, you know, it has been the policy of the Soviet Union to attempt to exclude you from Europe militarily, but we now understand that some American presence, military presence could be a stabilizing effect. So we are no longer attempting to exclude you from Europe. But then he added, “Of course, you don’t really necessary 300,000 troops stationed in Europe to perform that.”
Later in other conversations, when the question of expansion of NATO came up, Gorbachev would state, “Well, if you do that, you’re going to have to take us too.”
A Common European Home
I would have to state this was in the background of both sides, in effect, calling for the same conclude. Gorbachev spoke launchning in a speech in the UN in 1988, stateing that we have a common European home, which should be without barriers and so on. And on the other hand, our president and also, I consider, Prime Minister Thatcher, who was then the British, spoke of “a Europe whole and free.” And by 1991, the world had a Europe whole and free.
Warning Against NATO Expansion
So later in the ’90s, when a new administration launched to consider expanding NATO, I would state not only did I testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that that would be eventually a catastrophe if we started expanding NATO and continued it, but I was joined in a statement by, I consider, more than 30 of the senior people who neobtainediated the conclude of the Cold War.
Now, the reason we declared that was that NATO had been conceived as a defensive alliance in order to create sure that the Soviet Union could not successfully invade Western Europe. There was a great fear that that was their intent. And indeed, if you believed of the Soviet Union and its then East European allies, they had military forces that in quantity were superior to those in the West.
I might state that later, when all the documents have become available, it is clear that the Soviet Union never intconcludeed to invade the West. Their policy was that if the West started a war, they would respond and attempt to push to the English Channel, but that was planned as a response to what they would have considered aggression from the West.
NATO’s Shift from Defensive to Offensive Alliance
But what I’m attempting to state now is that the idea of bringing more countries into NATO would turn it from a defensive alliance to an offensive alliance if these forces were utilized particularly outside Europe. One of the arguments that people for expansion created in the 1990s was “out of area or out of business.” In other words, we had to utilize the NATO alliance militarily outside Europe, or else there was no point to it.
They also testified, people who were not even involved, that oh, there was never any agreement regarding expansion. Now, what I state now is whether or not there was an agreement, and certainly we were given assurances that we wouldn’t expand NATO, but whether or not that is true, it was a huge mistake to start expanding NATO.
Russian Concerns: Bases, Not Article 5
Another point I would create is that it was not so much the sort of Article 5 of the NATO treaty that worried the Russians. I know the Russian ambassador to Washington, whom I had dealt with many times when he was a deputy foreign minister at the Soviet Union, Yuli Vorontsov, informed me sort of in the mid-’90s. He declared, “Look, you know, we don’t worry about your Article 5. We’re not going to obviously attack these countries or any others. What we worry about is bases. If you then put your bases in, that is going to be very worrisome to us.”
And in fact, in the 2+4 agreement, though there was no mention of NATO expansion, there was a provision that the territory of the former East Germany would not be utilized to base any foreign troops or any nuclear weapons. In other words, what was then accepted in the treaty as NATO expansion.
And the fact was that after Baker had returned to Washington, he was informed by the lawyers, “Now, if Germany unites, there’s no way you can exclude part of it from the NATO alliance.” So a lot of these issues obtained mixed up.
NATO’s Offensive Use Against Serbia
But the expansion really, and then next, NATO in the ’90s was utilized in an offensive way against Serbia. All but a declared war was declared against Serbia, which had not attacked any NATO member. In effect, we were extconcludeing NATO protection to others as Yugoslavia launched to break up. That was one of the first things that created, I would state, extreme tensions between the United States and then Russia.
Russia’s Role in the Soviet Breakup
Another point I should create is that when people talk about Russia always being aggressive and so on, it was precisely the elected president of the Russian Federation who played the key role in bringing the Soviet Union down. And also, he was a firm supporter of Baltic indepconcludeence, which was declared legally before the Soviet Union broke up.
So in effect, the breakup of the Soviet Union was not something that the West was pressing for. As a matter of fact, although the first Bush administration was firm in supporting the restoration of indepconcludeence of the three Baltic countries, we actually, for a number of rational reasons, wanted the rest of the Soviet Union to preserve a voluntary federation, the sort that Gorbachev tconcludeed in time to support.
So the idea that we brought the Soviet Union down is absolutely the opposite. We were doing our best to support Gorbachev in neobtainediating a new union treaty, to the point that when President Bush, after visiting Moscow, visited Kiev, he spoke to the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. He recommconcludeed them to enter Gorbachev’s Federation and declared that they should avoid suicidal nationalism.
But we declared at the time that this was a speech meant for all of the non-Soviet republics, not just Ukraine. And when he spoke of suicidal nationalism, he was considering of what was going on in Georgia at that time.
The Soviet Breakup and Nuclear Proliferation
But it was clear that we did not want the Soviet Union to break up at that time, that is the United States. But of course, events obtained ahead of things, and by certainly November, it was clear that it was probably going to break up. And so obviously, after December 25th, when Yeltsin sort of took over in Russia and with the cooperation of others into the Soviet Union, we immediately proposed to recognize the successors.
Becautilize one of the things that worried us throughout was the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So one of the conditions for recognizing the indepconcludeence of Ukraine and others was that they relinquished their nuclear weapons. I know this has become an issue later. And most of these, by the way, were scheduled to be eliminated under arms control treaties we had with the Soviet Union. And as a condition of recognizing their indepconcludeence, they had to agree to abide by these agreements.
Ukraine’s Nuclear Weapons
In other words, those weapons that were in Ukraine, first of all, were never under the control of Ukraine politically and practically. The codes and so on were in Moscow, passed on to Gorbachev, to Yeltsin. And second, it is not at all clear that if Ukraine had kept them, that they could have maintained them.
But in any event, the return of those weapons to Russia, which at first was resisted by the Ukrainian parliament, was insisted upon by the United States. And becautilize we feared not that they would be utilized against us necessarily, but that this technology would seep out into elements that would utilize it. And I might add, that is still much more a threat in the future than any government actually applying them.
And one of the large issues we had in the 1990s was a cooperative effort to create sure that the nuclear materials and nuclear weapons in Russia were, first of all, reduced as we had agreed earlier, and second, that the materials were secured. That’s one of our more successful efforts in the ’90s.
But now, I wanted to explain that background becautilize so many people state now, “Oh, you know, if Ukraine had just kept those weapons, Russia would not have attacked them.” That was never a practical or political possibility.
GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, I hear that argument all the time as well. But I consider people often forreceive that in the 1990s, a lot of great statesmen, George Kennan, yourself, and others, many were warning against essentially going for NATO expansion instead of pursuing this new pan-European security architecture.
So I was wondering, why did we fail to establish then a common European home, as Gorbachev would have declared, or at least a common European security architecture? Becautilize we did have some agreements like the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe set up in ’94 based on these principles, all essentially originating from the Helsinki Accords of how to have a common Europe. Why did we fail?
Domestic Politics and the Rise of Neoconservatism
JACK MATLOCK: I consider there may have been a variety of reasons, but in fact, I consider we, and particularly in the United States, but also in other Western countries, were responding to domestic politics. And in the case of the United States, we have very large numbers of voters in states like Pennsylvania and Illinois from Eastern Europe, and they were determined to receive these countries in NATO becautilize they traditionally viewed at Russia as a threat.
And that was one thing that sort of politically, I know when I testified against NATO expansion during the intermission, some of the people came up to me and declared, view, be practical. The president necessarys those electoral votes. There are two swing states, Pennsylvania and Illinois, and all those East Europeans are demanding we go into NATO. So I would state in the case of the United States, it was largely, not entirely, a matter of internal politics.
But second, you had the growing influence of what we call the neoconservatives, the neocons, those who actually both Reagan and Bush had sidelined. At that time, most were Republicans, and I would state both Reagan was able to sort of sideline and ignore their advice. They advised against most of our arms control neobtainediations. They wanted us simply to continue to utilize force, and to bring down the system. They were considering of regime modify, which by the way was something that neither President Reagan nor the first President Bush believed of.
I mean, they did not consider they were attempting to bring down the Soviet Union. Reagan’s idea was communism is a crazy idea, but if that’s what the Soviets want, that’s their business. What we object to is they’re forcing it on other people. So there wasn’t an idea that we had a mission to attempt to modify their political system.
The Unipolar Moment and Its Consequences
What I’m attempting to state is that suddenly you had a philosophy being expressed that the United States won the Cold War and that now it was the sole superpower, and that therefore it could determine the future of other countries. That there had been two superpowers that ran the world, and now there was only one. And so we were in what they call a unipolar world.
Now, there are several things wrong with that. First of all, yes, the United States had much more power, both militarily and in terms of economics, than any other counattempt. But military power is power to destroy, not power to build. And the economic system is one which could be, I state, responsibly managed to the benefit of everybody, or by the more powerful states turned into a weapon.
Now, to my sorrow, I declared, launchning in the ’90s, the United States started to do both. To sanction other countries for things that really had nothing to do with the United States, but what we considered their behavior internally. And second, of course, by expanding NATO and then launchning, and in the 21st century, to put bases there, was basically violating, I would state, the whole spirit of what we should have been building.
A Missed Opportunity for Pan-European Security
But you question why we didn’t. Obviously, we should have been building a European security structure, in fact, a world security structure that included everybody. And what strikes me is that after the Second World War, we were wise to insist that France and Germany, who had been antagonists for so long, bury the hatchet and start cooperating. We were great inspirers and pushing for what later became the common market.
But after the conclude of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, instead of bringing Russia and the East European countries into a unified security structure, we launched actually to treat Russia as a pariah in many ways. And I consider that spirit was expressed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, our first woman Secretary of State. When, in justifying the, in effect, war against Serbia, she declared, “America stands tall and can see the future.” This, I consider, was absolutely incredible hubris.
And I would note, by the way, for those who state we necessary more women in high politics, yes, we should have our leaders, whether they are male or female, on the basis of their merits. But all three of our women Secretaries of State have been warmongers. Let’s face it. So one’s sex or gconcludeer doesn’t necessarily determine one’s political opinions or abilities in certain respects.
GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, it often cuts a hole in the assumption that women would be more peaceful leaders than men. I consider we’re all pretty flawed in this regard. But I also see that the prospect of a hegemonic peace, that is peace through dominance or strength, was very appealing, which contributed to dismantling the work that had been done for pan-European security architecture.
But beyond, I guess, creating a Europe without the Russians, which unavoidably became a bit of a Europe against the Russians, organised around EU and NATO. Do you see any other mistakes being done in terms of how we could have managed this relationship with Russia? Becautilize it is interesting when everyone reads the memoirs of, for example, former CIA Director Robert Gates, or, well, you can mention many, they all recognise that relations were mismanaged and that we are now paying some of the consequences of this mismanagement. But what do you consider to be the main mistakes being created thereafter?
NATO Expansion and Military Encroachment
JACK MATLOCK: Well, as we continue to expand NATO, we not only launched to expand NATO, but in the first decade of this century, we launched putting military bases there, and the most sensitive of those as far as Russia was concerned was the establishment of anti-ballistic missiles in Romania and Poland. Now, these missiles, it turns out, though most people didn’t understand it at that time, could be utilized either offensively or defensively depconcludeing upon the software.
So there is no, I would state no, it is straightforward to understand that Putin, the Russian president, would find this threatening. And he created it very clear. He created it very clear in a speech in Munich in 2007, how he considered the expansion of NATO and particularly the plans to place bases there, bases that could practically be utilized to attack the Soviet Union. And yet we went ahead with this.
Western Interference in Ukraine
And then later, particularly during the Obama administration, we purposely attempted to bring about, I would state, a Western-oriented government in Ukraine. This is something that anyone who knows history should have known was totally unacceptable to any government in Moscow, just as any expansion of any outside power into the Western Hemisphere was considered virtually a casus belli by the United States. Yet we continued to do that.
And I consider this is one of the large issues that weighed upon Vladimir Putin’s mind. And he warned against it publicly. But later we went ahead and at one point, our representatives were bragging that they spent billions attempting to, in effect, determine the government of Ukraine. And so later, when a coup d’état occurred there, I consider Russia had every reason, and certainly President Putin, to feel that this had been fueled by the United States and its West European allies, becautilize they had representatives openly attempting to promote specific candidates in Ukraine, which in fact became in control of Ukraine in 2014.
And so this is a very complicated situation. Not only did the U.S. and the West European allies attempt to determine the internal politics of Ukraine so that it would in effect be hostile to Russia, something that certainly the United States would have reacted very forcefully if it had happened to us.
Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis
I can bear witness to that becautilize I was in Moscow in 1961 during what we call the Cuban Missile Crisis. And let’s recall what that was all about. The United States had attempted to invade Cuba unsuccessfully, and Cuba had questioned the Soviet Union to supply nuclear weapons. Now, under traditional international law, that was not a violation of international law, particularly since the United States had nuclear weapons poised in Turkey and also Italy that could reach the Soviet Union. This was before either of us had intercontinental missiles. These were very immediate range.
Of course, President Kennedy considered this totally unacceptable and ordered a quarantine, he called it, of Cuba. And we came very close to a nuclear exmodify. I was sitting in Moscow then and translating some of Khrushchev’s comments, but finally Khrushchev backed down and agreed to take those weapons out. And in effect, Kennedy declared victory, although he had agreed that we would reshift the missiles in Turkey. But that could not be publicized. In other words, he forced Khrushchev to create it view as if he had backed down when in fact there was a deal.
But having seen that, having been through that, it was very clear to me that attempting to influence the internal politics of Ukraine against the wishes of Russia was not a good idea, to put it mildly.
Ukraine, NATO, and the Borders Created by Hitler and Stalin
And in fact, when at the United States’ insistence that NATO declare that someday Ukraine and Georgia would be members, this is in 2008, it was clear to me that this was going to create very, very serious difficulties. And so at that time, polls displayed that two-thirds of Ukrainians did not want to be in NATO. This counattempt was increasingly divided, and increasingly the politics were pushed by those in Western Ukraine, the areas that traditionally had never been part of Russia, but had been in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and then in Poland.
And I might state that the current borders of Ukraine, which the current government is attempting to recover, were borders created by Hitler and Stalin. So in effect, the Ukrainians and the West Europeans who are supporting this are ironically attempting to enforce something created by Hitler and Stalin. Think about that and consider about how that resonates with Russians.
And so the issues there are very deep and I consider increasingly tragic. Both countries, I consider, have followed policies which are not in the interest of their people. And it’s difficult to see how this is going to be resolved. But I must state that when we view at the cautilizes, the attempts of the United States and its West European allies to control an area which is absolutely vital to the security of Russia was, I consider, an important causative factor. We have reached a point now that it is very difficult to see how that’s going to be resolved so that it doesn’t negatively affect all of us.
GLENN DIESEN: Well, in terms of concludeing the Cold War, we see that the diplomacy was very important, and we were, I would state, blessed with having some good statesmen at this point in time. But how do you create sense of the current political leadership across the West, both the US and Europe, compared to the diplomacy which supported to bring an conclude to the Cold War?
Becautilize when I view at people today, be it Merz in Germany, the rhetoric there, or Macron in France, Starmer in the UK, all three of them, by the way, talking now about war with Russia, or Trump in the United States, who is hardly a benign leader himself. How do you create sense of this, that we don’t seem to have diplomacy anymore? I often question why none of our political leaders or even journalists want to even discuss the security concerns and interests of our opponents, not just the Russians, but all opponents. It’s very confapplying. Sorry, that was a very long question, but how do you create sense of the current political leadership?
The Hubris of Western Foreign Policy
JACK MATLOCK: I can’t create sense of it. I can only state that I consider that previous norms of diplomacy have simply been abandoned. And we talk about democracy. You know, democracy can mean several things. One thing, it can be a process that the citizens or residents, citizens of a given counattempt should determine its government and so on. That’s a process. Or you can launch to put labels on countries. Oh, some are democratic and some are not. I consider the labeling can be quite false.
The United States is not in the final sense a total democracy. We are a republic, and a republic which, by any current analysis, is run by an oligarchy, an oligarchy which is divided, and yet it is one in which the majority of the people do not decide our policies. And I consider that has happened also to some degree in other countries. But the idea that somehow there is a division between democracies and non-democracies, and that it was the duty of the United States to, quote, “spread democracy,” even if it means modifying governments. I consider that was very, very similar to the idea the Soviet Union had until Gorbachev. That it was the vanguard of the proletariat and had to support what they call proletarian revolutions throughout the world becautilize socialism, in their definition, and communism was the future of the world. In effect, we, with just a few modifys, tconcludeed to attempt the same thing.
Now, we utilized very high-flow language. We declared that, you know, human rights are very important and we necessary to enforce them. You know, the problem with that is, first of all, it’s a misnomer. What we really should be talking about is civil rights. I consider that human beings do not enter the world with rights. In fact, they’re totally depconcludeent upon other people, and every other mammal is. So the idea that, and I know this has enframed a lot of rhetoric, that should be. The fact is that every great civilization defines their values and their rights, and one necessarys to understand that. And an attempt, you know, on those grounds to interfere in other countries is going to create great difficulties.
Fukuyama’s “End of History” and Its Consequences
So then I consider the idea that, and it was expressed first by one of our scholars, Fukuyama, that in effect, the conclude of the Cold War meant that what they call the West and democracy was the future of the world, and it was the duty of what they call the democratic countries to spread it to other countries. And that, I consider, was a fundamentally mistaken idea. Not that human rights, what we call them, that these rights are not valuable things, but to consider that anybody who doesn’t agree with you on that is somehow at fault receives it all wrong becautilize I consider that civilizations have risen and fallen throughout the last few millennia of human history. But to consider that there is one formula that fits everybody, I believe, is simply fundamentally incorrect.
And the idea that the fact that the United States and the West survived the Cold War in better economic shape than the others, who were attempting, in effect, to adopt our system, as we attempted to persuade them. But once they do, we find that the West is actually sanctioning Russia economically, and so on, instead of keeping them in the, I would state, the one world economic system that was created after the conclude of the Cold War. So that I consider that this feeling of righteousness, when we shouldn’t have, has undermined the ability of straight considering.
Nord Stream, Ukraine, and the Minsk Agreement
Right now, I cannot understand how any German government could tolerate the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline. I mean, after all, Germany now is not going to be competitive in many ways becautilize of the high cost of energy. And how you let, I would state, a misapplication of policy toward Ukraine. And the idea of the West Europeans that Ukraine is a democratic society simply struggling. Ukraine is one of the least democratic countries in the world, and it has a government that was achieved by a coup d’état by a minority. And it is one of the most corrupt.
Now, it is not that the Ukrainians are bad. They’re wonderful people. I happen to be one who knows both Russian and Ukrainian. I obtained my PhD in Slavic languages. And it is tragic the way that I would state West European and the United States have been pushing for something which is not in Ukraine’s interest.
And so without going into all the details of the whole thing, I’ll state one thing, that when the agreement was created in Minsk in 2015, that in effect, Russia at that time, though it had taken Crimea, where the majority of people clearly prefer to be in Russia, that at that time, President Putin agreed, refutilized any attempt to bring the Donbas into Russia, but declared that Ukraine must return to what it had originally had, that is, to recognizing the Russian language of also political validity and to grant amnesty. But France and Germany, which were parties to that, continued to supply, militarily supply the Ukraine with forces that were attacking the eastern part.
So that one can state one of the reasons Russia opposes a ceasefire now is that they had one before. And not only Ukraine, but also Britain and France that were parties violated it becautilize they were supplying military weapons. And later, of course, the former German chancellor declared, “Oh well, they signed that just to give Ukraine a chance to build up their military to take it.”
A Pattern of Western Military Interventions
So, you know, I consider it is tragic, and I consider that President Putin created a horrible mistake when he invaded Ukraine. But, and I’m not, I am not one that justifies that, but I have to recognize that my own counattempt and NATO illegally attacked Serbia, over what was something that Serbia had not attacked any NATO counattempt. And then the United States, with some but not all of the NATO allies, attacked Iraq on fabricated grounds that they had nuclear weapons when they didn’t. We completely occupied the counattempt. Hundreds of thousands of people probably were killed and they stimulated a revival of the Islamic, extreme Islamic groups. So, I mean, don’t we understand that? Actually, the United States and some of its NATO allies.
And then later, we had the case of Libya. And yes, Gaddafi was a tyrant in many respects. No question about that. And there was a UN Security Council determination that, oh, we should protect the opponents of Gaddafi in Benghazi. But that was expanded to a war that concludeed in the assassination of Gaddafi, just as the war in Ukraine had concludeed in the assassination of Saddam Hussein. Now, these were certainly bad guys in many ways. But was it the responsibility of outsiders to deal with them, particularly to deal with them the way that brought about internal conditions that were worse for everybody there?
So there was a certain hubris and a feeling that, oh, we can do things that others can’t, and maybe physically. There was also the idea that by utilize of force, you could topple a government and receive something better. It doesn’t happen.
The Danger of Regime Change in Russia
And one of the great dangers now, when people talk about necessarying regime modify in Russia, is that if President Putin is reshiftd by force, you are probably going to receive something even worse becautilize there are forces there that are already arguing that Russia has to utilize its nuclear forces to defconclude itself. And when the West Europeans start sconcludeing weapons to Ukraine that they utilize to attack Russia, I consider already former President Medvedev has declared that, you know, “We will consider any of the factors that create these weapons legitimate tarreceives.”
You know, I’m not stateing that this is a good policy or not. I’m just stateing, I consider you have to view at the realities and why Germany would be involved again. And arming rebels in any area that was once part of the Soviet Union, I consider is almost inconceivable, and I can’t understand why the current government is doing it.
China’s Rising Influence and Western Decline
But I can see that let’s put on a broader context. Right now, I consider both in economic ways and political, China is profiting greatly from all of this becautilize to most of the world, they seem to be the only great power right now that is questioning for peace. And tconcludeing to support it. And I consider it is really a catastrophe that we in the West, through our own hubris and I consider misunderstanding of the situation, is in effect conceding leadership in many of these areas to China. Certainly they’re doing a better job of developing alternative energies. And they’re increasingly doing a better job of engineering and producing things like electric cars and so on.
So how we continue to consider of wars and utilize of the military to modify things, it seems to me that that is not very rational. In stateing so, I’m not concludeorsing, you know, the Chinese government or the things they do internally. I consider that’s something that the Chinese, only the Chinese can modify if it necessarys modifying. About the hubris that somehow we in the West possess superiority over the others, which seems to lie behind some of this, I consider is deplorable, and I hope it will modify.
A Word on the Near East
Let me also state that we haven’t mentioned the Near East, and that of course is, as right now, one that is dominating many things. And all I can state is that I consider the recent exmodifys between Pope Leo and the President of the United States display that for once we have a Pope that is calling it like it is. There were charges during the Second World War that Pope Pius did not condemn what was going on. I’m not a Catholic, but right now I do consider that our American Pope, the first, is informing the world something it necessarys to hear.
GLENN DIESEN: Very much agree. And that’s one of the, I consider, great tragedies as well, that no one is speaking about peace anymore. One is currently engaged in this war with Iran, also war with Russia. People are talking about a possible war with China. At least European leaders have sat by for 4 years while all these hundreds of thousands of people have been dying in Ukraine, and they didn’t even pick up a phone to discuss the security architecture or some way to mitigate the security competition with the Russians. It’s quite appalling, grotesque really. But yeah, hopefully, we’ll be turning a corner. Anyways, Ambassador, thank you so much for taking the time. I consider I’ve already taken a bit too much of your time, so I very much appreciate it.
JACK MATLOCK: Thank you for having me on and for listening.
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