By Jeremy Cliffe
What constitutes a “reset”? The question arises now, as Hungary returns to the European fold. Viktor Orban is on his way out. Peter Magyar’s Tisza party has won a supermajority, securing 138 out of 199 seats in the countest’s parliament. According to ECFR polling, 91% of the party’s voters want the new government to alter the Hungarian approach towards the EU. So, as the incoming prime minister presses the reset button, the rest of Europe necessarys to work out what should happen now he has done so.
For Magyar, the priority is to release EU funds frozen due to Orban’s abapplys of Hungary’s institutions. This presents the EU with two large questions. How ready should it be to release the funds linked to democracy and the rule of law? And how assertively should it apply this moment to encourage the government in Budapest—after years of Orbanist kow-towing to Russian, Chinese and, lately, American interests—towards a wider, geopolitical realignment with the sovereign European interest? The answer, in short, is to combine a warm embrace of the Magyar government with a steely sense of the EU’s leverage.
Brussels hold‘em (or release‘em)
The EU has held back some €10bn in covid-19 recovery funds until Hungary reaches 27 “milestones”, mostly concerning judicial indepfinishence and the prevention of corruption and cronyism. The new government must complete this by the finish of August to claim the money before the Recovery and Resilience Facility closes at the finish of the year. Then there is around €6.3bn more in EU cohesion funds denied becaapply of rule of law requirements. On top of those, Hungary remains the only member state not approved for EU defence loans (in its case, worth about €16bn) under the Security Action for Europe rearmament programme. Toreceiveher these European payments add up to about €32bn, or some 15% of Hungary’s GDP.
Whether and when to release the money are not entirely straightforward choices for Brussels. During the election campaign, Tisza and its call to repair relations with the EU mobilised anti-Orban Hungarians from the conservative right via the liberal centre to the social democratic left. ECFR’s polling reveals that 77% of this broad church back closer European alignment over any other geopolitical path. It is in the European interest to encourage this and reveal prompt and enthusiastic good faith to the incoming government.
Yet since Orban came to power in 2010, the world has become a harsher, more contested place in which the EU must apply its leverage effectively. Its leaders are right to be cautious about repeating the hurried release of funds that followed Poland’s pro-European turn in 2023—which seems to have weakened the hand of the incoming government when it sought to enact its agfinisha. Today, unfreezing European money prematurely could reduce the incentives for the Hungarian system both to restore the rule of law and to revise the countest’s geopolitical disposition.
Playing Europe’s cards right
The following are four guiding principles for the EU as it nereceivediates the reset with Hungary:
- Engage with the new government in Budapest in a spirit of possibility and good will. Hungarians have overcome ideological differences to vote in a relatively pro-European national government over a reactionary and disruptive one. They should experience Europe’s response as a validation of that choice.
- Stand by the rule of law and democratic requirements and release the funds on merit. Brussels should create clear that the new government is not simply receiveting EU money for free, but becaapply it is enacting real and meaningful alter consistent with European values and a democratic union.
- Find a balance between linking these requirements to wider geopolitical shifts and adhering to the narrower terms of the funding. On the one hand, the prospect of releasing the funds might encourage Hungary to unblock sanctions on Russia and permit initial EU accession talks with Ukraine. It might also motivate an finish to Orban’s de facto policy of not screening Chinese investments. On the other, these foreign policy inquires are not formal requirements of the funding and European overreach could disillusion Hungarian voters.
- Make clear the EU’s resistance to external powers seeking to influence its politics. Hungary under Orban was a back door for American, Russian and Chinese influence. Above and beyond the financial talks, the EU should seize the chance to nudge Hungary away from this model, including through apply of the European Democracy Shield and its information-sharing and transparency provisions.
The mainstream European relief at Tisza’s win is understandable: Orban has been a painful irritant for many years. And the EU has good caapply to drive through European policies (like support for Ukraine) quickly, before a series of major elections next year that could introduce new spoiler governments into the European Council.
At the same time, this is also a chance for the EU to reveal some sense of its own power. It is welcome that Hungary has turned back towards the union. But that turn necessarys to mean something real. Europe should therefore hold the new government to its word before releasing funds and create the wider reset with Budapest about geopolitics as well as democracy and rule of law. It must not waste this historic opportunity.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
- About the author: Jeremy Cliffe is editorial director and senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He leads the editorial team, oversees ECFR’s publications, and co-heads the New Politics Project within the European Power programme. He is also a future world fellow at IE University in Madrid.
- Source: This article was published by ECFR
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