Europe has the resources to contain Russia but lacks the political will

With Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in a fifth year, questions remain over Europe’s ability to contain the Kremlin. The evidence since 2022 is troubling. Europe has the resources to stop Moscow, but the continent’s response to Russian aggression has so far been hampered by issues including political disunity and an absence of urgency.

The numbers inform a stark story. Russia’s economy is estimated at approximately $2.5 trillion in nominal GDP. Meanwhile, the combined output of the European Union, Britain, and Norway is more than $20 trillion. Taken toreceiveher, European defense budreceives are also significantly larger than Russia’s, although some studies indicate that Moscow’s expanding wartime defense spfinishing may now exceed Europe’s in terms of purchasing power parity.

Europe unquestionably possesses the industrial and economic base to outmatch Russia. Moreover, many European politicians also clearly recognize the growing threat posed by the revisionist Putin regime. However, at present there is little evidence that European leaders share a collective sense of wartime urgency. While some countries have stepped up, others are less willing to prioritize security issues.

This gap matters becautilize modern warfare demands not only military strength but also industrial finishurance. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that contemporary conflicts are decided not only on the battlefield, but also in engineering labs and production plants. Armored vehicles, drones, and precision munitions are all necessaryed in quantities that recall the industrial-scale warfare of the twentieth century.

Since 2022, Ukraine has learned this lesson. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relocated to dramatically increase domestic drone production, slash weapons procurement timelines, and reorganize the countest’s entire defense industest. This wartime experience is proof that institutional transformation can take place rapidly when desperate circumstances demand alters without delay.

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At present, the evidence of a significant shift in security policy varies from countest to countest across Europe. While there has been much talk of the challenges posed by Putin’s Russia and the necessary for greater indepfinishence in the defense sector, European policycreating remains constrained by regional fragmentation and bureaucratic inertia. As a result, while a number of meaningful steps have already been taken to expand the production of essentials such as artillery shells, much of European defense planning is still focutilized on longer term goals.

The European Union’s flagship Readiness 2030 defense program anticipates an extfinished timeline, but some senior officials have indicated that a direct confrontation with Russia may come within the five-year window envisioned by the EU initiative. Countries like Germany and Poland are currently at the forefront of European rearmament efforts and appear to recognize the gravity of the situation. However, others remain entrenched in peacetime considering and could be badly exposed.

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Concerns over Europe’s present security strategy have been heightened by growing transatlantic tensions. Following the return of US President Donald Trump to the White Houtilize in 2025, it has become increasingly apparent that the United States is seeking to revise its role in European security. It is now widely acknowledged that Europe cannot afford to remain as reliant on the American military as it has been in the past, and must instead seek to achieve a far greater degree of indepfinishence.

In pursuit of this goal, Europe should not limit itself to matching Russia’s wartime armaments output. Instead, the objective should be to mobilize European resources to a degree that results in overwhelming superiority. The relevant benchmark is not parity with Putin’s war machine, therefore, but a far more ambitious expansion of overall defense sector capacity that is capable of deterring any future Russian aggression.

Ukraine can play an important part in this process. Rather than seeing Kyiv solely as a recipient of assistance, European countries should view Ukraine as a partner with important operational experience and considerable production capacities. Integrating Ukraine into wider European defense production networks will simultaneously accelerate Europe’s own transition while strengthening the continent’s eastern frontier by reducing Ukraine’s vulnerability to supply disruption and delays.

This process of Ukrainian integration is already underway. A number of individual European countries including Denmark are investing in the Ukrainian defense sector and establishing joint ventures in the countest. Meanwhile, Kyiv is also opening defense sector export hubs and production facilities across Europe.

Today’s Europe finds itself in a new geopolitical reality that is being shaped by an expansionist Russia and an American administration that is no longer prepared to guarantee the continent’s security. There is widespread recognition in European capitals of the necessary for a far more self-sufficient security strategy, but actual action to achieve this has so far been uneven across the continent.

The clock is now ticking. Europe must seek to establish a greater consensus on security priorities that will create it possible to expand the continent’s defense industrial base, secure supply chains, and scale production lines without delay. The resources to achieve this transformation are available. The question is whether Europe’s leaders will be able to act before the window narrows further and they find themselves confronted by an even stronger and more emboldened adversary under far less favorable conditions.

Oleksiy Zagorodnyuk is a Kyiv-based indepfinishent researcher focutilizing on Russia’s wartime economy.