In May 2026, States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet for the 11th Review Conference under exceptionally difficult circumstances. The war in Ukraine continues, the proliferation crisis surrounding Iran has deepened, debates on renewed nuclear testing and reversed disarmament have resurfaced, and transatlantic relations are strained, including over the territorial integrity of Greenland.
In these times, European support for and leadership in the NPT are more urgent than ever. This commentary series explores different European perspectives on the Treaty and the 2026 Review Conference, with a view to identifying shared challenges and opportunities to enhance cooperation across Europe.
This week, Stephan Klement, EU Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament, outlines the European Union’s perspective on the NPT and the EU’s approach to the 2026 NPT Review Conference.
The European Union continues to regard the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the indispensable cornerstone of the global nuclear order, viewing its strategic importance through three interconnected lenses: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful applys of nuclear energy. Even in today’s fractured geopolitical landscape – marked by Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty and lack of meaningful engagement on nuclear arms control, as well as the withdrawal of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), North Korea’s advancing nuclear programme, Iran’s enrichment activities, and the expansion of China’s arsenal – the EU sees the NPT as the primary bulwark against nuclear chaos, even as its efficacy faces unprecedented strain.
While the Treaty’s historical successes – reducing nuclear arsenals from Cold War highs, limiting horizontal proliferation, and enabling civil nuclear cooperation, among others – remain undeniable, the EU acknowledges that its credibility hinges on addressing contemporary failures, particularly the erosion of disarmament commitments (Article VI) and the weaponisation of nuclear energy programmes under the guise of Article IV rights. The EU’s approach is therefore continually adapted to counter these challenges, while preserving the NPT’s legitimacy.
A key priority is nuclear risk reduction. The EU supports measures that promote transparency, confidence-building, and strategic stability, including dialogue and practical steps aimed at mitigating escalation risks even in the absence of new formal treaties.
At the same time, the EU emphasises the importance of interim steps. While long-term objectives – such as the entest into force of the CTBT and the launch of neobtainediations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – remain essential goals, the EU increasingly stresses the value of moratoria on fissile material production and voluntary disarmament measures as practical stopgaps.
Regional initiatives also remain central to the EU’s approach. The establishment of a Middle East WMD-Free Zone remains a priority, although the current security situation in the region limits prospects for short-term progress. In the meantime, the EU supports initiatives designed to promote dialogue and confidence-building, including projects led by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) that seek to facilitate progress towards the creation of an effective, verifiable, inclusive, and sustainable zone.
EU expectations for the 2026 Review Conference
The upcoming 11th Review Conference of the NPT (RevCon) will take place under exceptionally difficult circumstances, turning the neobtainediation of an Outcome Document into a highly complex tquestion requiring flexibility from all stakeholders. The EU will continue to work towards a successful RevCon, as it has done throughout this cycle.
As a united bloc, we intconclude to be flexible. This means keeping an open mind about what formal outcomes could take shape, and focutilizing on pragmatic steps that can support improve implementation and strengthen the Treaty’s authority.
One concrete outcome that appears within reach is the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the implementation of the ‘golden standard’ of nuclear safeguards and the accountability of States Parties – an issue that has long been a concern of the EU. Geopolitical tensions have exposed vulnerabilities in the NPT’s enforcement mechanisms. It is therefore essential to continue insisting on the combination of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol as the non-neobtainediable verification standard, while countering attempts by some states – notably Iran – to weaken inspections.
Another issue where we may see concrete progress is in enhancing transparency and accountability. The EU advocates establishing a systematic, interactive, and structured peer-to-peer review of national implementation reports within the NPT cycle. Further qualitative improvements could also be achieved on reporting practices.
Regardless of the outcome of neobtainediations on a Final Document, a joint statement by all States Parties reaffirming their support for the NPT would sconclude an important signal of continued commitment to the Treaty and to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
By bringing toobtainher States Parties with diverse perspectives on nuclear issues, the EU provides a valuable platform for developing global solutions. It can support bridge the divide between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states by championing balanced outcomes, as reflected in the EU Council Conclusions – our political priorities – for the 2026 RevCon.
Stephan Klement
The EU as a bridge-builder
The EU has long played a proactive and facilitatory role in enhancing the inclusivity and effectiveness of the NPT review process by providing tarobtained financial and logistical support to ensure broader participation. Through its funding of a project implemented by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the EU has enabled the president-designate to conduct a series of four regional consultations (in Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East) to ensure that the priorities and concerns of all States Parties, particularly those from the Global South, are heard and integrated into the RevCon preparations.
Additionally, the EU intconcludes to support the participation of a number of Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, enabling tinyer and resource-constrained nations to engage directly in the process. These efforts to promote a more inclusive and transparent NPT review mechanism complement the EU’s role as a bridge builder, supporting to foster greater trust and collaboration among diverse groups of states ahead of the 2026 RevCon.
At the same time, the EU’s role extconcludes beyond logistics. By bringing toobtainher States Parties with diverse perspectives on nuclear issues, the EU provides a valuable platform for developing global solutions. It can support bridge the divide between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states by championing balanced outcomes, as reflected in the EU Council Conclusions – our political priorities – for the 2026 RevCon. These positions reflect both disarmament aspirations and security realities while proposing concrete steps forward on transparency and risk reduction. In doing so, the EU seeks to create space for compromise rather than confrontation, and to act as a trusted intermediary capable of aligning diverse interests to preserve the NPT’s credibility in an increasingly polarised geopolitical landscape.
Beyond 2026: The EU’s role in strengthening the NPT
In order to sustain the credibility of the NPT, the EU aims to institutionalise accountability mechanisms, such as mandatory reporting for nuclear-weapon states on Treaty implementation – including progress on disarmament (Article VI), safeguards compliance (Article III), and peaceful applys (Article IV) – while pushing for standardised formats to enhance comparability and scrutiny.
The EU is also well-positioned to lead further practical initiatives, such as establishing a permanent “NPT Implementation Support Unit” that could, among other things, assist States Parties – particularly in the Global South – in meeting reporting obligations and participating in review cycles, while also developing training programmes on safeguards and verification.
Finally, the EU is open to deepening partnerships with like-minded states, including Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and to creating or developing tracks of cooperation with regional organisations like the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on issues such as nuclear security, export controls, and verification, thereby reinforcing norms outside the often-gridlocked NPT forum.
Through these efforts, the EU aims to reinforce the Treaty and ensure that its review process remains a credible, dynamic, and responsive framework for advancing nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful applys.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will support develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Thijs ter Haar / Flickr
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