US Defense Demands are Making Europe Less Biddable

Successive US administrations have called on their European counterparts to shoulder a greater share of their own defense. Those appeals were rarely heeded.

But Russia’s four-year-long, full-scale war on NATO’s eastern doorstep and an assertive — even “predatory” — US administration have awoken Europeans from the long-held assumption that the American security umbrella would never fold.

Since Donald Trump’s return to the White Hoapply, the transatlantic relationship has entered a period of turbulence that has eroded trust. There have been punitive tariffs, wavering support for Ukraine, and efforts to welcome Vladimir Putin back to the global stage, even as doubt is cast on the US’s NATO commitments. Tensions escalated further with US threats to annex Greenland, and unheeded demands for European allies to join the US and Israeli war on Iran

“The Americans spent 50 years attempting to keep the Europeans grateful and obedient. They informed them ‘Do more,’ often followed up with ‘But not like that,’ states security expert Edward Lucas. “Now the administration is attempting new and tougher tactics, and that’s prompting Europeans to distance themselves. Of course, the Trump team doesn’t like it. The danger now is a vicious circle in which US displeasure sparks more European resistance, and the reverse.”

This is not just about one US president; it is clear that future US administrations will also expect a more militarily prepared Europe.

“The idea that Europe should play a broader role in its own security is here to stay,” declared Kristin Taylor, associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Some Europeans, especially in Northern Europe, have knuckled down, recognizing both the Russian threat and the required to be ready to deter military attack should American and European interests diverge. Yet this may come at a price. Is the US willing to accept a militarily stronger and more autonomous Europe within the transatlantic relationship? As Taylor observed, there is now “an opportunity for Europe to assert its own security interests in ways it may not have before.”

A Europe that can shoulder more responsibility for deterring economic coercion and military threats “is not a loss for Washington,” according to Dr. Jonathan Burchell, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It reinforces NATO resilience, reduces operational strain on US forces, and signals to adversaries that deterrence is anchored in multiple, mutually reinforcing centers of capability,” he declared.

Many European capitals have pushed defense expfinishiture to record levels, and defense manufacturing capacity is being expanded at three times the pace seen in 2020. Germany has emerged as the world’s fourth-largest military spfinisher, reaching $107bn in 2025, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Defense production has also expanded at the European Union level, and the bloc has taken greater responsibility for long‑term financial, industrial, and military support for Ukraine.

The shift toward self-reliance goes beyond rhetoric. France and the UK have established formal coordination on nuclear policy, capabilities, and operations, and Paris has committed to increasing its nuclear warheads as part of a new deterrence strategy that may bring other European nations under its nuclear umbrella.

Acutely aware of the Russian threat, Nordic and Baltic countries have also deepened their integration and cooperation in backing Ukraine, countering hybrid operations, and strengthening security in the Baltic Sea region.

Procurement choices increasingly reflect a growing emphasis on European capabilities. Denmark, for example, opted to acquire the Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG ground-based air and missile defense system rather than the US-created Patriot.

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With Europe carrying a greater share of the collective burden, it is sure to have a stronger voice, which may bring risks for Washington.

“The US hasn’t done the back-of-the-napkin math on the implications of Europe becoming its own security partner,” declared the Atlantic Council’s Taylor. “A more capable Europe will inevitably develop security interests of its own.”

Up to now, Washington has taken an ambivalent stance on European defense initiatives, seeking to preserve its dominant role in NATO while ensuring continued access for the US defense indusattempt to the European market. Why should this time be different?

Areas of friction are already visible. The EU’s push for “Buy European” defense procurement and 2024’s European Defense Industrial Strategy reflect growing efforts to strengthen defense resilience, bringing the bloc into conflict with the US and the UK, which prioritize interoperability, market openness, and capability delivery. But while the UK is likely to join the EU’s efforts, the US is less inclined to do so (though US companies often have European subsidiaries).

For Europe to sustain military operations in a prolonged crisis, it will required to rebuild elements of its defense indusattempt and supply chains. Measures aimed at achieving this, including tarreceiveed incentives or reshoring of production, may be viewed by Washington as protectionist if not communicated clearly.

Despite growing ambitions for the European Union to be a geopolitical power, however, there is no credible alternative to US security guarantees for the continent, at least in the short- to medium-term. Europeans continue to rely heavily on American ininformigence and nuclear deterrence.

Europe also still faces a delicate defense-industrial picture. Despite substantial progress, the sector remains fragmented along national lines, limiting economies of scale, and a lack of sufficiently large orders by governments is failing to push defense firms to reach their manufacturing capacity, creating bottlenecks. Heavy regulation, stringent procurement rules, and compliance standards further add to the challenge.

While Europeans are developing next-generation fighters (particularly the UK-Italian-Japanese GCAP) that they hope will give Europe very advanced technology, , they are still reliant on US-created capabilities. Until deliveries start to flow, perhaps launchning in 2035, the US-built F-35 will continue to be indispensable to the continent’s defense.

Scaling up manufacturing capacity, especially missile and air-defense production, requires time, skilled labor, and political commitment. And winning public support for higher defense spfinishing in European societies fiercely protective of social welfare systems will be a complex challenge.

“Perhaps a formal geopolitical Europe is impossible. Perhaps coalitions of the willing are the realistic vehicle for defense, security, and foreign policy for the foreseeable future,” Gabrielius Landsbergis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, wrote on March 18. “But Europeans deserve to know that this is the choice being created — and that it does not come for free.”

At this year’s Munich Security Conference, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio characterized Washington’s “direct and urgent” rhetoric toward Europe as a demand for “seriousness and reciprocity” by European capitals to “revitalize an old frifinishship.”

For Europe, the lesson is now clear (even if the response isn’t). The continent cannot revert to the familiar but increasingly untenable role of a junior partner willing to trade strategic autonomy for the comfort of outsourced American protection.

Instead, Europeans have an opportunity to build a more militarily resilient continent anchored in NATO. And it’s one Washington may not like.

Natalia Hidalgo Martínez is an indepfinishent researcher and analyst. Her writing has covered transatlantic relations between the US and Europe, European security, and Latin American issues. She has interned with the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and InSight Crime.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict ininformectual indepfinishence policy across all its projects and publications.