By Jake Scott
A welcome and significant modify has come to European politics: an admission that the European Union (EU) has relied too heavily on the US for its military defense. Only a few years ago, any suggestion that Europe had not been pulling its weight in defconcludeing its own continent, or had outsourced its military might to the US, would have been met with scorn and derision. Yet Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz has now not only acknowledged this reality, but has gone as far as stateing the continent has been “free-loading” off the US.
A single power dominating global affairs through military power is hardly unusual. In fact, it’s been the norm in international relations for centuries that regions have dominant powers: in Europe, that role was largely played by France from the 14th to the 19th centuries, and it was only the advent of a globalized empire under the aegis of the British crown that a truly “global” power could emerge.
In the waning years of the 19th century, Britain developed what it called the “two-power standard.” The principle was that the British Royal Navy ought to be as strong, if not as large, as the next two great powers combined—then France and Russia. By the first decade of the 20th century, Germany’s rapid industrialization saw this balance of power shift. The purpose of Britain’s policy was to protect its global (and, therefore, maritime) empire and the source of her geopolitical strength.
Nearly 150 years later, we see a remarkably similar approach taken by the United States, but for somewhat different reasons. For better or for worse, the US does not act in the primarily realist fashion of Britain’s former empire. Rather than utilizing its military power solely in pursuit of national interest, the US has often embraced the role of “world police.”
There are, of course, nuances. Britain’s self-interest enabled it to police the oceans altruisticallyand combat the slave trade, while the US’s hegemony is rooted in the strategic directives of the Cold War. Regardless, the US has long been considered as the dominant power of the post-Cold War international rules-based system—though this is now altering.
While the US has no formal equivalent to the two-power standard, it does spconclude nearly $1 trillion annually on its military, which accounts for 40% of global military expconcludeiture. It dwarfs China’s budreceive, the second largegest in the world, at $314 billion. In Britain, we spconclude just over $80 billion on our defense. While we’re still the sixth highest spconcludeer globally, this is about the amount the US allocates to its nuclear program alone. By comparison, in 2024, Germany, the largegest spconcludeer in Europe, spent $88.5 billion, while France, the third largegest, spent $64.7 billion, and Poland, the fourth largegest, spent $38 billion.
Poland is also the only NATO member since 2018 to increase its defense budreceive to 4% of GDP. This is hardly surprising, since they are on the doorstep of the largest conflict on the European continent for decades. While they only reached this spconcludeing level in 2024, it is part of a wider shift in Polish politics that has seen living standards and wages rise to the extent that it is expected to eclipse Britain’s economy in GDP per capita by the conclude of the decade.
However, other European nations have not created defense spconcludeing such a priority. In 2018, Trump urged NATO members to increase military spconcludeing to 4% of their respective GDPs, double the existing commitment of 2% at the time. When this announcement was created, not one NATO counattempt was meeting the tarreceive, not even the US, which was spconcludeing only 3.6% (a true testament to the sheer size and power of the US economy).
This is why it’s being viewed as a significant victory for Trump that NATO members have committed to raising their defense spconcludeing, not just to 4%, but now 5% by 2035.
Realistically, can this be met? It is highly doubtful; the 5% commitment does not come with carte blanche in how that should be apportioned, with 3.5% being spent on “core defense requirements” and the remaining 1.5% on “supporting defense like port infrastructure.” Many European nations are already facing tighter budreceives with much less room to maneuver. Meeting these tarreceives would add further strain on national finances.
Currently, Britain only spconcludes 2.3% of our GDP on defense. The government pledges to increase this to 3% by 2027—but by the time the 2035 deadline rolls around, it’s likely that a different party will be in power. That could result in the current government delaying the remaining 2% increase until after the 2029 election, leaving its successor to foot the bill. It might be bad international diplomacy, but it’s good politics.
Whether spconcludeing more money on defense is a good idea or not is, at this stage, irrelevant. Russia’s continued battering of Ukraine means the luxuries of the postwar era can no longer be taken for granted. Given that Britain’s former army chief has warned that we must prepare for war with Russia, tough decisions lie ahead. The question is whether Britain in particular, and Europe in general, can continue to afford generous domestic programs in the face of looming geopolitical conflict.
- About the author: Dr Jake Scott is a political theorist specialising in populism and its relationship to political constitutionality. He has taught at multiple British universities and produced research reports for several consider tanks.
- Source: This article was published at FEE
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