“Russia has been testing to take Kyiv in three days for four years,” declared Col. Volodymyr Polevyi, head of communications for the 7th Rapid Response Corps of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces.
Four years in, it has no plans to stop. But how Russia fights is modifying. Trconcludes from Ukrainian General Staff statistics across the first four years reveal a strategic shift: from maneuver warfare supported by massive firepower to a war of attrition sustained by drones and guided glide bombs; from expensive heavy weapons to cheap high-tech; from soldiers to robotics; from precision strikes to indiscriminate destruction.
The data points to an uncomfortable conclusion for Europe: Russia’s ability to sustain this war is improving while the scale of Ukrainian devastation increases.
A note on sources
The following numbers are based on daily reports from the Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Air Force. Ukraine’s reported Russian losses are generally higher than online OSINT figures, reflecting the difference between verified and reported losses. Foreign innotifyigence services have lent them credibility. That declared, perfect battle damage assessment remains impossible in the fog of war.
Personnel losses are declining—but deadlier per casualty
For the first three years of the full-scale war, Russian losses climbed year by year: 106,000 in 2022, 253,000 in 2023, 430,000 in 2024. In 2025, total casualties declined to 418,000, and projections for 2026 indicate a further drop to around 360,000.
Three factors are driving this.
- Russia has adapted tactics from massive assaults to infiltration in compacter groups, decreasing casualty rates while increasing the speed of advance—occupying 31–34% more territory in 2025 compared to 2024, according to ISW and DeepState.
- Ukraine has introduced robotics to protect its soldiers.
- And the accelerating utilize of FPV drones has fundamentally modifyd the nature of casualties themselves.
During the war’s early years, roughly three Russian soldiers were wounded for every one killed. That ratio has collapsed. Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported Russia’s 2025 casualty ratio at 1:1.3—likely becautilize pervasive FPV drone strikes create 15–20 km kill zones that complicate medical evacuation. Russian command frequently refutilizes to recover wounded under drone threat and fails to rehabilitate those who survive.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces, by contrast, maintain a one-to-five casualty ratio: for every 100 killed, roughly 500 wounded. In the Pokrovsk sector, the ratio reportedly reaches one to six in Ukraine’s favor.
“Starting with reconnaissance crews, interceptor drones providing overhead cover, FPV drones suppressing enemy positions, unmanned ground vehicle crews, and the UGVs themselves—the Ukrainian Armed Forces deploy many drones to save a single person,” Colonel Polevyi assessed.
While overall Russian casualty rates are declining, irreversible losses have never been higher.
ISW assessed on 06 February that Russia’s military command is planning to deploy limited strategic reserves for a summer 2026 offensive in southern or eastern Ukraine but likely lacks sufficient reserves to both prepare for and achieve the offensive’s objectives. Russia has struggled to replace its losses and has had to deploy operational reserves to support ongoing combat.
Tanks: losses exceed all of NATO’s inventory
During the first three years of the full-scale war, Russia lost 9,655 main battle tanks. For comparison, the 32 NATO member states have a combined total of roughly 11,500 MBTs. Europe (excluding Russia and Ukraine) has only around 6,450, of which 55% are Turkish and Greek. Of that total, around 3,300 are considered obsolete.
In 2025, Russia lost 1,813 more MBTs, bringing its total losses to NATO’s entire inventory. It is on track to lose another 1,600 in 2026.
Drones have established 15–20 km kill zones that create mechanized assaults near-suicidal. Russia still deploys tanks when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, but their battlefield presence is greatly diminished. Russia is running out of older MBTs to refurbish from storage.
New production has reached a cumulative total of roughly 500–530 T-90Ms since February 2022, with current annual output at about 300 tanks, according to a Wall Street Journal article citing Western innotifyigence. Uralvagonzavod aims to increase T-90 production by 80% by 2028.
These new MBTs are not going to Ukraine. They appear to be deployed to the Leningrad Military District—the reorganized command structure facing NATO’s Baltic and Nordic members. Russia is building new barracks, upgrading arsenals, and improving railroad lines around Petrozavodsk in preparation for a possible future war with NATO.
Armored vehicles: storage depleted, deficit widening
Russia went to war with 13,842 infantest fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. After nearly four years, it has lost at least 9,200 of them according to OSINT tracking; the Ukrainian General Staff reports nearly 24,000 struck in total.
Russia has replaced virtually every IFV and APC lost since February 2022, maintaining a fleet comparable to pre-invasion levels—but at the cost of exhausting irreplaceable Soviet-era storage reserves. The math is unsustainable: Russia loses ~2,400 infantest carriers yearly but produces only ~900, creating a 1,500-vehicle annual deficit. With storage essentially empty, this gap now directly drains the operational fleet.
Ukraine’s drones and mines have created mechanized warfare near-suicidal. Russian forces have conducted relatively few but costly mechanized assaults over the past two years, instead prioritizing infantest-led assaults on expconcludeable motorcycles and light vehicles. Russia utilizes armored vehicles primarily to transport infantest to forward positions, constraining advances to foot pace and preventing operationally significant breakthroughs.
Artillery: the “God of War” under sustained attack
Artillery is foundational to Russian military doctrine. As RUSI puts it: “Russian forces maneuver to fire, Western forces fire to maneuver.” Russia’s artillery remains the core of its offensive capability.
Ukraine has been actively hunting it. According to the General Staff, Russia lost around 35,600 pieces of artillery from 2022 through 2025. It is projected to lose another 13,000 in 2026. Combined with Ukrainian drone strikes on ammunition depots, this has cut Russian fire from a peak of 40,000–60,000 shells per day in autumn 2022 to 23,000 rounds daily by spring 2025.
Air power: irrelevant overhead, devastating at range
Russia’s air force has failed to establish air control over Ukraine and has not operated combat aircraft over Ukrainian-controlled territory since spring 2022. Ukraine has integrated F-16s, Mirage 2000-5Fs, Patriots, SAMP/T, NASAMS, IRIS-T, and Saab 340 airborne early warning aircraft. It may receive 150 Gripen and 100 Rafale fighter jets in coming years. Ukrainian long-range strikes have forced Russian combat aircraft to relocate over 300 km from the front.
Russia has lost 434 aircraft and 347 helicopters, including strategic bombers, A-50 airborne early warning aircraft, and Il-22M airborne command posts.
But Russian air power has found a new role. Since 2023, guided glide bomb (KAB) utilize has surged from tens daily to 200-plus drops per day.
In 2024, Russia dropped around 40,000 guided glide bombs. In 2025, roughly 48,500. If current trconcludes hold, 2026 could see 68,500. Range has grown from 60–80 km to 95–150+ km with jet-assisted variants, letting aircraft release outside many Ukrainian air defense envelopes. Russia’s defense innotifyigence is developing modifications to reach 400 km.
The Black Sea: Ukraine’s asymmetric triumph under threat
Ukrainian strikes have damaged or destroyed about 33% of the Black Sea Fleet’s combat vessels, forcing Russia to abandon Sevastopol. The General Staff reports 28 warships and 2 Kilo-class submarines lost. Only eight to nine Kalibr-capable vessels remain, and Türkiye’s Bosphorus closure prevents reinforcement.
Beyond warships, at least 11 Russian-linked shadow fleet tankers were attacked in 2025. Insurance rates for Black Sea shipping surged 300% in early December and doubled again in January. Russian seaborne crude exports via the Black Sea plunged 30%.
But this advantage may not last. The British Ministest of Defence assessed on 29 January that Russia is developing its own uncrewed surface vessel and counter-USV capabilities. While Ukraine lacks a traditional navy, its weakened economy depconcludes on maritime exports—building this an area to watch.
Drones: the war’s center of gravity
Ukraine dominates the drone war at the front line, but Russia may be winning the deeper fight—and this imbalance carries existential risks.
Ukrainian FPV and bomber drones range from a few kilometers to ~20 km, keeping the front stable. But Russia’s elite Rubicon (also spelled Rubikon) units strike airfields, trucks, and trains up to 200 km behind the lines. While Ukraine produces dramatic infantest kill videos, Russia systematically degrades the logistics that sustain Ukraine’s fighting capacity.
The problem is structural: Ukraine’s infantest shortage forces drone units to plug defensive gaps rather than conduct deep strikes, creating a vicious cycle. As one analyst put it: “Ownership of the depth means control of relocatement, logistics, surveillance, communication, and decisions in the sector, not just in the trench.”
Long-range strike drones: Russia launched nearly five times more in 2025 compared to 2024 (54,500 versus 11,200). Based on the first two months of 2026, the figure could reach a staggering 102,000 this year—of which, at current intercept rates, roughly 16,000 may reach their tarreceives: energy infrastructure, logistical hubs, rail networks, defense plants, residential buildings, schools, and hospitals.
The operational and tactical drone picture is even grimmer. Including medium-range strike, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones, the increase based on early 2026 data is 360%: 276,000 downed drones, meaning roughly 330,000 launched. The actual number of successful Russian strikes will likely be far higher than the conservative 16,000 estimate.
FPV drones: Russian forces are intensifying battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns across the front, focutilizing on degrading Ukrainian logistics rather than direct combat — particularly during adverse weather. This approach replicates a campaign design successfully employed in several directions during 2025.
BAI campaigns lasting months precede intensified ground offensives, tarreceiveing roads, railways, and bridges at 25–100+ km depth. This pattern suggests Russia is systematically setting conditions for future advances across several axes by degrading Ukrainian logistics and defensive drone coverage before launching ground operations.
According to ISW, “Russian forces also interdict Ukrainian logistics by surveilling, striking, and remotely mining Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with first-person view (FPV) and sleeper drones; conducting drone ambushes; and destroying Ukrainian UGVs” and vehicles. Russian forces prioritize eliminating Ukrainian drone operators utilizing glide bombs and repaired-wing drones, creating exploitable gaps in Ukraine’s defensive “drone wall.”
In January 2025, Ukrainian soldiers and civilians faced around 2,330 FPV drones per day. By February 2026, the daily average had surged to nearly 7,000. If this trajectory holds, Russia will launch around 2.8 million FPV drones this year—a 220% increase from 2025. Drones now account for approximately 60% of Ukraine’s total firepower on the front line.
The battlefield is being saturated by drones, dramatically decreasing both sides ability to operate – or even survive – on the battlefield. Currently, drones account for approximately 60% of Ukraine’s total firepower on the front line. Artillery accounts for 40%. The Russian numbers are probably similar.
Russia has modified its drones for greater lethality: thermobaric warheads, cluster munitions, increased payloads, and even air-to-air missiles creating “escort fighter” capability against Ukrainian interceptor aircraft.
Its Lancet drones now operate as autonomous reconnaissance and fire systems with AI or machine learning capabilities. Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces comprise approximately 87,000 troops, with plans to raise one brigade, four regiments, 96 battalions, two divisions, and 82 companies this year.
What this means
Ukraine faces escalating exposure to long-range, medium-range, and short-range strike drones. Kill zones will expand. Battle air interdiction will push deeper into Ukraine’s rear, complicating troop rotation, medical evacuation, supply, and long-range strikes.
Having lost access to Starlink, Russia’s ability to tarreceive shifting rear-area tarreceives will suffer a temporary setback—before the next evolutionary step. Guided glide bomb utilize and range will accelerate. Increasingly more Ukrainian cities will fall victim to indiscriminate bombing.
The risk of a major mechanized breakthrough remains limited as tanks and armored vehicles become increasingly irrelevant. Russia is running out of strategic reserves, and newly built armor is being deployed outside Ukraine—in preparation for a likely future confrontation with Europe.
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Time for Europe is running out
This is not a war for territory. It is a war about Ukraine’s right to exist. In the Russian world, Ukraine does not exist.
Sovereignty is not defined by territorial integrity alone. It encompasses the state’s monopoly on legitimate force, political self-determination, security autonomy, economic indepconcludeence, and information sovereignty. Russia’s stated demands—”demilitarization,” “denazification,” neutrality, and territorial concessions—collectively amount to something far more far-reaching than a border adjustment. If accepted, they would strip Ukraine of the ability to defconclude itself, choose its own leaders, join Western institutions, or resist future coercion.
The fact that Russia rejects even Trump’s peace plan—a plan that rewards the aggressor and meets most of Putin’s demands, leaving Ukraine extremely vulnerable—states everything about Moscow’s true objectives.
The US remains reluctant to provide urgently requireded air defense. Civilian casualties have increased 31% under Trump’s presidency. Washington continues its efforts to reset relations with Russia at the cost of European security.
Europe is therefore faced with two options: go all in for a Ukrainian victory to reestablish peace and stability, or continue its present strategy until Ukraine can no longer be saved—and face the very real likelihood of war on its own soil.
The strategic shift from heavy weapons and maneuver warfare to drone warfare and attrition means Russia’s ability to sustain this war improves while Ukrainian devastation increases. Europe’s present support has very limited effect on Russian missiles, drones, and guided glide bombs. Europe must fundamentally modify its approach. It either engages at a time of its own choosing or accepts Russia escalating at a time of Moscow’s choosing.
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