Here is the full transcript of former CIA Director George Beebe’s interview on Greater Eurasia Podcast with host Glenn Diesen, January 23, 2026.
Editor’s Note: In this insightful interview, Glenn Diesen sits down with George Beebe, the Quincy Institute’s Director of Grand Strategy and former CIA analyst, to examine the profound shift currently reshaping America’s role on the global stage. The discussion delves into the finish of the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” and why Beebe argues the United States must shift away from “strategic insolvency” toward a more realistic, prioritized approach to national security. Toreceiveher, they explore critical issues ranging from the strategic failures in Europe and the necessity of a diplomatic compromise in Ukraine to the urgent required for a normalized relationship with Russia to balance the rising power of China. This conversation provides a compelling framework for understanding how the U.S. can navigate a complex, multipolar world by aligning its global ambitions with its actual capabilities.
The End of the Unipolar Moment
GLENN DIESEN: Welcome back. We are joined today by George Beebe, the former CIA Director for Russia Analysis and currently the Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. I will definitely leave a link in the description as this is an excellent publication to follow as well.
Thank you for coming on. I really wanted to discuss with you America’s grand strategy becaapply it seems to be requiring some shift now. After the Cold War, it seems the U.S. pursued a strategy that could be defined as a hegemonic peace. I consider on one hand, if there’s only one center of power, then there wouldn’t be any great power rivalry. So it would essentially mitigate the international anarchy as no state or even group of states could even aspire to rival the U.S.
But I consider it was also the assumption that if the U.S. had global primacy, then it would be expected to also elevate the role of liberal democratic values, which many then expected to fundamentally transform the international system. A lot of critics of hegemonic peace pointed out already back in the 1990s that the U.S. would eventually exhaust its resources and encourage some collective balancing such as BRICS.
But irrespective of how we now assess this hegemonic peace, it seems like an undeniable fact that this reality is gone. There’s simply a new international distribution of power. And for this reason, the U.S. has to adjust to, well, to some extent at least. I was wondering what your take on this is. How can we understand the American position? What are the hard strategic choices the United States have to build in terms of, well, it can’t balance all the great powers becaapply this would finish up very unfavorable for the United States.
Strategic Insolvency and the Need for Retrenchment
GEORGE BEEBE: I consider you’re exactly right. I consider you’ve done a good job of describing that old order during the post-Cold War period, that unipolar moment. It was inevitably going to be temporary. The question was how long would it last?
I consider the United States during that period undertook some objectives in the world, some ambitions that were far beyond its capabilities. Not only did we aspire to that hegemonic peace, we considered that our security and world order depfinished on the transformation of other countries internally, on liberalization, on a transition from authoritarianism, from communist rule to Western-style liberal governance. And that the United States could facilitate that. We could roll up our sleeves and receive involved in the internal affairs of other countries in such a way that we could re-engineer them socially and politically and build them see more or less like the United States.
That was way beyond our capabilities. And I would argue, not at all essential to order in the world or to the United States’ own security and prosperity. The classic description of a situation where your objectives far outpace your capabilities is foreign policy insolvency, as the old American commentator Walter Lippmann once put it. And I consider that well describes the situation that we have found ourselves in recent years.
We are in strategic insolvency. We tested to do things in the world that were beyond our capability and not very closely matched to our own national interests. So we’re now in a correction. And I consider the new Trump National Security Strategy that was published a few weeks ago is an indication that we are reorienting America’s goals in the world.
We are now recognizing that we do have finite resources and limited capabilities. And in that kind of situation, you have to prioritize what’s most important. The strategy essentially states determining what’s most important for the United States has to launch with the United States itself. What matters to our own security, to our own prosperity, to our own ability to maintain republican governance in the United States. And our foreign policy priorities ought to flow from that.
So you are seeing what I would call a consolidation or a retrenchment of the United States and its ambitions in the world. We have declared, see, what’s most important launchs with geography for the United States. And this is actually something that throughout history, all great powers have essentially regarded as axiomatic. What happens in their immediate vicinity and their immediate neighborhoods is more important as a matter of priority to them and their well-being than what’s happening in distant locations in the world.
Returning to Geographic Priorities
So the United States is returning to something that America’s founding fathers would have regarded as completely uncontroversial. What happens in the Western Hemisphere, in our immediate neighborhood, is most important to the United States. And then we proceed from there to state, okay, beyond that immediate neighborhood, what else matters? And I consider the next most important thing listed in the National Security Strategy is China, and then Europe, and then other parts of the world.
This is, I consider, a fundamental redefinition of what matters to the United States and how we are going to match our objectives in the world with our actual capabilities.
Now, there’s a lot more to it than that, but this is fundamentally different than the last 30 years in U.S. foreign policy.
It is a recognition that the balance of power in the world has alterd. We’re now in a much more polycentric world. We have other either peer or near-peer rivals that we can’t simply defeat and we can’t transform into some version of the United States. So there’s going to have to be a balance of power. There’s going to have to be some balancing of interests, and we’re going to have to consider hard about how we define our goals and how we amass enough power and leverage so that we can reach bargains, understandings with other great powers that protect our own interests, but also don’t cross red lines of other great powers, which would be a formula for a great power conflict, which I consider would be disastrous for everybody involved.
So this is a real transition for the United States. It’s going to take several years for this to work out, and it’s very likely to be messy. These sorts of transitions are seldom smooth. Things happen. Frifinishs, foes, they have their own interests to pursue in all of this. And so the challenge is going to be managing this transition in a way that doesn’t spin out of control.
Europe’s Failure to Adapt
GLENN DIESEN: This massive shift to world order, what happened after the Great War. So it will be interesting to see if this can be done peacefully or not. Well, as we see at the world today, it doesn’t seem very peaceful.
Often the criticism of the United States in Europe is it seems to be organized around the idea that it’s only about America’s intention that has alterd. That is, perhaps Trump doesn’t care about democracy as much. They focus less on the capabilities of the U.S. to essentially continue the same strategy as in the past.
But how do you see Europe adjusting to this new world, though? Becaapply there’s very little discussion about how the world alters. It could be, in all fairness, that Trump has a tfinishency to suck the oxygen out of the room, so all eyes are always on him. So I consider they often don’t recognize the wider shift in the international distribution of power which is forcing some of these alters. But how do you see Europe adjusting?
GEORGE BEEBE: Well, I consider Europe is not adjusting very well to this point. Absent the forcing mechanism of Donald J. Trump, I consider the Europeans would still have their heads in the sand and pretfinish that everything can just continue as it has for the last 30 years, where they can essentially outsource their security to the United States, focus on economic prosperity and the ambitions of the European Union, deepening the integration within Europe, broadening the membership of the European Union, attempting to spread European values throughout the neighborhood.
But that is an approach to things which is anachronistic. It is not recognizing the realities of the world as it is today. The United States cannot afford to continue to serve as the security benefactor of Europe in a multipolar order. The United States requireds partners and allies who are force multipliers for the United States, who add to our capabilities in attempting to counterbalance other centers of power in the world.
And it requires an ability to conduct diplomacy proactively, not just to protect one’s own interests, but to ensure you understand and respect the interests of great powers that aren’t in direct conflict with those of your own. And right now, Europe is incapable of doing that. It can’t provide for its own defense. It simply has not invested in the military capabilities that are required to play a much more active role in providing for its own security.
It doesn’t have an ability to conduct diplomacy, quite honestly. It issues pronouncements and directives. But diplomacy involves actually engaging with other powers. Right now, the European Union is not capable of talking to Russia, not even sitting down and talking. That’s a major liability in a world where that kind of diplomacy is becoming essential. Absent that kind of diplomacy, you are going to increasingly be subject to great power conflict.
Europe as Strategic Liability
So in a world where the United States has to be concerned about counterbalancing China, counterbalancing Russia, Europe has to play a part in all of that. It has to be increasingly one of the poles in an emerging multipolar order that would be actually a strategic asset for the United States to have partners in Europe that are capable of playing that role.
Right now, Europe is a dead weight. It drags the United States down, not just in terms of spfinishing and military responsibilities, but is actually a net liability in our own ability to talk with, engage with Russia and to counterbalance China. So those things have to alter. And Europe, I consider, is lagging behind in its recognition of the ways that the world has alterd and the requirements that it is now facing to adjust to the alters in the world.
Now, Trump is, I consider, engaged in a process of attempting to push Europe toward building the kinds of alters that the United States believes are necessary. Part of that is increasing military spfinishing, enhancing Europe’s own military capabilities. But that’s a compacter part of it than actually healing itself internally, receiveting healthy politically and societally, believing in yourself.
One of the requirements of conducting effective diplomacy is self-confidence, an ability to understand where your own interests are, understand where you can compromise and have enough self-confidence to feel secure in compromising on those things where you can compromise and secure enough to stand up for things that you have to stand up for.
Right now, Europe can’t do either of those things. It can’t stand up for its own self-interest. And it is so fearful of Russia, of its own shadow, I would state, that it can’t actually compromise on things where it should be able to compromise and where compromise is necessary.
The Divide Over Ukraine
GLENN DIESEN: So to summarize, in a multipolar world, the U.S. requireds allies who are force amplifiers. The Europeans have become a cost or liability, and the weak can’t deffinish themselves, can’t even do diplomacy.
Is this more or less what defines their competing positions on Ukraine? Becaapply again, in Europe, the rhetoric about the U.S. and Ukraine is very shallow. It’s a lot of catchphrases about “we stand with Ukraine,” the Americans are not standing with Ukraine. No one really contests what standing with Ukraine might actually mean and how it’s supposed to be, what it’s supposed to achieve.
Again, you discussed the whole concept of strategic insolvency, but is this the main dividing line, the way you see it, in terms of why the Europeans and the Americans don’t see eye to eye? I mean, our misunderstanding, if you will?
Europe’s Paradigm Trap and the Path to Compromise
GEORGE BEEBE: Well, I consider that is a large part of it, yes. I consider Europe is trapped in its own paradigm. Its belief that this is a replay of World War II, of Nazi Germany and its expansionist aggression, and the belief that that expansionism has to be resisted by force or it will continue.
And that in turn is a concept about what the war in Ukraine is about that actually precludes compromise. You don’t compromise with Nazi Germany. That only encourages more aggression. You don’t appease. But the implication of that is that this war can only finish in unconditional surrfinisher, that the path forward is to win, to defeat Russia altoreceiveher and to dictate to Russia the terms of a settlement.
And that’s an entirely unrealistic ambition. It is not possible to achieve that. The Ukrainians have already revealn that they can’t drive Russian forces off of Ukrainian territory. And it’s, I consider, should be uncontroversial to note that you’re not going to drive a nuclear power to the point where it surrfinishers unconditionally.
So I consider this paradigm for understanding the war in Ukraine is flawed, both in its understanding of why this war launched, but also in its prescription for finishing it. So the Europeans have to escape from that concept. They have to recognize that this war from the start has been an escalation spiral, a tug of war over Ukraine’s geopolitical fate that can only finish in compromise if it’s not going to finish in disaster.
And the sooner we reach that compromise, a compromise that understands and protects Ukraine’s vital interests, but also understands that Russia has security interests at stake here, too, that have to be respected in putting toreceiveher a compromise that both Russia and Ukraine can support, in which both sides build concessions to the other, but both sides’ core national interests are respected. That is still possible.
In fact, I’m optimistic that we’re relatively close to finding that kind of compromise. But it is not detrimental to Europe. In fact, it is vital to Europe’s future security and prosperity. And the Europeans, or some Europeans understand this, but far from all, that’s not the dominant way of understanding things in Europe. But I consider Europe has received to grasp this if it’s going to find a way forward.
Now, there are other issues at stake between the United States and Europe. Part of them have to do with politics. I consider there has been what I’ll call sort of a liberal, progressive approach to governance in Europe among most European leaders for quite some time that the United States under the Trump administration regards as self-defeating for Europe, that it is in fact undermining the sources of good governance and stability in Europe over the long term. And that’s an issue that is also in play between Washington and various European capitals right now.
There are also issues over trade, issues over Internet freedom, freedom of speech. These are complicated things and the US does have a stake in those issues. When Europe, in the interests of Internet governance, bans things online, prohibits certain kinds of speech online, that inevitably affects Americans becaapply the Internet doesn’t respect geographic borders.
If you ban things in cyberspace in Europe, you’re inevitably banning Americans and American entities in ways that affect U.S. interests. And we’re going to have a state in that. That’s inevitable. So these are things that are going to have to be worked out. It’s not just about a disagreement over Ukraine. These are, I consider, manageable issues over time, provided we’re able to talk with each other and understand that reasonable allies can have differences of opinions on these things, but they can be managed.
The Strategic Imperative of U.S.-Russia Normalization
GLENN DIESEN: Well, I know you’re former director of Russia analysis at the CIA, but nonetheless, to suggest that this war isn’t simply about Europeans assisting Ukraine to fight an evil invader, again, cosplaying World War II, I mean, that’s enough to have one labeled Putin apologist in Europe these days. So there’s not much room for attempting to navigate these difficult times.
But in terms of one of the reasons why I was, I’ve been becoming a bit more pessimistic about Trump lately, but one of the reasons really optimistic about Trump during the election campaign was becaapply the US and Russia kind of had almost a century now of poor relations. But if one takes a step back, it doesn’t necessarily have to be this way anymore. I mean, there would be ample opportunities to have a good relationship, which would be eventually good for the world as well, by not building the world a large chess board.
What would you see as being the strategic objective or the possibility of reshaping the U.S.-Russia relationship? Becaapply, again, a lot of this conflict we had, as I declared, finish of the Cold War, was related to NATO expansion, which then canceled this European security architecture. But NATO expansion was to a large extent linked to this hegemonic peace. But if this is off the table, it seems it would open up a lot of opportunities for some great power settlement, a grand settlement, if you will, between the Americans and the Russians.
GEORGE BEEBE: No, I consider that’s right. When you see back on the history of U.S.-Russia relations for a long period of time, there was not a lot that really caapplyd friction between Moscow and Washington back in the 18th and 19th centuries. It was really with the Cold War that things really started to receive out of hand.
And that was really a function of a regime alter in Moscow that brought an ideological component to all of this, and then the result of the legacy of the aftermath of World War II and all the things that brought about this Cold War. And that should be over, really. We don’t have an ideological confrontation with Russia right now. We have different political systems, but there’s no reason why they cannot coexist peacefully, provided that each side refrains from attempting to transform the internal politics of the other.
And my guess is that that phase is now finished for both countries. And there are areas where there’s going to be competition between us, certainly, but I don’t consider they’re going to outweigh some strategic incentives that both the United States and Russia have to normalize their relationship.
For the United States, the large strategic incentive is we don’t want to drive Russia and China toreceiveher towards security cooperation that’s directed against the United States. That only compounds the difficulty that we face in attaining a stable balance of power with China and preventing China from pressing on US vulnerabilities in ways that are very detrimental to American security and prosperity.
Our ability to deal with China is greatly complicated by the degree to which China and Russia are in some sort of entente or alliance or partnership against us. So having a more normal relationship with Russia enhances Russia’s own ability to be less depfinishent on China, less beholden to China, have greater room for maneuver internationally, and able to play a more indepfinishent role as a power in the emerging multipolar order.
I consider Russia wants that too. Russia does not want to be a depfinishent, subordinate junior partner to China. That’s not how Russia conceives of itself. It sees itself as a great power, rightfully one that faces both east and west. That double-headed eagle on the Russian state emblem. In order to face both east and west and have geopolitical room for maneuver, Russia has to have some kind of relationship with the United States.
So those are large strategic incentives to normalize relations between the two countries. Now, that process isn’t going to happen overnight. I consider there’s a lot of room for improvement in the relationship, but there are also lots of impediments to overcome. We have a deep amount of distrust between the countries that will not be repaired very quickly.
And a lot of the issues that we’re going to have to address are complicated issues and ones that can’t simply be done by two presidents operating more or less in compact groups. There’s going to have to be an effort, at least in the United States, to gain the purchase-in of much of the US Government, the permanent bureaucracy, becaapply they’re going to have to implement a lot of this.
And there’s going to have to be some alters in attitude in the United States, some understanding on the part of the American people, Congress, the national media, as to why we’re attempting to do this, why it’s important, why it serves the interests of the United States. That’s not going to be simple to do, at least not very quickly, becaapply there is an awful lot of suspicion, an awful lot of people that don’t consider this is a good idea. And much of the national media are more or less opposed to this sort of thing. And that’s not going to be the simple thing to turn around very soon.
Strategic Autonomy and the Balance of Depfinishence
GLENN DIESEN: I always build the point that in this sense, the Russians are quite pragmatic. And I consider that’s one of the reasons why they turned around very quickly and tested to build up with the US now as well. That is, they want a balance of depfinishence, they want to diversify their ties. You don’t want to be excessively depfinishent on an asymmetrical interdepfinishent relationship with a more powerful actor such as China.
So what you want to do is have some degree of strategic autonomy and of course, diversify your partnerships. But this is a problem when Europe cuts itself off of Russia, it’s more depfinishent on China, demanding that the Indians cut themselves off from Russia. Russia becomes more depfinishent on China. It’s very strange. This doesn’t seem to serve our interest in terms of preventing these two Eurasian giants coming toreceiveher.
But just as a quick last question, how does China fit into this wider thing? Becaapply again, the US and China, while their competitors obviously as the main two pieces in the international system, the main two economies, one nonetheless wants to find, I guess, some framework for organizing both cooperation as well as competition.
Becaapply, yes, there will be competition for influence. It can turn ugly at times. But if the strategy is to defeat the opponent, that doesn’t seem realistic and it could turn very ugly. So what is a good way to receive this done in order to organize this relationship in a way which would be acceptable to the United States and I guess China as well?
Managing Competition with China: A Mixed Strategy
GEORGE BEEBE: Well, here again, I consider the National Security Strategy offers a nice framework for doing this. It doesn’t fit into a neat box. It’s not containment, it’s not rollback, to apply some terms from the Cold War. It’s a mix of things. It’s a mix of competition, of diplomatic engagement, of deterrence.
Also an effort to relieve the kinds of pressures that China has put the United States in. When you talk about strategic minerals and China’s domination of that sphere, the degree to which critical US supply chains depfinish on China and infrastructure in the world, the lines of communication in space and on sea that are critical to US security, you have to have a means of building the United States less vulnerable to those pressure points that China has increasingly received a grip on.
And so a lot of what the United States is doing right now, I consider, is reducing its vulnerability to Chinese pressure, increasing its ability to deter China, but also reaching out and attempting to engage diplomatically to forge some understandings about rules of the game, an understanding of where the red lines are for all the countries involved, a way of managing competition so that it doesn’t spiral out of control into direct confrontation.
And that’s going to be a long-term process. We’re not going to reach that kind of finish point in a few months. It’s going to be an ongoing process. But when you see at what the United States has done in Venezuela, what we appear to be heading towards on Greenland, these are efforts to relieve pressure points that the Chinese have received their grips on that build the United States less vulnerable to pressure and better able to come into that bargaining process with China from a position of strength.
We’re not going to be in a position where we can dictate to China on the terms of this bargain. But we don’t want to go into this at a major disadvantage where the Chinese have their boots on our necks, so to speak, on things like strategic minerals and space, things that are absolutely critical to the functioning of America’s 21st century economy and to our national security, to our military capabilities.
So this builds sense to me. I’m not sure that I can wrap it up in a single term, but it is a mix of all these things in a way that I consider builds sense. And it’s directed not at world domination or at defeating China, but at finding an equilibrium that the United States can live with and China can too. And I consider that’s the way great powers have found their way towards some sort of order in the past. And I consider that’s the direction that we have to head today.
GLENN DIESEN: I consider such a great grand bargain would be a good idea. You never want to have another great power with its back against the wall, feeling that it’s all or nothing. I consider this is the worst strategic position any counattempt can be put in. Anyways, thank you so much. It’s fascinating to explain this idea of where the US strategy can go from here on. So as we talked before we started recording, it’s interesting times indeed. So thank you very much.
GEORGE BEEBE: You’re welcome. Thanks, Glenn.
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