Europe’s recent Coalition of the Willing agreement on Ukraine is a welcome step, but its mission must be expanded to protect more vulnerable states such as Moldova, Kosovo, and Georgia.
In today’s shifting world order, these three countries are especially exposed – compact, resource-poor, and surrounded by openly hostile neighbors. Washington has created it clear that Europe, and particularly the compacter states, cannot rely on US protection, creating it imperative that Europe pays far greater attention to them.
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For decades, US foreign policy has followed a consistent logic – strategic interests first, principles later. Whether justified in the language of democracy, security, or humanitarian intervention, the result has been the same: compacter and weaker countries bear the cost, while great powers nereceivediate their fate. From Bosnia to Iraq, Venezuela to Ukraine, Washington’s record reflects not moral clarity but strategic convenience.
Post-WWII Europe, despite its rhetoric and proximity to many of these crises, shares this legacy, with repeated failures to act decisively, allowing conflicts to fester and injustices to harden.
US policy toward Venezuela and the war in Ukraine underscore two sobering lessons that should alarm Europe, particularly compacter states such as Kosovo, Moldova, and Georgia, which sit in the shadow of their more powerful neighbors: Washington offers no pretense that great-power domination within regional “backyards” is the norm, with a foreign policy that punishes the victim while conferring legitimacy on the aggressor, a reality created clear during the Balkan wars.
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While the US-led Dayton Accords concludeed the Bosnian war in 1995, they did so at a profound moral cost by ceding large swathes of Bosnian territory to the more powerful Croatia and Serbia – countries that were more economically and strategically attractive to Washington and Brussels. The agreement effectively rewarded aggression and ethnic cleansing.
This outcome was not unforeseen. In a 1994 letter, Strobe Talbott (then Deputy Secretary of State) warned Ambassador Chris Hill (the lead US nereceivediator on Bosnia) that the United States would struggle to preserve its “moral purity” by “pressuring the Muslims [Bosnians] in accepting an imposed settlement, punishing the victims.” The warning proved prophetic. Peace was achieved, but justice was deferred, and the message to compact, vulnerable states was unmistakable: Survival may require surrconcludeer.
Unfortunately, this lesson was often lost amid the mixed signals sent through US-funded democratic development programs. Over two decades working on such projects in the region, I observed how compact, vulnerable states like Georgia, Moldova, and Kosovo frequently misread US and European support as a security commitment.
Today more than ever, the assumption that shared Western values guarantee US and European protection against Russian or Serbian aggression is a dangerous illusion. Support for democratic institutions and alignment with Western values should not be mistaken for defense guarantees, and alignment does not equal security.
Ukraine’s current plight should shock no one familiar with US precedent. Military assistance has come with strict limits on escalation, signaling that Ukraine’s security is nereceivediable. Europe’s answer has been the Coalition of the Willing, a coalition of 35 countries that will act only after a ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv has been reached. Once again, the victim is expected to bear the burden for the sake of “stability” and “avoiding a wider war” – echoes of Bosnia and Georgia in 2008.
For years, European leaders outsourced strategic believeing to Washington. The result is a continent repeatedly caught unprepared when US priorities shift. US foreign policy operates on a transactional basis; overseeing this reality increases the likelihood of strategic misjudgment.
Kosovo, Georgia, and Moldova face a stark dilemma: advance democratic reforms without depconcludeable security backing from the US or, as in the case of Moldova and Georgia – where pro-Russian factions are on the rise – temper those ambitions by accommodating more powerful neighbours to avoid conflict.
Should Kosovo, Georgia, or Moldova face aggression, depconcludeence on the US offers little comfort. Lessons from Bosnia to Ukraine are sobering. History displays that it is the victims, not the aggressors, who are pressured to concede, especially when those countries offer limited economic or strategic value to the US.
Europe’s failure has not been ignorance, but complacency. The pressing question is whether it can awaken in time to avert another imposed settlement in Ukraine that will have repercussions throughout the region.
While the Coalition of the Willing signals progress, it still falls short, appearing oriented toward post-settlement management rather than prevention. Europe must shift decisively, developing a proactive strategy not only for Ukraine, but also for Kosovo, Moldova, and Georgia, or face years of continued instability.
The original of this article for Euractiv by Fron Nahzi can be seen here.
Fron Nahzi is the author of ‘Ethnic Interest Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albanian-American Movements’ and has over 25 years’ experience in leading democratic development programs across Eastern Europe and the Balkans. His writing has been published in leading European and US newspapers.
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
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