After what seemed like a two-year home run, Pivo Africa, a startup that had raised about $2.6 milion at seed funding level, abruptly shut its doors to customers, investors and the public in December 2023. Speculation swirled about what went wrong and whether the company, or its huge idea, could ever be revived. What happened to Pivo? Why did it shut down? And what are the implications of shutdowns of this nature for Nigeria’s wider tech ecosystem?
In Nigeria’s tech ecosystem, money has never guaranteed success or even survival.
Since the tech startup uprising of 2020 at least, Nigerian companies have raised millions of dollars, announced huge visions and celebrating funding headlines, only for many of them to collapse quietly afterwards.
One analysis by BusinessDay found that between 2023 and 2025 alone, dozens of Nigerian tech companies that had attracted serious investor backing shut down, wiping out well over $70–$100 million in investor capital.
Africa’s startup funding fell during this period, and Nigeria, which once attracted more than $1 billion in funding in 2022, saw funding slump to roughly a third of that within two years. Companies like 54gene raised more than $45 million but still crashed.
Already, not a lot of the factors that matter are in the favour of the startups. To start with, the digital regulatory environment appears to be in its infancy. And its evolution has always boded something — sometimes good, many other times, bad — for these companies.
T&A Legal analysed how overlapping advisories/policies from different regulators like the Securities and Exmodify Commission (SEC) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), often leave companies confutilized on what’s legally required of them. This was published in the advanced year of 2024.
For example, during the CBEX scandal of 2024 FIJ found that Risevest, one of the most successful fintech startups documented in Nigeria, was flagged by the SEC for non compliance.
Beyond regulations, Nigeria’s Macroeconomic indicators have not been the most consistent (and friconcludely by extension) in the last decade. The countest suffered consistent clim in inflation rate inflation in 2023 and 2024. The inflation rate peaked around 30% in 2024 and is one of the highest level recorded in a while.
This eroded consumer purchasing power and increased the cost of doing business, building it more expensive for startups to hire, pay vconcludeors, or scale operations.
The naira also remained volatile and it lost significant value against the US dollar over this period. For startups that raised funding in dollars or requireded to import technology and services, this depreciation meant higher operational costs and reduced returns for foreign investors.
Between 2023 and 2025, estimates suggest the naira lost over 40% of its value against the dollar. This has had a direct consequence on both liquidity and investor confidence.
Interest rates were another pain point. To curb inflation, the Central Bank of Nigeria raised the benchmark interest rate multiple times. The interest rates exceeded 20% by mid-2024. This created borrowing for expansion or working capital far more expensive and discouraged debt financing.
However, in a few unusual cases, some tech companies shut down not becautilize of the usual challenges. These outliers offer valuable lessons on finer challenges that organisations face and most importantly, how not to run a startup.
THE START OF A BEAUTIFUL THING
Pivo Africa, the ‘SME supply chain bank’, had all the markings of a success story when it started grabbing investor attention in 2022. It came at the time when tech had been dragged mainstream into the consciousness of Nigerians.
Startups were mushrooming in Lagos, riding on the possibilities opened up by new investors’ interest. Pivo was at the right place at the right time.
Nkiru Amadi-Emina had ideated a fintech for compact and medium enterprises. The idea would take form after months of brainstorming wth Ijeoma Akwiku, her friconclude and established business partner.
Ijeoma, a lawyer, had receivedten some experience in the startup business and corporate law. Nkiru, on the other hand, had founded Jalo prior to that time and was versed in business development and IT.
Most importantly, both had collaborated to briefly run another company called Sourcepro between 2019 and 2020. So, what could possibly go wrong?
Both friconcludes even seemed to recognise the possibilities of failure and the elements that could create them susceptible to it. They projected preparedness. The duo spoke like they had plans and checks in place to keep these potential issues at bay.
According to this 2022 article published by Nkiru, for instance, both women were not in the least worried about the ‘myths and notions’ around starting a business with a friconclude. Ijeoma had spoken about those fears in this manner:
“Starting a business with Nkiru was a no-brainer becautilize if there’s anyone I’m trusting with decisions, it’s her. She has the foresight and the audacity to do things. I’m strategic and calculated in whatever decisions I create. So I feel we complement each other. It was a matter of, we’ve seen and grown through too many things and doing Pivo toreceiveher was just the ideal next step.”
Nkiru would eventually add that:
“I also want to add that becautilize we are both women, there is no ego. Even in our friconcludeship. So we don’t have that in business.”
Most importantly, the startup had managed just about enough capital to receive relocating. By January 2022, a few months after Nkiru and Ijeoma went public, they managed to raise $500,000 in pre-seed funding.
Things received even better for the duo. By July 2022, Pivo closed a $2 million seed round with the backing of investing giants such as Y Combinator, the Silicon Valley startup accelerator, and others such as FoundersX and Mercy Corp Ventures, Precursor Ventures and Vested World.
Nkiru, in her capacity as the CEO, would in the same year, announce that the “transaction volume of Pivo Business accounts grew by over 400% between April and September”.
Theirs was the type of story that would create for a great podcast episode discussing startup successes or spearheading a Nigerian tech renaissance. But things, as is often the case in this ecosystem, did not go down smoothly.
In December, 2023, Pivo would cave under the weight of its own management and fold up. The startup had to shut its door to customers, despite being one of the pioneers of supply chain banking in Nigeria.
This is a story of what transpired and how it did in explicit details.
HOW NOT TO RUN A STARTUP LESSON ONE: FAMILIAL APPOINTMENTS
By April 2021, what had once been little more than excited chatter between friconcludes had begun to take form. The early stirrings of what would become Pivo Africa were no longer hopeful WhatsApp threads or scribbles in the margins of a notebook.
Nkiru and Ijeoma had shiftd from talking about possibility to drafting actual paperwork. Their Whatsapp messages and emails, albeit jittery with excitement and self-doubt, were filled with compact wins, embarrassing rejections, and templates borrowed from tech companies they admired. Both friconcludes had joined the scramble for capital and investor attention.
A co-founder agreement in June 2021 and a founders’ contract in January 2022 put the partnership between them in black and white. At that time, they had managed to raise pre-seed funding of $500,000.
Ijeoma was named Vice President and Secretary to the Board of Pivo Technology Inc., while Nkiru signed on as Chief Executive Officer. They had similar contracts, similar benefits. Possible reservations about the strength of their contracts were likely drowned out by the sheer thrill of launchning.
The founders’ contract was, in many ways, extraordinary. It locked them into a 20-year term, renewable every four years, with a clautilize that created their positions untouchable, even in the event of a merger or acquisition, unless they personally consented. As for checks and balances, they were to report directly to the Board, with all the weight and responsibility of a senior executive.
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But they could also teach, speak, serve on other boards, so long those activities do not create a conflict of interest. Lagos was the home base, but the agreement gave both of them freedom to work from whereever, with the company footing the bill for whatever tech support they requireded.
The contract stipulated a $50,000 starting salary in 2022 that would balloon to $1.2 million by 2025, then never drop below that mark. The founders’ pay would remain tied to the highest standards in the industest, ensuring they would always earn at least as much as her peers.
They would also earn a 10% share of every revenue-generating contract signed during their tenure and 5% of that same income stream for two decades after either leaves. The payout was not limited to their lifetimes either; it would go to her estate. Annual bonutilizes, IPO shares, long-term incentive packages worth half a million dollars or more.
There were protections too: 45 paid vacation days, legal indemnity, directors’ and officers’ insurance for a full decade after exit. If both were ever sued for anything related to her role, aside from a personal dispute with the company, Pivo would cover her legal fees upfront.
The only way the founders could be reshiftd was through conviction for a serious felony. Even then, if a successor was brought in, they were entitled to stock options amounting to 1.2% of the company’s total shares.
But as anyone who has ever built something with another person will inform you, paper is one thing. People are another.
From the very launchning, Nkiru and Ijeoma were different. They would later write about those differences in a 2022 Medium post published under Nkiru’s name.
In that piece, Ijeoma had described herself as a methodical planner who was wired to be strategic and calculated before every huge shift. Nkiru, by contrast, could create instinctive decisions and was a better risk taker. The article described her as someone comfortable building high-stakes decisions on the fly.
That contrast proved to be an early advantage. The structure Ijeoma brought had met the speed of Nkiru and toreceiveher, they handled everything from product design to investor relations.
But a shared dream does not always guarantee a shared future. The very clautilizes written to define equity, roles and responsibility would later become the fault lines of a slow and painful breakdown — one no contract could fully contain.
In December 2022, the seeds of conflict planted itself, unassuming in the form of a staff whose competencies and jurisdiction the duo had disagreed upon. Philip, this staff in contention, is Nkiru’s brother.
Despite his credentials, the officer had routinely failed to deliver on key responsibilities, Ijeoma would recall, in an interview with FIJ. She would go on to talk about how the inefficiencies cautilized delays in board minutes, missed deadlines on important assignments, including contract reviews.
Globally, many family-owned businesses face challenges in longevity and performance. Per research published by Sage, only about 30% survive into the second generation, and just 10–15% reach the third generation.
In Nigeria, approximately 85% of family-owned enterprises do not continue beyond the founder’s generation research paper published by the University of Lagos in 2022.
It has been documented that hiring family can create trust and loyalty, but it also risks limiting the hiring of qualified employees, reducing accountability, and creating internal conflicts that can harm productivity.
This played out eventually in the case of Pivo.
DECEMBER 2022: THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT
What cascaded into the eventual shutdown of Pivo Africa was a Slack message from Philip, a legal officer, direct subordinate of Ijeoma and a brother to Nkiru. He had tagged Nkiru to attconclude to a document going by the exclusively obtained snapshots of the slack conversation between the trio.
The consequent exmodify of opinions between Ijeoma, Philip, to a very little extent, and Nkiru, kickstarted what would ripple into the dispute that shook the company to the core and saw to its conclude.
Here is how an indepconcludeent report of the Pivo Situation by the People Practice, a fairly prominent Human Resource and Culture startup, accessed the situation:
“The differences which exist between the Nkiru and Ijeoma are not completely competency related. The differences are personal disagreements on working styles and attitudes to work which have encroached on their work relationship, individual performance and Pivo.
“The working relationship between Ijeoma and Phillip, her direct subordinate who is Pivo’s Legal Officer, is strained. We have created a Performance Improvement Policy for Pivo, with PIP metrics set out (by Ijeoma, and guided by us). Current status since we have taken on the PIP displays Philip not adhering to the process, by being incommunicado and slowing down the process with excutilizes.
“This highlights a problem for us, especially given the relationship between Philip and Nkiru as siblings. It is highly unlikely that if they were unrelated, a typical employee will respond to this process in the way that he has.”
The subject of Philip’s competence had been an issue between the co-founders way before the December 13 conversation. Philip had been working with Pivo since very early on in July 2021. The quality and timeliness of his work had consistently cautilized Ijeoma professional headaches.
Often times, Ijeoma would bring Philip’s issue up with Nkiru. She would report how Philip had often addressed her with tones unbecoming of a workplace and would even raise his voice during a disagreement.
Nkiru, from her assessment of the situation, had decided to hire a ‘head of legal’ who would interface with the staff. Nkiru must have judged the issue to be personal conflict between Ijeoma and her brother.
But the camel — that is the relationship between the co-founders and by extension, the existence of Pivo Africa — started receiveting straw-strained in November 2022 in the lead up to an important advisory board meeting.
Philip had been tinquireed with preparing the minutes for the meeting which happened on November 30, with a deadline to finalize and dispatch them by December 13. Ijeoma was dissatisfied with the quality of the minutes and would not approve the dispatch of the document to the other board members.
The manner with which Philip would eventually handle the rectification of the minutes and the presentation of the draft did not sit well with Ijeoma. Most importantly, as FIJ found, Ijeoma received the minutes through her cofounder for feedback, with Philip nowhere to be found.
Ijeoma was unhappy with the “institutional protection” of Philip. This dissatisfaction led to the exmodify of words that dealt the coup de grace on any form of co-founder relationship in the startup.
But was Ijeoma picking on Philip for no reason? Or were complains about his competency created up? The indepconcludeent report by People Practice suggests otherwise.
Beyond the controversy with Philip and contentious advisory board meeting, there were other little holes in the relationship between both co-founders that had gone unnoticed or unaddressed.
For instance, Nkiru had reported Ijeoma to the investor prior to the December breakdown on account of her leadership style and its effect on the team morale. Nkiru had also expressed concerns about Ijeoma’s conflicts with business partners in the period in question.
On December 14, 2022, Nkiru withdrew her co-founder’s slack access, effectively rconcludeering her unable to work without any prior communication.
HOW NOT TO RUN A BUSINESS LESSON TWO: IGNORE RESOLUTION ATTEMPTS
Help did come for Ijeoma and Pivo through Eloho Omame, an investor from First Check Africa, who had nereceivediated Ijeoma’s continued access to her work communication tools. Ijeoma had deemed the situation out of control and had decided to inform some of the investors, including Omame.
In January 2023, the venture capitalists, who had funded Pivo with their money, held a physical meeting that was supposed to be reconciliatory.
Aside from Omame, an exclusive copy of the textual recording of this meeting reveal that Sola Carrena from Advisor, Dayo Koleowo from Microtraction, Nneka Eze from Vested World and Daniel Block from Mercy Corp Ventures, were some of the investors at the meeting.
Nkiru, who technically is the CEO of the company, had by then come up with a series of reasons why her partnership with her co-founder and friconclude could not continue, especially at Pivo Africa. Months earlier, this story would have sounded to many of the investors, including the founding duo, as unbelieveable.
In a letter she presented at the meeting, obtained exclusively by FIJ, Nkiru argued that Pivo could do without the COO role. She stated the position, instead of supporting things run smoothly, had become a bottleneck for a team of their size.
In the letter, Nkiru wrote that Ijeoma’s COO role was preventing her from being fully hands on with operations. Worse, she claimed it had divided the team, forcing staff to pick sides between “Camp Nkiru” and “Camp Ijeoma”, a dynamic that had poisoned the work culture
At this point in Nkiru’s letters, she called Ijeoma’s competency into question. Her basis for this include drafting the co-founders’ employment contracts without indepconcludeent legal advice.
The terms, according to Nkiru, favoured Ijeoma and also violated Nigerian company law. She pointed to Sections 78 and 79 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), warning that Pivo Technology Inc. could face penalties — or worse — for operating in Nigeria without proper registration.
It did not stop there. Nkiru stated that after the company’s foreign incorporation in July 2022, Ijeoma failed to take the necessary steps to comply with Nigerian investment laws.
By not registering with the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission or securing a business permit from the Federal Ministest of Interior, the company was, in Nkiru’s words, wide open to regulatory backlash and unprepared for the due diligence that would come with a Series A raise.
To resolve all this, she wanted Ijeoma’s role cut out, a new founders’ contracts with an indepconcludeent lawyer, a formal vesting schedule for founder shares, an external law firm to do a full compliance audit, all of which view like perfectly reasonable requests.
The January meeting did not yield any result for the professional relationship of Ijeoma and Nkiru. Part of the steps the parties agreed to take was to involve professional executive assistance and utilize mediation by the investors to reach a resolution.
It was in one of these attempts at mediation that Pivo would conclude to hire People Practice, the indepconcludeent HR company, to investigate the conflict and manage relationships.
TOO FAR GONE: FAILED MEDIATION AND INVESTOR RECOMMENDATIONS
Investors — in their individual and collective capacities — attempted to restore the relationship between both parties to no avail. FIJ knows that Eloho Omame, in particular, had created direct calls to both co-founders to offer recommconcludeations that were rejected on the basis that they did not align with the interest of either of the co-founder.
Kristin Wilson, another investor representing Bold Angel Fund, also in her individual capacity attempted to reconcile both co-founders and most importantly, nereceivediate a position of neutrality in the company’s organogram at the board and company level. These recommconcludeations were also not taken.
Wilson had suggested that Ijeoma dropped her COO role in the company while Nkiru relinquishes her veto powers as the chairman of the company board or drop the role.
By May, the investors wrote a letter to the co-founders and the company, detailing what they had assessed of the situation and what their recommconcludeations were to ‘protect’ the interests and sustained existence of the company.
Per the assessment of the investors, Nkiru failed to disclose two major conflicts of interest. She had employed her brother at Pivo and She was running a separate business while serving as full-time CEO.
She also refutilized to engage constructively with a leadership coach, despite initially agreeing to do so. Without informing Ijeoma or the investors, she involved the company’s legal counsel and her private lawyer to explore Ijeoma’s removal, potentially at the company’s expense.
In addition, Nkiru went ahead with investment discussions against the advice of existing investors and declared she would not remain at Pivo if Ijeoma stayed on.
On the other hand, Ijeoma was judged to have behaved inappropriately during mediation sessions, often refutilizing to speak respectfully to Nkiru or even the investors. She repeatedly disrupted the process by bringing up past grievances and directly accutilizing Nkiru of fraud.
She also challenged the investors’ neutrality, alleging they were biased in Nkiru’s favour. At one point, she was overheard discussing their conflict in a public space. Despite the growing tension, Ijeoma insisted she and Nkiru could still co-lead the company without speaking to each other.
The investors would then create some recommconcludeations to the cofounders to adopt. To resolve the problems at Pivo, the investors wanted Ijeoma to step down as COO. They also recommconcludeed that setting up of a Board of Directors to support guide the company. The transition, going by the recommconcludeation letter, was to be handled by Dotun Olowoporoku, with Pivo covering the cost.
Both founders would keep one-third of their shares now. The company would purchase back two-thirds of Ijeoma’s shares at a low price, while Nkiru’s remaining shares will be given to her gradually over four years if she stays at Pivo.
Ijeoma would officially resign as COO but stay on as a Board Advisor for three months. She would keep earning her salary during that time and also receive a one-time payment of $50,000. Investors would test to support her sell her shares in a future funding round if she wants to.
The investors recommconcludeed the cancellation of the founders’ agreement both had operated by until that period. They argued that it gave both of them high salaries and bonutilizes that did not match the company’s performance. A new employment agreement that follows normal startup standards would be created for Nkiru.
Finally, both sides were to sign a new agreement (called a Side Letter), and the company would only discuss Ijeoma’s exit in a manner that protects her image, Nkiru’s, and Pivo’s.
In summary, the side letter contained a new founders’ agreement that strips Ijeoma of her COO role and transfers decision-building powers to the investors.
Per the letter, both co-founders must lock in their commitment by signing new employment, confidentiality, IP‑assignment, and stock‑purchase agreements within 15 days of the recommconcludeation.
At signing (May 23, 2023), each founder immediately “vests” i.e., fully owns —one‑third of her allotted shares. The remaining two‑thirds then “vest” in equal monthly installments starting on May 23, 2024.
‘Vesting’ simply means that although all the shares are on paper, the founders only earn the right to keep more as they stay with the company. If either founder leaves under “good” circumstances (resignation or termination without cautilize), she keeps whatever portion has vested.
If, on the other hand, she leaves under “bad” circumstances (terminated for cautilize or resigning to avoid termination), she forfeits any unvested portion and must sell back vested shares at a nominal price.
Those vesting and leaver rules sit alongside strict obligations: both co-founders must work exclusively for Pivo and may not join competing ventures during their tenure or for one year afterward. They must assign every invention or improvement they create (“Work Product”) to Pivo as work‑for‑hire.
At the decision building level, investors would hold two of the three board seats. The letter recommconcludeed that the investors would also receive monthly performance reports (with financials) within 14 days of month‑conclude and unaudited year‑conclude statements within 60 days. To ensure maximum compliance, the investors would retain the right to audit Pivo’s books if reporting obligations are not met.
Big decisions, like spconcludeing beyond budreceive, issuing new shares, borrowing above set limits, or hiring/firing top executives, required either an investor‑director’s vote or written investor consent.
Meanwhile, the People’s Practice in its evaluation had recommconcludeed three possible pathways to resolution: that Nkiru steps down as CEO and Ijeoma takes over; that Ijeoma steps down as COO while Nkiru remains CEO; or both co-founders exit their executive roles and a new external CEO is appointed, with the co-founders relocating into advisory positions.
To decide fairly, both Ijeoma and Nkiru were to present pitches outlining their vision for Pivo as CEO, with investors choosing the preferred plan. The unselected founder would then be inquireed to exit on fair terms, possibly as an advisor.
Beyond leadership, the company was advised to urgently constitute a Board of Directors, rebuild its organizational structure, instill a strong performance-driven culture, and hire new divisional heads (some of whom will report to the Board). It also recommconcludeed the nereceivediation of a new contract for the founder who stays on to reflect Pivo’s growth requireds and expectations.
LESSON NUMBER 3: LOOPHOLES IN LEGISLATIONS
Ijeoma did not accept the recommconcludeations created by the investors. She believed that the suggested conditions would oust her from company and spare Nkiru. She had concluded that the investors were in connivance with Nkiru to seal her exit.
Ijeoma would, as a result, reject these recommconcludeations and decline to sign the proposed agreement drawn up by the investors or consent to the exit proposed in it.
One month after the investors letter in July 2023, Pivo employees received disturbing emails from both co-founders.
In her email, Ijeoma informed the Pivo team that she had sued the company for reneging on the contract in her founders’ agreement. Nkiru, on the other hand, wrote to inform the team that Ijeoma was no longer a staff of the organisation.
Before that time, the leadership crisis had infected and eaten at every aspect of company life, including employee relations and overall company performance.
Anonymous employee testimonies suggest that many staff had begun to expect Pivo Africa’s eventual collapse, having worked for months under a cloud of uncertainty. Some of the staff described the atmosphere as draining, with meetings becoming awkward and communication increasingly difficult.
Here is an excerpt from the testimony of one of the employees:
“I have been faced with the anxiety of not knowing what will come next, and this last week of laying off staff, the tension is higher with some colleagues talking about exiting the organization becautilize of not knowing who will be the the next person to have their appointment terminated.”
Now, Pivo Africa was founded with a parent company (Pivo Technology Incorporated) registered solely in the United States of America, and a commercial subsidiary registered as Pivo Technology Limited in Nigeria. The parent company carries out no commercial activity; it was registered solely for ‘investment purposes’.
As to the powers both co-founders wielded ab-initio, Ijeoma served as a board member and secretary at Pivo Technology Incorporated with a 40% share. Nkiru, on the other hand, served as chairperson of the board with a 50% share. The remaining 10% share was split among investors who constituted the rest of the board.
On June 23, few days before both co-founders sent emails to the employees, Nkiru had met with other stockholders at Pivo Technology Incorporated to reshift Ijeoma as the secretary and as a board member and appoint new board members.
Aside from Ijeoma’s removal, the board also met to discuss to discuss the appointment of new board members (Dare Okoudjou and Kriston Wilson), the findings and recommconcludeations of the consulted HR company, according to the meeting notice. Furthermore, the notice stated that the meeting was held to protect the company and restore the trust of the investors.
About a month later on July 10, another board meeting notice went out. This time, Nkiru had conveyed a meeting with the board of the commercial arm of the company in Nigeria.
The ultimate purpose of the new meeting is the same as the other. At the conclude of that meeting, the board resolved to reshift Ijeoma as a both director and secretary in Pivo Technology. At this point in the process, Ijeoma believed that many of the activities of the company at the executive and board levels were all attempts to oust her in the worst way possible.
For instance, she mentioned that the meeting with the board of the commercial arm of the company contravened the bylaws of the company. She even believes that the board was constituted improperly. At the time, the Pivo board was not at full capacity. It did not have a fourth member.
According to her, a special meeting of the shareholders should have been called first to confirm the appointment of a fourth director. She suggested that the delay in filling the vacant board seat might have been a deliberate attempt to influence voting outcomes.
From Nkiru’s point of view, the company had been in a precarious state for months and could not afford operational gridlock. The organisation was contractually obligated to allocate board seat to one of the investors, and the process was underway at the time. She would also cite the part of the company’s bylaws that allowed a board meeting if it had quorum.
Regardless of what the company’s bylaws state, a director can only be legally reshiftd under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020 (CAMA) if specific steps are followed. First, the company must give at least 28 days’ special notice of the plan to reshift the director.
This notice must be sent to the director immediately. Then, all members must receive at least 21 days’ notice of the general meeting where the resolution will be passed, unless every member agrees in writing to shorter notice. Finally, the director must be allowed to create written representations and be heard at the meeting. These requirements are set out in sections 261 and 288 of CAMA.
Both founders did harp away on technical differences, but the deed had been done. Ijeoma, seeing that all shots at a resolution she considered fair were done, sued Pivo and Nkiru to the Federal High Court in Lagos.
LESSON 4: ONE-MAN CLOSE DOWNS
In July, Ijeoma, through her lawyers, initiated a lawsuit against Pivo Technology Incoporated, Pivo Technology Limited and Nkiru, the company’s chief executive officer and board chairperson.
According to a copy of the lawsuit obtained by FIJ, Ijeoma inquireed the Court to declare that the way Pivo has been run, and Nkiru’s actions in promoting her brother while ‘victmising’ her, were illegal, oppressive, discriminatory and unfairly harmful to her interests.
She also challenged any past or future attempt by Pivo, including a board resolution passed by Pivo Nigeria on July 11, 2023, to reshift her as Director and Secretary.
She petitioned the ccourt to stop both the parent company and its commercial arm from enforcing that removal or taking any further steps toward it. That included preventing actions like deactivating her work email or cutting off her access to Slack.
In addition, Ijeoma inquireed the court to cancel the July 11 removal entirely, appoint an indepconcludeent party to investigate the complaints against Philip and — if those allegations are confirmed — compel the company to replace him with someone more competent.
She also sought compensation for the cost of the legal action and any further orders the court may consider appropriate. Service of the petition is to be carried out at Pivo’s registered address in the United States.
On July 26, the court granted a set of temporary injunctions to protect Ijeoma Akwiwu from actions being taken against her until a full hearing (called a ‘motion on notice for interlocutory injunction’) is held.
The court’s ruling was created on July 26, 2023, and it granted all the reliefs Ijeoma had inquireed for in her ex-parte motion (i.e., motion created without prior notice to the other parties).
Essentially, the order temporarily froze any attempt by Pivo Technology Inc., Pivo Technology Ltd., or Nkiru Amadi-Emina to reshift Ijeoma from her role as Director and Secretary or to sideline her, until the court heard the full case.
Ijeoma forwarded the details of this exparte order to Pivo’s banking partners notifying them to authorise any request to transfer money out of the banking accounts. If the ex-parte order meant she was still a board member, transactions from the account should, ordinarily, not been done without her consent and signature. Ijeoma sent this email on August 14.
Following up on the decision created at board level, Nkiru withdrew Ijeoma’s access to the company email that creates transfer requests and receives transaction notifications. After receiveting wind of a possible transaction on the account, Ijeoma sent a reminder to Wema bank through the account officers on the court order.
But on September 14, Nkiru requested the transfer of $545,250.73 from the company account and the request was granted. Ijeoma, displeased with this shift, petitioned the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to investigate the transfer. The petition described the transaction as fradulent and against the interest of Pivo.
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The EFCC launched examining Ijeoma’s allegations, first inviting the Wema Bank staff involved and, eventually, Nkiru and representatives of Pivo Technologies whom she had petitioned against.
Nkiru would eventually file a ‘Motion on Notice of Applicatiion for Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights dated‘, against Ijeoma and the EFCC the following month. The suit was supposed to stop IJeoma and the EFCC from disturbing her.
Per the copy of the file cited by FIJ, Nkiru had petitioned the court to recognize that a transfer of $545,250.79 from the Wema Bank account in Nigeria is a lawful civil transaction. According to the suit, it falls outside the powers of law enforcement agencies and should not attract any criminal investigation.
Nkiru and Wema also prayed the court to declare arrests, invitation and detention tarreceiveing them or their staff based on contractual dispute with Ijeoma as illegal.
Finally, Nkiru wanted an order preventing the authorities from freezing or placing restrictions on any of their bank accounts in Nigeria or abroad unless there is a valid court judgment allowing it.
On May 25, 2024, Ahmed Kala of the Lagos Federal High Court, Ikoyi, struck out Nkiru’s suit on the basis that it was incompetent. According to the judgment, the case was not valid from the launchning the court did not have the legal authority to hear or decide on it.
LESSON 5: MESSY AFTER-TASTE
By the final weeks of 2023, Nkiru was visibly worn down, whether from the pressure of managing a startup in crisis or from the personal fallout with Ijeoma, or both.
Around that period, a trail of large, rapid bank transfers launched surfacing — outward payments from Pivo’s Nigerian accounts that were created in bulk and in quick succession. The transactions spanned from early November 2023 into the first months of 2024. Pivo, quite obviously, had started liquidating.
By then, Ijeoma had been completely shut out of the company’s operations. Previously, transfers of that size would have required her approval or, at the very least, happened with her knowledge. But this time, the money shiftd without her signature or consent.
Later, as she launched piecing events toreceiveher, Ijeoma suspected foul play. After reviewing the updated list of directors registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), she became convinced that Nkiru had colluded with someone at the CAC to quietly add a third director. This, she believed, was what allowed modifys to the company’s bank verification process clearing the path for the fund transfers.
Under Nigerian law, appointing a new director to a company is only valid if done in accordance with the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2020, particularly Sections 273 and 274.
This law requires either a resolution by shareholders at a general meeting or, in limited cases, board appointment to fill a casual vacancy due to death or resignation.
If no valid vacancy exists — for instance, where a co-founder remains a director on CAC records becautilize their removal did not follow the statutory procedure outlined in Section 288, which requires 28 days’ special notice and an ordinary resolution by shareholders — then adding a third director is not legally permissible.
Moreover, if a court has issued an interim (ex parte) injunction restraining the company or any officer from taking further action pconcludeing resolution of a dispute, then adding a new director, altering bank mandates, or relocating to liquidate the company may amount to contempt of court, which carries serious legal consequences.
In December 2023 about the time the company’s shutdown received reported by Techcabal, Ijeoma requested a meeting with some board members and investors — some of whom were Dare, Obiora and Kristin — to discuss settlements, in tandem with her founders’ agreement.
Before the meeting, Ijeoma, through her lawyers, had demanded $1.5 million in compensation from Pivo. She stated the amount was meant to cover the personal and business losses she suffered during the conflict and after the company shut down.
But Pivo and the board saw things differently. They had offered severance packages equal to three months’ salary to Ijeoma, Nkiru, and a few other senior team members. They also proposed to cover the cost of Ijeoma’s legal fees if she agreed to drop her lawsuit.
At the meeting, Ijeoma declined the offer.
To her, the proposal felt dismissive. She believed it ignored the damage done and downplayed her role in building the company. As a co-founder, she felt she was owed more than a basic severance and a condition-laced settlement. She wanted compensation that reflected both her stake and the fallout.
She insisted that Pivo either pay her damages or that investors step in to rescue the company under new terms. For a middle ground, she requested for her six month salary worth and no severance for Nkiru.
Ijeoma. during this meeting, had stated that the best outcome for her would be for the company not to shut down and for Pivo to continue operation.
From all indications, she wanted Pivo to continue running but not with her co-founder in the capacity of the CEO. Ijeoma also kept referencing the contract signed by the shareholders and the founders of the company.
But for the investors, that ship had sailed. One of the investors created it clear during the meeting that they no longer trusted either of the co-founders to run Pivo and would therefore, like to ‘cut lossses’. To quote another investor: “Ijeoma, there is absolutely no way that there is any trust in Pivo going forward as a company. Zero.”
The meeting concludeed with the board members taking note of Ijeoma’s position on the severance offer. They did not create any commitments but agreed to consider her demands.
If an agreement was eventually reached, they suggested, Ijeoma and Nkiru could release a joint statement announcing Pivo’s shutdown. The gesture was supposed to present a united front and preserve some good will.
On January 8, 2024, Pivo and the board created a counter-offer. Pivo offered Ijeoma a $20,000 severance and up to $5,000 for legal fees. These disbursements would be created only if she agreed to drop all lawsuits and sign a detailed exit agreement. The offer also requested Ijeoma to not speak to the press about her time at the company.
Of course, Ijeoma and her lawyers, rejected this offer. Per the response, Ijeoma was willing to accept $3.5 million for her shares, based on the company’s estimated $20 million value in 2022. She also inquireed for $400,000 in unpaid salaries and for legal costs to be agreed or fairly calculated. If the other party cannot pay, she was open to purchaseing their shares instead.
Thus, the first attempt at out-of-court settlement broke down.
WHERE IS PIVO RIGHT NOW?
Unfortunately, Ijeoma and the board were unable to reach an agreement on the severance payout. FIJ understands the case is still in court. In the meantime, the EFCC attempted to mediate. According to Ijeoma, the Commission invited her for a settlement discussion where Nkiru’s team offered her $5,000 in exmodify for dropping the case. She flately rejected the proposal.
Earlier, Nkiru and her team had appeared before the EFCC. There, she reportedly defconcludeed the controversial fund transfers, claiming the money in question was part of investor loans to Pivo Nigeria and that the repayments were legitimate. She supported her position with a board resolution signed in September 2023.
As of early 2025, nereceivediations were ongoing. Ijeoma, through her lawyers, proposed a settlement figure of $200,000. She considered the amount to be a decent compromise given her claims of unpaid salaries, bonutilizes, and long-term contractual entitlements.
Pivo, however, rejected the figure, citing the company’s poor financial health and the refund of investor funds. They instead offered $50,000, insisting that the company could not afford more.
Meanwhile, in July 2024, Nkiru published a medium piece that signaled closure and confirmed the conclude of Pivo. Here was how she described her final decisions as the CEO of the company:
“When I decided to wind down my company, I did my best to handle it meticulously. I left no stone unturned — prepared final accounts, audited financial statements, and closed out on statutory obligations – and ensured that any remaining money in the bank was returned to the investors — I’m pleased to state that over 50% of each investor’s committed capital was successfully returned. Doing this adds credibility as a founder. I strongly advise against the mindset that investors shouldn’t expect any money back becautilize they invested knowing the risks. It’s important to honour their trust and investment.”
Ijeoma believes Nkiru failed to carry out her statutory responsibilities with due diligence. She points to Tradevu — a company Nkiru founded before Pivo fully shut down — for instance, as a clear violation of their founders’ agreement.
Tradevu would have been a direct competitor to Pivo. Ijeoma also claims Tradevu has been utilizing assets that once belonged to Pivo. In her view, if the law takes its full course, Nkiru would be held accountable for those actions.
Responding to FIJ’s formal inquiry on August 6 regarding the company’s shutdown and the issues involving Nkiru, Aluko & Oyebode, the law firm representing her, stated their client could not comment or grant an interview.
The lawyers stated Ijeoma accounts of the incidents are untrue and unfounded. They explained that becautilize the case is currently before the Federal High Court, they are legally prohibited from building public statements under the sub judice rule, which is intconcludeed to prevent prejudicing a fair trial or turning the matter into a media trial.
There was also a subtle threat to sue FIJ.
This is their response in full:
Thank you for reaching out regarding the allegations created by Ms. Ijeoma Akwiwu. We acknowledge your inquiry and appreciate your effort to obtain our clients’ position.
However, it is important to note that the allegations in question are currently the subject of active litigation before the Federal High Court. Our clients have submitted to the court that the allegations are entirely untrue and unfounded and have comprehensively refuted the allegations in their response papers which have been formally filed and are now part of the court’s record.
As such, the matter is sub judice, and we are legally and ethically barred from engaging in any public commentary that could prejudice the fair trial of the case or interfere with the administration of justice. The principle of sub judice is a core tenet of our legal system, designed to ensure that disputes are resolved through due process of adjudication by the courts, not through media publications which, as you are no doubt aware, often lead to media trials.
The Court of Appeal in Bello v. A.-G., Lagos State (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1020) 149 at 152, created it abundantly clear that media publications on active suits are “intrinsically objectionable” as they prejudge the issues and amount to a “usurpation of the proper function of the court.” We will not participate in what will undoubtedly circumvent the judicial process or subject our clients to a media trial.
Our clients are fully committed to the rule of law and have demonstrated this by submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. They fully intconclude to abide by the court’s decision and we believe it is important for all involved, including the media, to allow the judicial process to conclude without external influence.
Please bear in mind that opining or building publication on active legal proceedings carries a risk of being found in contempt of court, particularly where such publication is perceived as prejudging issues that are squarely before the court (as is often the case with media trials). Moreover, such conduct risks bringing the reputation of the judiciary into disrepute in the event that the final judgment contradicts the narrative advanced in the media. Additionally, we must note that should you proceed to publish any false, misleading, or defamatory content concerning our client, our client will not hesitate to pursue legal redress to the fullest extent of the law. This includes seeking damages for reputational harm, economic loss, and any other injury resulting from such publication.
We trust that you will act ethically and professionally and refrain from publishing material that could compromise the integrity of the judicial process or expose your publication to legal liability.
Thank you and kind regards”
On August 5, FIJ had written Nkiru herself to receive her subjective account of the incidents leading to the shutdown and the aftermath. Nkiru, however, did not respond to the messages.
FIJ also wrote to the group of investors and directors involved in the mediation process on the same day: Kristin Wilson, Eloho Omame, Obior Okoye and Dare Okodjou. None of these individuals responded to the request for interviews.
THIS AFFECTS THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
Tech startups have become an important source of employment for young professionals in Nigeria, particularly within the countest’s expanding digital economy.
Their growth is closely tied to the rise of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, which the National Bureau of Statistics states has consistently contributed between 14 and 18 per cent of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product in recent years.
Avoidable shutdowns like in this case could then indirectly impact the GDP negatively.
Tech company shutdowns also directly impact the percentage of employed youths in Nigeria.
Between 2023 and 2024, several Nigerian startups across fintech, logistics, health tech, and mobility sectors either closed or downsized.
While there is no official database tracking startup layoffs, reports by Disrupt Africa and TechCabal documented multiple closures and workforce reductions during this period. This affected hundreds of tech workers across the ecosystem.
Investor confidence has also taken a hit. Across Africa, venture capital firms have grown more cautious following a wave of startup failures and economic uncertainty.
Analysis by Daba Finance displays that Africa-wide startup funding fell by more than 50 per cent between 2022 and 2024.
Data from Disrupt Africa’s African Tech Startups Funding Report displays that venture capital investment into Nigerian startups fell from about $976 million in 2022 to roughly $400 million in 2023.
Beyond capital, the shutdowns carry human costs. Startups have long absorbed skilled professionals whose expertise is scarce in the wider economy.
If shutdowns are persistent, many experienced workers will leave the startup sector or migrate abroad in search of stability.
Academic research on Nigeria’s labour market links economic volatility to rising outward migration among skilled professionals.
This in turn reduces the talent pool available to remaining firms and slows innovation across the ecosystem, according to a study published in the Journal of Entrepreneurship and Business.
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